Dynamical systems and embedded cognition

Randall D. Beer

6.1 Introduction

The conceptual frameworks that we bring to our study of cognition can have a tremendous impact on the nature of that study. They provide a set of filters through which we view the world, influencing our choice of phenomena to study, the language in which we describe these phenomena, the questions we ask about them, and our interpretations of the answers we receive. For much of the last fifty years, thinking about thinking has been dominated by the computational framework, the idea that systems are intelligent to the extent that they can encode knowledge in symbolic representations which are then algorithmically manipulated so as to produce solutions to the problems that these systems encounter (see Chapter 4 of this volume). More recently, the connectionist framework forced an important refinement of the computational framework, in which representation and computation could be distributed across a large number of loosely neuron-like units (see Chapter 5).

Beginning around the mid 1980s, just as the popularity of connectionism was rising, another conceptual framework appeared (or, as in the case of connectionism, reappeared) on the scene. This framework, which, for want of a catchier label, I will call the situated, embodied, dynamical (SED) framework, focuses on concrete action and emphasizes the way in which an agent’s behavior arises from the dynamical interaction between its brain, its body, and its environment. In this chapter, I will attempt to trace some of the history of the individual intellectual threads of situated activity, embodiment, and dynamics that underlie the SED approach. I will particularly focus on the years 1985–1995. Although there were important precursors to the SED approach (some of which I will briefly mention), and work in this area has grown rapidly in recent years, many of the pivotal ideas were first given their modern form during this ten-year period.

6.2 Situated activity

The first intellectual thread making up the SED approach is situated activity. Roughly speaking, situated activity stresses three ideas that have been traditionally neglected in AI and cognitive science.
S1 Concrete action. Actually taking action in the world is more fundamental than the abstract descriptions that we sometimes make of it. While conscious deliberation clearly has its role, the ultimate job of an intelligent agent is to do something, to take some concrete action with consequences beyond its own skull.

S2 Situatedness. An agent’s immediate environment plays a central role in its behavior. This environment is not only a rich source of constraints and opportunities for the agent, but also a context that gives meaning to the agent’s actions.

S3 Interactionism. An agent’s relationship with its environment is one of ongoing interaction. The environment does not serve merely as a source of isolated problems for the agent to solve, but rather a partner with which the agent is fully engaged in moment-to-moment improvisation.

The philosophical roots of situated activity can be traced to phenomenology, especially the work of Martin Heidegger (1927/1962), which was brought into AI and cognitive science primarily through the criticisms of Hubert Dreyfus (1972/1992). One of Heidegger’s key insights was the distinction he drew between objects being zuhanden (“ready-to-hand”) and vorhanden (“present-at-hand”). In our normal daily experience, we usually encounter things as resources for immediate action in the service of achieving our goals. For example, to someone in the act of hammering a nail, the hammer in some sense ceases to exist. Rather, like any tool, it becomes merely an extension of the arm (i.e., it is ready-to-hand). It is only when we explicitly adopt an intellectual attitude toward the hammer (e.g., because the handle has broken and the hammer is suddenly unable to perform its normal function), that the hammer emerges from the unarticulated background of things as a distinct object characterized by its own set of properties (i.e., it becomes present-at-hand). A number of authors have carefully articulated the challenges that phenomenological ideas pose to the cognitivist worldview that has dominated thinking in AI and cognitive science, which not only conceives of cognition as the rule-governed manipulation of symbolic representations, but also makes fundamental distinctions between the physical and the mental, between the body and the mind and between the environment and the agent (Dreyfus 1972/1992; Winograd and Flores 1986; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991; Clark 1997; Wheeler 2005).

Another important precursor to situated activity was James Gibson’s Ecological Psychology (Gibson 1979). Based on his studies of vision in World War II pilots, Gibson emphasized the structure inherent in an organism’s environment and the importance of the organism/environment relation to a theory of perception. For example, the way in which an animal’s visual field changes as it moves through its environment carries a great deal of information about the direction and speed of motion, distances to objects, orientations of surfaces,
and so on. Gibson’s views eventually encompassed a wide-ranging rejection of cognitivism. However, for our purposes here, Gibson’s most important contribution is his notion of affordances – the possibilities for action that an environment presents to an agent. For example, Heidegger’s hammer affords pounding nails due to the grasping ability of its handle and the shape and hardness of its head. Furthermore, Gibson argued that, although affordances are perceivable facts about the world, they are ecological in the sense that their significance is relative to the capabilities of a particular organism. For example, an opening that affords passability to a mouse does not necessarily afford passability to a human being.

A third important influence on situated activity came from work in the social sciences. For example, Lucy Suchman, an anthropologist studying man–machine interaction, traced breakdowns in communication between a person and a help system for a photocopy machine to mistaken assumptions made by the designers of the system about the nature of action (Suchman 1987). She rejected the traditional view in AI and cognitive science that action results from the execution of a plan, and argued instead that action must be understood as situated, in the sense that it is contingent upon the actual circumstances as they unfold. On this view, explicit plans are best interpreted as resources for communicating about action rather than as mechanisms for action. Based on his studies of the navigation team of a large naval vessel, another anthropologist, Edwin Hutchins, similarly concluded that cognition “in the wild” must often be understood as a culturally constituted activity among a group of individuals depending heavily on the unfolding situation in which it occurs (Hutchins 1995).

Within AI, situated ideas came to the fore in the mid 1980s. Earlier demonstrations of how rich behavior could arise from simple mechanisms interacting with complex environments include W. Grey Walter’s robotic “tortoises” (Walter 1953) and Valentino Braitenburg’s simple “vehicles” (Braitenburg 1984). However, situated activity research within AI arose mainly as a reaction against the traditional planning view of action, in which agents represent the current situation and available actions, formulate a symbolic plan of action, and then execute this plan. Philip Agre and David Chapman stressed the inability of classical planning techniques to scale to complex, uncertain, real-time environments and proposed instead that routine activity arises from the interaction of simple internal machinery with the immediate situation (Agre and Chapman 1987). Agre and Chapman demonstrated the utility of this idea in a series of programs, the best-known of which was Pengi, an agent that played the video arcade game Pengo in real time despite having to deal with hundreds of often unpredictable objects. Stanley Rosenschein and Leslie Kaelbling showed how a specification of an agent’s goals could be “compiled away” into simple machinery such that, although it still made sense for an external observer to talk about the agent’s knowledge and beliefs, these
states no longer played any direct role in the agent’s actions (Rosenschein and Kaelbling 1986). Rodney Brooks’ influential work on autonomous robots rejected the traditional sense-model-plan-act cycle, emphasizing that often “the world is its own best model” (Brooks 1986, 1991a; see also Chapter 13 of this volume). He developed a layered control system known as the subsumption architecture, in which networks of simple machines interact with one another and the immediate circumstances to produce behavior, and deployed it on a variety of different robots. David Cliff (Cliff 1991) and I (Beer 1990) demonstrated the significant potential for interaction between work on the neural basis of animal behavior and situated agents, developing models of a hoverfly and a cockroach, respectively.

Presumably, no one would deny that the environmental situation has an important role to play in an agent’s behavior, but just how fundamental this observation is remains controversial (Kirsch 1991; Vera and Simon 1993; Hayes, Ford, and Agnew 1994; Clancey 1997; Anderson 2003). To some, situated activity smacks of behaviorism, but this charge depends a great deal on what exactly one means by “behaviorism.” It is certainly true that work in situated activity exhibits a renewed emphasis on concrete behavior over abstract reasoning. However, abstract reasoning is not rejected by situated approaches, but rather relegated to a supporting role as an evolutionarily recent elaboration of a more basic capacity for getting around in the world. It is also true that much work in situated activity has tended to emphasize reactive architectures, in which an agent’s actions are completely determined by its sensations, and to either reject or at least significantly reconstrue the idea of internal representations. Reactive architectures are strongly reminiscent of the stimulus–response paradigm embraced by behaviorism, and have well-known limitations when it comes to, for example, anticipatory behavior. However, as we shall see later in this chapter, a commitment to purely reactive architectures is unnecessary, and it is possible to articulate a role for internal state that is both essential and interestingly different from the representational role that such state plays in traditional AI and cognitive science.

Perhaps the most controversial idea that has emerged from research on situated cognition in recent years is the notion of the extended mind (Clark 1997; Clark and Chalmers 1998). This idea is grounded in the observation that not only does an agent’s environment play an essential role in its behavior, but the agent itself can manipulate that role by actively organizing its environment so as to increase its problem-solving ability. For example, we lay out the ingredients for a recipe in the order in which they will be needed, and we use maps to find our way through sprawling cities. Such scaffolding allows us to offload significant parts of our cognitive processing into the environment. Furthermore, through language, we can coordinate the activities of many people so that they can collectively accomplish things that no individual person may be able to, such as navigating a large naval vessel (Hutchins
Extended mind advocates argue that if memory, problem solving, and so on can be spread across many agents and artifacts, then cognition itself must be understood as a distributed phenomenon that transcends the skull of an individual agent, and properly belongs only to the larger system of agents and artifacts of which that individual is a part. Indeed, even social insects are known to collectively accomplish complex construction tasks such as nest-building by modifying their environment in such a way as to appropriately organize the flow of workers and material, a process referred to as *stigmergy* (Turner 2000).

6.3 Embodiment

A second intellectual thread in the SED approach is *embodiment*. There are at least three somewhat distinct ideas that have been advanced by advocates of embodied cognitive science.

**E1 Physical embodiment.** The uniquely physical aspects of an agent’s body are crucial to its behavior, including its material properties, the capabilities for action provided by the layout and characteristics of its degrees of freedom and effectors, the unique perspective provided by the particular layout and characteristics of its sensors, and the modes of sensorimotor interaction that the sensors and effectors collectively support. In some ways, this aspect of embodiment is a special case of situatedness. Whereas situatedness includes any kind of interaction with the environment, embodiment emphasizes those specifically physical interactions mediated by the body.

**E2 Biological embodiment.** Not only are the physical characteristics of bodies important, but the specifically biological facts of an organism’s existence must also be taken into account, including the relevant neuroscience, physiology, development, and evolution.

**E3 Conceptual embodiment.** Even when engaged in pure ratiocination, our most abstract concepts are still ultimately grounded in our bodily experiences and body-oriented metaphors.

The philosophical roots of embodiment can also be traced to phenomenology, especially the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962), who made bodily involvement in the world central to his phenomenology of lived experience. To take but one example, Merleau-Ponty’s argument that how we perceive an object is shaped by the kinds of interactions with it that our body allows can be seen as an early precursor to Gibson’s (1979) notion of affordances. Merleau-Ponty’s thought also played a major role in Dreyfus’ critique of computational theories of mind (Dreyfus 1972/1992).

Within AI and cognitive science, the importance of physical embodiment was first emphasized by Brooks (1991b). Brooks argued that AI needed to move beyond the abstract microworlds that had been its primary concern and
begin to address the sorts of problems encountered by real robots moving around in real environments. In this way, Brooks suggested, the extent to which most classical AI techniques are simply untenable in realistic situations would become clear. In its milder form, the argument of physical embodiment is simply that the material properties of the body and environment play a key role in its behavior and, by building robots, we get this physics “for free” rather than having to painstakingly model it. In its most radical form, the claim is that only physically instantiated AI systems will exhibit truly intelligent behavior. Coupled with the contemporaneous trends in situated cognition reviewed in the previous section, Brooks’ arguments unleashed an explosion of work in behavior-based robotics (Arkin 1998), active perception (Ballard 1991; Churchland, Ramachandran, and Sejnowski 1994; Noë 2004), embodied cognitive science (Pfeifer and Scheier 1999), autonomous agents (Maes 1990), some aspects of artificial life (Langton 1989), and the philosophy of mind (Clark 1997).

Biological embodiment takes the arguments of physical embodiment one step further. Not only are the physical characteristics of bodies important, but so are the biological facts of an organism’s existence. The conditions necessary to maintain our living state fundamentally constrain our behavioral and cognitive capacities. In addition, the specific properties of bone, muscle, and skin, the specific characteristics of biological sensors, and the ways these sensory and motor capabilities are knitted together in human bodies fundamentally define our own particular mode of embodiment. Furthermore, the fact that we have gone through the particular evolutionary and developmental history that we have may also have important consequences for our behavioral and cognitive architecture. For example, Esther Thelen and Linda Smith have argued for the importance of understanding the sensorimotor origins of cognition in development, both in studies of the development of walking in infants (Thelen and Smith 1994) and, more recently, in studies of Jean Piaget’s classic A-not-B error, in which an infant repeatedly shown an object being hidden under box A will still reach for A even after being shown the object being hidden under a second box B (Thelen et al. 2001). A similar argument can be made for the emergence in evolution of uniquely human cognitive capacities from simpler precursors. Finally, there has been a very strong push toward incorporating more neurobiological realism into embodied agents (Arbib 1987; Beer 1990; Edelman et al. 1992). Conversely, neuroscience has begun to take seriously the role of the body and of neuromechanical interactions in the production of behavior (Chiel and Beer 1997).

Thus, the conventional claim of biological embodiment is that the biological features of organisms matter to their behavior and cognition. A more radical claim that is sometimes associated with biological embodiment is that the living state itself is fundamental to cognition (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela et al. 1991; Di Paolo 2005). The idea here is generally not that the
material or biochemistry of life is essential, but rather that the organization of living systems is indispensable to their cognitive capabilities. The relevant notion of living organization is generally derived from Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s concept of autopoiesis (roughly, a self-producing network of components and processes, i.e., a kind of organizational homeostasis) (Maturana and Varela 1980).

Finally, conceptual embodiment concerns the way in which even abstract concepts are often grounded in bodily experience and metaphor. For example, Stevan Harnad defined the symbol grounding problem as the problem of how words, and ultimately mental states, get their meaning (Harnad 1990), and he proposed that a way to address this problem is to ground them in sensorimotor signals. Furthermore, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have argued that the structure of our reason is grounded in the details of our embodiment, and that many abstract concepts are metaphors derived from sensorimotor domains (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). For example, we speak of understanding something as “grasping” it and we speak of failing to understand something as a failure to “grasp” it or it “going over our heads.” Likewise, bad things “stink” and the “pieces” of a theory “fit” together.

6.4 Dynamics

The final intellectual thread constituting the SED approach is dynamics, within which we must distinguish at least three ideas.

D1 Dynamical systems theory (DST). A mathematical theory that can be applied to any system characterized by a state that changes over time in some systematic way.

D2 The dynamical framework. A collection of concepts, intuitions, and metaphors involved in taking a dynamical perspective on some system of interest.

D3 The dynamical hypothesis. A specific hypothesis, put forward by Timothy van Gelder (1998), for how DST and the dynamical framework could be combined into a rigorous counterproposal to the traditional computational hypothesis in AI and cognitive science.

A dynamical system is a mathematical abstraction that unambiguously describes how the state of some system evolves over time (Abraham and Shaw 1992; Strogatz 1994). It consists of a state space $S$, an ordered time set $T$, and an evolution operator $\phi$ that transforms a state at one time to another state at some other time. A dynamical system whose evolution depends on its internal state only is called autonomous, while one whose evolution also depends on external inputs is called nonautonomous. $S$ can be numerical or symbolic, continuous or discrete (or a hybrid of the two), and of any topology and dimension (including infinite dimensional). $T$ is typically either the set
of integers or the set of real numbers. The evolution operator may be given explicitly or defined implicitly, and it may be deterministic or stochastic.

The most common examples of dynamical systems are sets of ordinary differential equations and iterated maps, but many other kinds of mathematical systems can also be fruitfully described and analyzed in dynamical terms. For any mathematical system that can be put into this form, DST offers a wide variety of tools for analyzing its temporal behavior, many of which were first developed by the French mathematician Henri Poincaré in support of his work in celestial mechanics. These tools include the identification of invariant sets (sets of points in the state space that the evolution operator does not change, i.e., fixed points and limit cycles), the characterization of their local behavior (how they respond to perturbations, i.e., their stability) and their global behavior (how they are interconnected, i.e., their saddle manifolds), and their dependence on parameters (how they change as parameters are changed, i.e., their bifurcations). It is important to reiterate that, just like the formal theory of computation, DST is a body of mathematics, and not itself a scientific theory of the natural world.

Despite the fact that DST is not itself a scientific theory, taking a dynamical perspective on some natural phenomenon brings with it a set of concepts, intuitions, and metaphors – a certain worldview – that influences the questions we ask, the analyses we perform, and how we interpret the results (van Gelder 1995). When one approaches some system from a computational perspective, one is concerned with what function the system is trying to compute, in what format the problem input is specified, in what output format the answer is required, how the relevant features of the problem are to be represented, by what algorithms these representations are to be transformed, and how the performance of these algorithms scales with problem size. In contrast, when one approaches some system from a dynamical perspective, one seeks to identify a minimal set of state variables whose evolution can account for the observed behavior, the dynamical laws by which the values of these variables evolve in time, the overall spatiotemporal structure of their possible evolution, and the sensitivity of this structure to variations in inputs, states, and parameters.

The dynamical perspective has been found to be a fruitful one in many areas of cognitive science (Port and van Gelder 1995; Beer 2000). A dynamical perspective on brain and behavior was first explicitly articulated by W. Ross Ashby (Ashby 1960). Within neural networks, Stephen Grossberg has long emphasized the importance of dynamical ideas (Grossberg 1969). Indeed, DST is now an essential tool in computational neuroscience (Izhikevich 2007) for analyzing, not just individual nerve cells or small circuits, but also entire brain systems (Skarda and Freeman 1987). Dynamical ideas were first brought into ecological psychology by Peter Kugler (Kugler, Kelso, and Turvey 1980; for reviews see Turvey 1990 and Warren 2006). Scott Kelso and colleagues
have pursued a dynamical perspective on brain and behavior for many years, especially emphasizing the role of self-organization in the creation of behavioral patterns and the transitions between them (Kelso 1995). Thelen and Smith have argued for a dynamical approach to cognitive development, in which processes and change are studied using the same tools across a range of timescales (Thelen and Smith 1994). Jeffrey Elman emphasized the fundamentally temporal character of language understanding, with preceding words strongly influencing the interpretation of subsequent ones, and has developed a dynamical approach to language (Elman 1995). Finally, I argued that dynamical systems theory provides the appropriate theoretical language and tools for analyzing the kinds of autonomous agents that were being developed in AI and robotics (Beer 1995a), and Timothy Smithers (1995) and Gregor Schöner (Schöner, Dose, and Engels 1995) advocated a dynamical approach to the design of autonomous robots.

A specific formulation that has received a great deal of attention is the dynamical hypothesis put forward by van Gelder (van Gelder 1995; 1998). Van Gelder defines a dynamical system as a quantitative system, that is, a system whose state space, time set, and evolution law involve numerical quantities. As we saw above, this is a significant restriction of the mathematical definition of a dynamical system. His dynamical hypothesis then has two components: (1) the nature hypothesis and (2) the knowledge hypothesis. The claim of the nature hypothesis is ontological: Cognitive systems are dynamical systems. In contrast, the knowledge hypothesis claims only that cognitive systems are best understood using the tools of dynamical systems theory. Given that even many advocates of the dynamical approach do not fully support van Gelder’s dynamical hypothesis, it is unfortunate that most critical discussion of the dynamical approach to cognition has focused on van Gelder’s specific formulation (Eliasmith 1997; Grush 1997; Bechtel 1998; Van Leeuwen 2005). Nevertheless, it is an historically important attempt to formulate a dynamical alternative to the computational hypothesis.

6.5 Toward an integrated perspective

To this point, I have treated situatedness, embodiment, and dynamics as relatively separate intellectual threads. I did this both because the historical development of these ideas occurred somewhat independently and because they are logically independent – that is, people can and do hold each of them individually without necessarily also subscribing to the others. However, it will not have escaped the careful reader’s attention that there is a great deal of potential overlap and synergism between them. The goal of this section is to articulate an integrated theoretical framework that combines the insights from situatedness, embodiment, and dynamics. In contrast to previous sections, I will also adopt a more personal viewpoint in this section, describing my own
particular integrative view (Beer 1995a; 1995b; 2003) rather than attempting a general survey of all such views.

The basic situated, embodied, dynamical (SED) framework is quite simple and is illustrated in Figure 6.1. It consists of the following three postulates:

SED1 *Brains, bodies, and environments are dynamical systems* (cf. S2, E1, E2, D1, D2). Nervous systems, bodies, and environments are all conceptualized as dynamical systems, by which I mean only that we assume that each can be characterized by a set of states whose temporal evolution is governed by dynamical laws.

SED2 *Brain, body, and environment dynamics are coupled* (cf. S1, S3, D1, D2). Nervous systems are embodied in bodies, which are in turn situated within environments, leading to dense interaction between these three component systems. The coupled brain–body subsystem will be termed the “agent.” Coupling that flows from the environment to the agent will be termed “sensory,” and coupling that flows in the opposite direction will be termed “motor.” The “behavior” of an agent will be defined as its trajectory of motor actions.

SED3 *The agent is subject to viability constraints* (cf. E2). There are conditions on the dynamics of the agent that determine its viability. If these viability constraints are violated, then the agent ceases to exist as an independent entity and can no longer engage in behavioral interactions with its environment. (We will not consider this postulate further here; for discussion of its role in the SED framework, see Beer 2004.)

The a priori theoretical commitments of this framework are quite minimal. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a theoretical framework that makes fewer
commitments than this. What could possibly follow from such a small set of claims? In fact, quite a number of nontrivial consequences follow almost immediately if we take these three postulates seriously.

Perhaps the most important conclusion is this: Strictly speaking, behavior is a property of the entire coupled brain–body–environment system, and cannot in general be properly attributed to any one subsystem in isolation from the others. We have defined behavior to be only the trajectory of an agent’s motor actions. However, because the brain, body, and environment dynamics are coupled, they form a single larger autonomous dynamical system with its own trajectories of temporal evolution. The trajectories of an agent’s motor actions are merely projections of the full trajectories of the complete brain–body–environment system, and it is these full trajectories that are the proper objects of study within the SED framework.

Even though behavior is a property of the entire coupled system, it is still meaningful to ask about the relative contributions of brain, body, and environment to some particular feature of a behavioral trajectory. In order to do so, we must open the coupled brain–body–environment system by cutting one or more of the coupling pathways in order to isolate the component we wish to study. This component then becomes a nonautonomous dynamical system, and our analysis involves examining how its own intrinsic dynamics interacts with the inputs it receives from the other components of the coupled system in the production of the behavioral feature of interest. This has many interesting consequences for the way we conceive of traditional behavioral and cognitive phenomena.

For example, perception is generally viewed as a means by which an agent extracts information about its surroundings from the raw sensory signals it receives and internally represents the structure of its environment. But a dynamical system follows a trajectory specified by its own internal state and dynamical laws. Sensory inputs cannot in general place a nonautonomous dynamical system into some state uniquely characteristic of a given external object. Rather, the most that they can do is bias the intrinsic tendencies of the agent dynamics by selecting some particular trajectory from the set of possible trajectories that the agent’s dynamical laws allow from its current state. This suggests a more behavior-oriented view of perception that is reminiscent of Gibson (1979). On this view, perception is a process whereby agent dynamics that are appropriately sensitive to environmental influences become perturbed by the trajectory of sensory inputs that the system receives and transforms into behavior appropriate to the circumstances. Furthermore, because the coupling between an agent and its environment is two-way, an agent’s action can shape its own perception. Agents not only perceive in order to act, but they also act in order to perceive.

Because agents in the SED framework are dynamical, they are not vulnerable to the criticisms that have been leveled against reactive agents. A reactive
agent is one whose motor outputs depend only on its sensory inputs; it is merely a function from sensation to action. Although such an agent can participate in complex interactions when coupled to a dynamic environment, its behavior is always subordinated to that environment since it possesses no dynamics of its own. In contrast, the response of a dynamical agent is determined at least in part by its own internal dynamics. Because it possesses an internal state, a dynamical agent can respond differently to the same sensory stimulus at different times, it can initiate behavior independently of its immediate environment, it can modify its behavior based on its history of interactions, and it can exploit long-term correlations in its environment to organize its behavior in anticipation of future events.

One significant advantage of the SED framework is that it offers the possibility of a uniform treatment of disparate behavioral and cognitive phenomena that have often been seen as irreconcilable. At one extreme, some basic sensorimotor behavior may be mostly reactive in character, with internal state playing only a small role in “coloring” the agent’s responses to its environment. At the other extreme, some of our most cognitive behavior can be conceived as being nearly decoupled from the immediate environmental circumstances, driven primarily by the temporal evolution of internal state. Of course, most behavior is usually a mixture of external and internal influences, with the relative importance of the two varying, sometimes substantially, from moment to moment. Indeed, the interesting questions of how higher cognitive processes arose from more basic sensorimotor competence during the course of evolution and development seems much more approachable within a theoretical framework that places them both on a common footing. On this view, higher cognition does not necessarily alter our fundamentally situated, embodied, and dynamic character, but instead augments it with a vastly increased reservoir of internal dynamics.

How are we to understand the nature and role of this internal state within a dynamical agent? The traditional computational interpretation of such states would be as internal representations. But possessing an internal state is a property of physical systems in general, and these states can covary with states outside the system in quite complicated ways. Unless we wish to grant representational status to all physical states (does a thunderstorm represent the topography of the terrain over which it passes?), there must be additional conditions that license the modifier “representational.” Unfortunately, despite the fundamental role that the notion of representation plays in computational approaches, there is very little agreement about what those additional conditions might be. These considerations have led me to adopt a position of representational skepticism (not, as some have suggested, anti-representationalism) (Beer 2003). I view the representational status of an internal state as an empirical question, to be settled according to the precise definition of the particular representational notion on offer. Thus, by not taking representation for
granted, a dynamical perspective offers a broader theoretical playing field. On
the one hand, it offers the possibility of understanding what representations
are and when and how they arise. On the other hand, we may find that, at
least in some cases, the roles played by the internal states of a dynamical
agent simply cannot be usefully interpreted as representational.

What is the relationship between a SED approach to cognition and the
more familiar computational and connectionist approaches? Such a compara-
ision is fraught with difficulties. For example, we must distinguish between
the bodies of mathematics that underlie each of these approaches and the
theoretical claims that these approaches make. As mathematical formalisms,
computational, connectionist, and dynamical systems are all of roughly equiv-
alent power in the sense that they can each be used to construct models of
the same class of phenomena. Thus, there is no useful mathematical
distinc-
tion to be drawn between these different approaches. This, I think, is one
of the ways in which van Gelder’s dynamical hypothesis goes wrong (Beer
1998).

In addition, we must recognize that computationalism, connectionism, and
dynamics are not really scientific theories at all, because they themselves
do not make sharply falsifiable predictions. Rather, they are what I have
called theoretical frameworks (Beer 1995b). They provide a set of pretheoreti-
cal intuitions, a theoretical vocabulary, a style of explanation, a worldview
within which particular falsifiable theories of specific cognitive phenomena
are formulated and analyzed. The computationalist framework, for example,
emphasizes the structure and content of the internal representations used by
an agent and the algorithms by which those representations are manipulated.
In contrast, the connectionist framework emphasizes the network architecture,
the learning algorithm, the training protocol, and the intermediate distributed
representations that are developed. In this sense, many connectionist mod-
els are still disembodied, unsituated, and computational (albeit distributed) in
nature (Harvey 1992/1996). Finally, the SED framework emphasizes the struc-
ture of the space of all possible trajectories of the brain–body–environment
system and the various forces, both internal and external to the agent, that
shape those trajectories so as to stabilize some particular pattern of behavior.
It is likely that all three perspectives will be important in any future the-
ory of behavior and cognition. For example, since the neural components of
a SED model are often recurrent connectionist networks, and since deliber-
ate reasoning is one of the cognitive phenomena that must eventually be
addressed, ideas and mathematical tools from both connectionism and compu-
tationalism are likely to play an essential role even in a SED-centered theory.
The exact mix of insights from these three theoretical frameworks (or other
frameworks yet unimagined!) that will ultimately prove to be the most fruit-
ful remains an open question that only ongoing empirical investigation can
resolve.
6.6 Methodological issues

Taking the SED framework seriously raises many difficult methodological issues. Studying just one component of a brain–body–environment system is difficult enough, but studying the interactions of all three simultaneously is a daunting task. Experimentally, we currently lack the instruments to monitor and manipulate the activity of all the relevant neurons within the nervous systems of intact, behaving animals, let alone the relevant properties of the animal’s body and environment. Theoretically, we currently lack the mathematical tools necessary to understand large networks of densely interconnected, heterogeneous, nonlinear dynamical elements, particularly in systems that were evolved for their behavioral efficacy and not for their intelligibility in terms of traditional engineering design principles of modularity and hierarchical decomposition.

For these reasons, a number of researchers have turned to the study of model agents using dynamical neural networks and evolutionary algorithms (Beer and Gallagher 1992; Cliff, Husbands, and Harvey 1993; Nolfi and Floreano 2000). In this approach, a model “nervous system” is embodied in a model body, which is in turn situated in a model environment. The entire system is evolved to perform some behavior of interest. A common choice of nervous system model is continuous-time recurrent neural networks, which are known to be universal approximators of smooth dynamics. Typically, only the neural parameters are evolved, but in some work, network architecture and body properties are also evolved. One significant advantage of an evolutionary approach is that it minimizes a priori theoretical assumptions and thus allows the space of possible brain–body–environment systems capable of generating a particular behavior to be explored.

This evolutionary methodology has already been applied successfully to a wide range of interesting behavior (Nolfi and Floreano 2000). A great deal of work has focused on sensorimotor behavior, such as orientation, legged locomotion, object avoidance, and navigation (Beer and Gallagher 1992; Kodjabachian and Meyer 1998; Vickerstaff and Di Paolo 2005). Another line of work has focused on the evolution of learning behavior (Yamauchi and Beer 1994; Floreano and Mondada 1996; Tuci, Quinn, and Harvey 2002; Izquierdo-Torres and Harvey 2006). In addition, there has been considerable work on visually guided behavior (Cliff et al. 1993) and its application to categorical perception, selective attention, and other cognitively interesting tasks (Beer 2003; Di Paolo and Harvey 2003; Ward and Ward 2006). Finally, the evolution of communication has also been an active area of research (Di Paolo 2000; Marocco, Cangelosi, and Nolfi 2003; Steels 2003; Nolfi 2005). Thus, although there are difficult open issues in scaling evolutionary approaches to increasingly complicated behavior, one could argue that the agents that have already been evolved are interesting enough that their careful analysis...
could teach us many things about the dynamics of brain–body–environment systems.

Indeed, for me, the main interest is not in evolving such model agents per se, but rather in analyzing the resulting brain–body–environment systems using the tools of dynamical systems theory (Beer 1995a, 1995b, 2003; Husbands, Harvey, and Cliff 1995). The primary purpose of such an analysis is to build the intuitions, theoretical concepts, and mathematical and computational tools necessary for understanding the dynamics of brain–body–environment systems. While DST provides a solid foundation for such investigations, many additional issues must be addressed. For example, there are different levels at which the dynamics of a brain–body–environment system can be analyzed, including the autonomous dynamics of the entire coupled system, how the coupled behavior arises from the interaction between the nonautonomous environment and agent dynamics, how the nonautonomous agent dynamics arises from the interaction between the nonautonomous body and neural dynamics, and how the nonautonomous neural dynamics arises from the architecture, intrinsic and synaptic parameters of the neural elements.

A final issue that must be addressed is understanding nonautonomous dynamics. The mathematical tools of DST are most highly developed in the case of autonomous dynamical systems, when the analysis can focus on attractors and their bifurcations. However, as mentioned above, when we wish to understand the contribution of a particular component of a brain–body–environment system, we must decompose the coupled system into interacting nonautonomous subsystems, and study their transient responses to time-varying inputs received from the other components. Unfortunately, the mathematical tools for analyzing transient dynamics require significant further development.

6.7 Prospects

Like both computationalism and connectionism, the situated, embodied, and dynamical framework described in this chapter has its roots in ideas first articulated in the 1940s and 1950s. However, because the modern form of the SED framework only emerged in the years 1985–1995, it has had far less time for development than have the computational and connectionist frameworks. The number of people working within the SED framework is also considerably smaller at present. Despite these disadvantages, situated, embodied, and dynamical ideas are having a major impact on thinking in cognitive science, AI and robotics, neuroscience, developmental psychology, and philosophy of mind.

In order to further explore the scope and limits of the SED framework, and to clarify the best mix of computational, connectionist, and SED ideas necessary for understanding the mechanisms of behavior and cognition,
considerable further development is necessary. First and foremost, this will require the construction and analysis of many more concrete model agents, especially those of a more cognitively interesting nature. This in turn will require the continued development of techniques for scaling evolutionary techniques and dynamical analysis to larger systems and the further development of techniques for analyzing the transient dynamics of nonautonomous dynamical systems. Finally, there is a need for improved education in dynamical systems concepts within the cognitive science community, and for software to support the dynamical analysis of brain–body–environment systems.

Further reading


References


(1998). Framing the debate between computational and dynamical approaches to cognitive science, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21: 630.


