Hybrid Politics:
Social Movement Mobilization in a Multi-Movement Environment

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Abstract: Social movements mobilize in environments in which many of their potential supporters maintain loyalties to other social movements. If they are to be successful in the mobilization process, movement organizations must find ways to induce spillover from these allied movements. We argue that organizations with hybrid identities – those whose organizational identities span the boundaries of two or more social movements – are vital to creating this spillover. These organizations are well positioned to use interorganizational networks in ways that allow one movement to mobilize the adherents of another movement. They do so by helping to satisfy the individual identity needs of activists, serving the organizational maintenance needs of the movement, and achieving strategic positions in interorganizational networks. Our analysis draws upon original data from surveys of 2,276 antiwar demonstrators conducted in 2004-2005 and 2,082 antiwar demonstrators conducted in 2007, combined with publicly available data on the 293 organizations that mobilized them, to test our hybridity hypotheses. Regression analysis using a two-stage mixed-process estimator shows that past involvement in non-antiwar movements makes it more likely for individuals to join hybrid organizations, while past involvement in antiwar movements makes it less likely for individuals to join hybrid organizations. Regression analysis using Tobit and Negative Binomial estimators shows that organizations with hybrid identities enjoy central positions in interorganizational networks within the antiwar movement and are a key link in attracting supporters from non-antiwar constituencies. Our analysis suggests that the antiwar movement could expand its mobilizing potential by lending more support to hybrid organizations, especially those that hybridize peace with environmentalism and/or with communities of African Americans, Latino Americans, and Asian Americans. We conclude by explaining the implications of our analysis for theories of social movements, networks, and organizations.

Keywords: Social Movements, Mobilization, Spillover, Social Networks, Identity, Hybridity, Antiwar Movement, U.S.-Iraq War

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The events of the early 2000s created a series of threats and challenges for the political left in the United States. The disputed election of President George W. Bush in 2000, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing American-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq collectively represented a sea change over the relatively placid 1990s. While the attention of activists on the left had been widely dispersed among a plethora of issues – such as globalization and fair trade, abortion rights, and same-sex marriage – many activists redirected their focus toward anti-terrorist policies and the Iraq War. Massive street demonstrations throughout the 2000s were a major part of the organized response to these rapidly unfolding events. These mass mobilizations included some of the largest public protests in the United States since the nuclear freeze movement of the early 1980s (Meyer 1990). A new cycle of protest had begun (Tarrow 1993).

A fundamental organizational challenge of the nascent antiwar movement was how to recruit the hundreds of thousands of people who would be needed to turn out for large-scale street demonstrations. Meyer and Whittier’s (1994) analysis of women’s involvement in past peace movements suggests that spillover from previously existing movements would play a vital role in making these events possible (see also Della Porta and Mosca 2007; Fisher 2006; Meyer and Boutcher 2007; Van Dyke 2003; Whittier 2004). Indeed, veterans of previous struggles for civil rights, women’s liberation, and clean air – to name only a few – turned out to protest the U.S.-Iraq War. Organizers relied heavily on existing interorganizational networks and multiple social movements to draw activists into the streets on these new issues (cf. Bearman and Everett 1993; Carroll and Ratner 1996; Della Porta and Mosca 2007).
The relevance of both cross-movement spillover and interorganizational networks to the mobilization process is apparent during a casual stroll through any antiwar demonstration. Activists display the messages of their myriad causes – from Latin American solidarity to the abolition of nuclear weapons – on signs, buttons, and bumper stickers and broadcast their organizational affiliations with tee-shirts, banners, and hats. Less apparent, however, is how and to what extent spillover and interorganizational networks interrelate in the mobilization process. If movements spill over seamlessly into one another, then networks matter independently of spillover. However, if spillover occurs more readily between some movements and takes place less freely between other movements, then networks may play a critical role in channeling these flows.

A critical question, then, is what determines when networks contribute to mobilization through spillover? When do networks magnify the flow of activists from movement to movement? This question is important to scholars striving to understand the dynamic processes through which movements intersect, contend, and change during contact with one another. It is important to activists who are navigating networks aimed at mobilizing resistance to hostile policies. Contemporary movements are especially affected by spillover because the Internet increases the speed and effectiveness with which allied social movements reach out to one another’s activists (Carty and Onyett 2006; Chadwick 2007; Nah, Veenstra, and Shah 2006).

We argue that organizations with hybrid identities – those whose organizational identities span the boundaries of two or more social movements – are vital to creating spillover between movements. Such organizations are well positioned to use interorganizational networks in ways that allow one movement to mobilize the adherents
of another movement. They do so by helping to satisfy the *individual identity* needs of activists, serving the *organizational maintenance* needs of the movement, and achieving *strategic positions* in interorganizational networks. When organizations with hybrid identities build network ties with organizations inside or outside the antiwar movement, these ties tend to stimulate the mobilization process by integrating activists from other movements into the peace community. Antiwar organizations are less effective at mobilizing support when they instead focus on building ties with other primarily antiwar/peace organizations, with whom they are competing to mobilize the same constituents. Therefore, we argue that the positive role of organizations with hybrid identities in creating spillover depends on the structure of interorganizational networks.

In this article, we investigate the link between spillover and interorganizational networks by drawing upon evidence from the contemporary American antiwar movement. We begin by theorizing the roles of spillover, networks, and hybrid identities in the mobilization process and by presenting hypotheses for empirical analysis. Our analysis draws upon original data from surveys of 2,276 antiwar demonstrators conducted in 2004-2005 and surveys of 2,082 surveys of antiwar demonstrators conducted in 2007, combined with publicly available data about the 293 organizations that mobilized them, to test our hybridity hypotheses. We find that organizations with hybrid identities enjoy central positions in interorganizational networks within the antiwar movement and are a key link in attracting supporters from non-antiwar constituencies. We conclude by underscoring the importance of these findings to theories of social movements, networks, and organizations.
Social Movement Spillover

Early studies of social movements concentrated on constructing explanations for the rise and fall of individual social movements as self-contained entities, such as the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and religious movements (J. Freeman 1973; Harrison 1959; McAdam 1982). This “movement-centric view” treated individual social movements as the fundamental unit of analysis in research (McAdam 1995, p. 218). Over the past two decades, a consensus has emerged that significant interdependencies exist among movements. As a result, the boundaries between movements are understood to be blurred, rather than clear. A distinct sequencing of movements often exists, with one or more movements occupying a dominant position over other allied movements at a given point in time (Minkoff 1997). Movements may be sequenced such that one movement is clearly the “initiator” and the other a “spinoff” (Fisher 2006; McAdam 1995) or the movements may feed back onto one another in a nonrecursive fashion (Isaac, McDonald, and Lukasik 2006).

According to the interdependency view, movements must be understood in terms of their relationships to past, contemporaneous, and future social movements. Past social movements train activists for current struggles, pass on know-how that becomes the content of tactical repertoires, and leave a cultural legacy that opens and closes doors to current movements (Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Voss and Sherman 2000). Contemporaneous social movements affect one another by molding political opportunity structures, providing and competing for resources, and generating allies in coalitions and opponents in countermovements (Isaac, McDonald, and Lukasik 2006; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Future social movements matter because these are where a
movement may have its most definitive impact. Even if activists do not achieve their goals in their own day, they may ultimately be vindicated by setting the stage for others who win victories in their stead (Taylor 1989).

Social movement spillover is the most basic type of intermovement interdependency. According to Meyer and Whittier (1994, p. 227), spillover occurs when the “ideas, tactics, style, participants, and organizations of one movement . . . affect other social movements.” Their study of the relationship between the women’s and peace movements demonstrates how coalitions, overlapping memberships, shared personnel, and external environments affected the mutual influence of the movements upon one another. This view depicts spillover as having largely beneficial effects on both movements, leading the authors to conclude that “spillover effects are cause for greater optimism about movement survival and the scope of social movement influence” (Meyer and Whittier 1994, p. 293).

Subsequent research established that organizational processes modulate spillover effects. Minkoff (1997) demonstrates that the density of social movement organizations matters to the spillover process in her study of the sequencing of the civil rights and women’s movements. She argues that “increases in organizational density accelerate the diffusion of activism across multiple constituencies through a transfer of information and the construction of a niche or resource infrastructure” (Minkoff 1997, p. 178). Specifically, she found that increased density of African-American organizations had a positive effect on women’s activism. On the other hand, Olzak and Uhrig (2001) stress that increasing organizational density spurs competition among social movement organizations for resources, potentially creating negative effects for movements. Under
these conditions, competition may begin to dominate movement interactions when similar organizations repeatedly turn to the same supporters for contributions, forcing organizations to focus more on symbolic differentiation than on achieving movement goals.

If competition among social movement organizations is fierce enough, spillover may leave one movement in a weaker position than before the emergence of its allied movement. Hadden and Tarrow (2007) invoke the case of spillover from the global justice movement into the American antiwar movement to raise the possibility of movement “spillout.” They define “social movement spillout” as “the hollowing-out of a social movement when its activists shift their activities to a cognate, but differently structured, movement” (Hadden and Tarrow 2007, p. 360, emphasis removed from original). They found that, rather than stimulating the global justice movement, the antiwar movement and the 2004 presidential election drew the energies of anti-globalization activists into other pursuits. This argument suggests that close ties between allied movements have the potential to reduce the mobilizing potential of one of the movements.

While spillover may benefit the receiving movement at the expense of the sending movement (leading to spillout, at the extreme), cross-movement coalitional arrangements may be driven by expectations within the sending movement that it is likely to gain more eventually through reciprocity than it gives in the initial coalition (Van Dyke 2003). Further, the sending movement may be able to use participation in the receiving movement as a kind of “abeyance structure” – or holding pattern – during difficult times for the movement (Taylor 1989). For example, climate change activists became involved
in antiwar activities at a time when attention to climate change was in a lull (Moser 2007). Antiwar activities may have been a way for climate change activists to stay connected and energized, while they waited for a better day to capture attention for the issue of global warming.

Although the extant literature on spillover enumerates a variety of factors that moderate the rate of spillover, it fails to identify the factors that determine where it is most likely to occur. A theory that identifies such factors would deepen our understanding how social movements intersect with each other. We propose below that the blending of movements through organizations with hybrid identities helps to guide the flow of movements into one another.

**Interorganizational Networks**

Social networks are a critical part of the mobilizing structures of all social movements. Ties through social networks are an important predictor of why some people are recruited into activism and others are not (Diani 2004; Klandermans 1997; Schussman and Soule 2005; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980). Integration into networks explains not only why people participate in movements, but also why they escalate their involvement and take higher risks (McAdam 1986). Networks do not automatically draw participants into activism, since successful recruitment additionally depends on the creation of identity-based links to the movement and the relative absence of counterveiling pressures opposing involvement (McAdam and Paulsen 1993; see also Klandermans and Oegema 1987). Just as network ties promote activism, they have the potential to inhibit it (Kitts 2000).
The presence of robust multiorganizational fields helps to create space for activists to forge, modify, and draw upon the networks needed for movement activities (Curtis and Zurcher 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973; Polletta 1999; Fernandez and McAdam 1988, 1989). Interorganizational networks within these fields interact with preexisting informal networks to stimulate or block mobilization (Gould 1991). These networks exist both at the organizational level – among the elites within each organization in the field – and at the individual level – among individuals with overlapping memberships among diverse groups (Chatfield 1969; Curtis and Zurcher 1973; Diani 2004). Ties through these networks facilitate the dissemination of information, trust building, identity construction, values creation, and the sharing of tactics which stimulate the mobilization process (Kitts 1999; Della Porta and Mosca 2007; Heaney 2004a; Gould 1991, 1995, 1996; Soule 1997).

Interorganizational networks often cross movement boundaries. Even if an organization confines itself to the work of a single movement, its supporters often do not. Overlapping organizational memberships among individuals link movements to one another (Bearman and Everett 1993; Carroll and Ratner 1996; Della Porta and Mosca 2007). At the organizational level, coalitions are a common way that networks traverse these boundaries, since a leading organization in one movement may be willing to add its support (sometimes only its name) to causes promoted by other movements (Hula 1999; Van Dyke 2003).

Networking across movement boundaries is especially prevalent among peace and antiwar activists. In their survey of the Greater Vancouver area, Carroll and Ratner (1996) found that 71.4% of peace and antiwar activists had memberships in multiple
organizations in multiple social movements. Their research demonstrated that these “cosmopolitan” activists were more common in the peace and antiwar sector than in any other movement sector. Bearman and Everett (1993) similarly found that peace and antiwar activists have a high propensity to form cross-movement networks, though their intermovement network positions are contingent on the salience of peace and antiwar issues. Their study of protest events in Washington, DC over the 1961-1983 period revealed that Quaker, peace, and antiwar activists had the highest degree of network centrality among protesting groups during the Vietnam War era, though their positions became considerably more peripheral during times of relative peace (Bearman and Everett 1993, p. 183).

Although the extant literature on interorganizational networks establishes that cross-movement networking is a widespread phenomenon, it less clear as to why these networks exist between some movements and not between others. However, as Carroll and Ratner (1996, p. 603) point out, “movement networks may be segmented in ways that limit the extent to which activists in one movement cooperate with activists in another.” In the next section, we explain why organizations with hybrid identities play an important role in facilitating cross-movement segmentation.

**Hybrid Identities**

While identity is often thought of an individual-level phenomenon (Mead 1934; Erickson 1968), an analogous, though conceptually distinct, phenomenon exists at the organizational level (Albert and Whetten 1985; Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Hsu and Hannan 2005). Albert and Whetten (1985, pp. 266-7) define organizational identity as a
statement of “central character” that establishes the organization “as recognizably
different from others.” The multiple audiences that observe an organization hold default
expectations that help to form and define the organization’s identity (Hsu and Hannan
2005, p. 476). As a result, social movement organizations are tenaciously attentive to the
ways that their identities are understood by the multiple audiences that observe them
(Coy and Woehrle 1996; Engel 2007; Heaney and Rojas 2006; Lipsky 1968; Polletta and
Jasper 2001). These audiences include members, supporters, volunteers, staff, other
social movement organizations, foundations, government officials, mass media, and the
public at large. Identities may be simple, widely accepted, and stable or they may be
complex, actively contested, and dynamic, depending on the organization and the nature
of the environment in which it is embedded.

A significant debate about identity is whether actors are at a greater advantage
when their identities are simple and focused or when they are complex and multifaceted.
Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, and von Rittman (2003) posit that simple, focused identities
are advantageous because they are easier for observers to decipher under conditions of
uncertainty (see also Hsu 2006). Padgett and Ansell (1993) and Leifer (1988), however,
point out that simple identities constrain actors and lock them into patterns that may not
serve their long-term interests. Instead, they argue, actors are advantaged when they
maintain ambiguous identities that allow for robust action in evolving situations.

Whether simple or complex identities better serve the needs of actors depends
acutely on the context. In their study of the feature-film labor market, for example,
Zuckerman et al. (2003, p. 1067) find that although having a narrowly-defined specialist
identity is usually a wise career move, more established performers can violate this rule if
they are not likely to be easily screened out of consideration. Likewise, political advocacy groups often seek to create identities in a single dimension, but sometimes sustain more complex identities that occupy multiple dimensions (Heaney 2004b, 2007).

While complex identities are not always desirable, there are some situations in which they are essential. We argue that complex organizational identities – specifically, organizations with hybrid identities – are pivotal to creating social movement spillover. We define an organization with a hybrid identity as one that has a core identity in two or more social movements.\(^1\) Hybrids benefit from their allegiances to multiple institutions, which often allow them to adapt to their environments better than more narrowly focused organizations (cf. Kraatz and Block 2008; Minkoff 2002).\(^2\) In the case of the antiwar movement, organizations with hybrid identities attempt to marry peace with environmentalism, women’s issues, the labor movement, or other causes. For example, U.S. Labor Against the War (USLAW) is an organization that has a core identity in both the labor movement and the antiwar movement. Thus, organizations such as USLAW are critical for establishing the networks that bring union members to antiwar events. The formation of these types of organizations has become increasingly common because, as

\(^1\) Our usage of “hybrid” is consistent Albert and Whetten (1985, p. 270) who define “hybrid” as “an organization whose identity is composed of two or more types that would not normally be expected to go together.” In examining cross-movement hybrid identities, our analysis addresses only one form of hybridity. We recognize, however, that other forms of hybridity exist which may prove strategically beneficial. Chadwick (2007) explains that MoveOn benefitted by creating a hybrid organizational form that draws upon characteristics of political parties, interest groups, and social movements. Henney and Rojas (2007) develop the concept of the “party in the street,” which hybridizes political parties and social movements. Padgett and McLean (2006, p. 1545) examine how the economic partnership system in Renaissance Florence was “a hybridization of the two relational logics of patrilineage and guild through the means of political republicanism.” We are not suggesting that other forms of hybridity are not useful to organizations, but are only focusing here on the importance of cross-movement hybridity.

\(^2\) Hybrids may also face unique environmental constraints. For example, hybrids are subject to pressures from multiple institutional environments and must maintain legitimacy in each one (Minkoff 2002, p. 384). For example, a veterans’ antiwar organization is challenged to maintain credibility both among veterans groups and among peace activists. These pressures may constrain the organization from making arguments that appeal to veterans but not peace activists, and vice versa.
Chadwick (2007, p. 284) notes, “the Internet, by creating an environment where rapid institutional adaptation and experimentation is almost routine, encourages ‘organizational hybridity’.”

Organizations with hybrid identities possess three advantages that facilitate their use of interorganizational networks in a way that promotes spillover between movements. These advantages include, first, the ability to satisfy the individual identity needs of activists; second, the capacity to serve the organizational maintenance needs of social movements; and third, an enhanced likelihood to achieve strategic positions within interorganizational networks.

**Individual Identity.** Social movements are settings for individuals to act out preexisting identities and to form new identities (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Individuals often find that participation in social movement organizations is a desirable way to pursue the development of these identities (Stryker 2000, p. 30). Thus, organizations compete with one another, in part, based on their abilities to appeal to the identity needs of movement participants.

When a new dominant movement arises on the scene, activists may look for ways to participate in that movement that allow them to retain and build the identities developed in past movements. Participants in women’s movements may particularly value opportunities to become involved in new movements in ways that embrace their feminist identities. In their study of women’s and labor movements in West Berlin in 1989-90, Feree and Roth (1998, p. 644) conclude that “Women need to organize by gender . . . both in representing women’s economic interest in and outside of mixed gender unions and in representing women’s political interest in and outside of the
parties.” They surmise that the failure of women to win substantial concessions in a local strike of day care workers was due to the absence of “bridging organizations” that could have kept open lines of communication between the women’s and labor movements. Thus, even when women are engaged in the work of “other” movements, they often benefit from the existence of organizations that focus on their identities as women.

While Feree and Roth’s (1998) case points to the notable absence of organizations with hybrid identities, Valocchi (2001) investigates a case where organizations used cross-movement identities in a politically efficacious manner. He demonstrates that the successful politicization of homosexuality in the late 1960s and early 1970s was owed, in part, to the emergence of the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) as a hybrid that merged the concerns of the New Left with the gay identity movement. Organizations like GLF allow . . . individuals to come together around common interests, grievances, or social ties, engage in dialogue on and debate the causes of grievances and problems, engage in collective action on the basis of these understandings, and then come to alter the ideology or the collective identity of the movement as their experiences change (Valocchi 2001, p. 449).

By creating space inside a movement for individuals with identities rooted primarily outside the movement, hybrid organizational identities help to build connections between the movements. Hybrids grapple with the arguments brought to the table by both groups and are therefore more likely to generate frames that bridge the two movements (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986). Thus, hybrids are more likely than non-hybrids to draw participants from outside the movement into the new movement.
Organizational Maintenance. All movements pass through high and low points of energy and attention (Koopmans 2004). During the high times, especially when the movement is acutely threatened, resources are likely to be relatively plentiful (Hansen 1985). During the low times, movement leaders are pressed to keep activists and supporters engaged and committed to the movement’s goals and values (Walker 1983). Organizational maintenance is a principal activity of movements during periods of abeyance, “a holding pattern of a group which continues to mount some kind of challenge even in a nonreceptive political environment” by finding a niche for itself (Taylor 1989, pp. 762, 772). Since the campaigns of a more vibrant, allied social movement are obvious opportunities for abeyance, creating a hybrid identity between the movements is a possible method of carving out and maintaining a niche.³

The creation of a communist antiwar organization, for example, might help to keep people involved in the communist movement even when it has lost much of its appeal. If better days eventually arrive for communism, the net resources of the hybrid communist organization can always be transferred back to the communist movement proper. Most importantly, if that time comes, previous members of the communist antiwar organization will be available and prepared to resume the struggle as leaders, having maintained their personal networks, training, and commitment. By facilitating maintenance when movements are in the doldrums, hybrids appear to be especially desirable channels to connect movements with one another. Thus, the “new” movement enhances the rationale for the “old” movement to stay alive, while the new movement is able to appropriate the supporters and institutional infrastructure of the old movement.

³ These organizations resemble the “transmovement” structures discussed by Polletta (1999).
Strategic Positions. Interorganizational networks are especially valuable to movement actors when they allow them to connect to people and organizations that would otherwise be hard to reach. Networks are littered with spaces where links are challenging to establish. Burt (1992) describes these gaps as the “structural holes” of the network. Organizations with hybrid identities are likely to achieve a positional advantage in interorganizational networks precisely because they tend to rest within structural holes. For example, an African American peace organization has the potential to mobilize a unique following because the African American and antiwar communities tend not to be closely connected – the space between them is rich in structural holes. While a typical structural holes argument stresses that individual actors benefit by building interorganizational links across structural holes, our observation is that advantages can also be gained by placing hybrid organizations inside these holes in the network.4

Organizations with hybrid identities gain strategic position not only from their specific location in the network, but also from their status in the network. Feree and Roth (1998) note that hybrids gain from being able simultaneously to claim positions as insiders and outsiders in the movement. This joint insider/outsider status enhances the hybrid’s potential to employ multivocal rhetoric, as they use one set of appeals to movement insiders and another set of appeals to outsiders (Padgett and Ansell 1993). Thus, because hybridity has the potential to broaden the appeal of the organization, it enhances its ability to navigate the boundaries among multiple social movements.

Organizations with hybrid identities do not automatically achieve desirable network positions. The hybrid organization’s identity must retain legitimacy with actors

4 This strategy is similar to what Burt (1998) terms “borrowing social capital” in his analysis of the advancement of female managers. Corning’s strategy in pursuing joint ventures follows an analogous logic (Nanda and Bartlett 1990).
on both sides of structural holes and the organization must earn the trust of potential network partners (cf. Suchman 1995). For example, a hypothetical organization called “Republicans Against the War” would have bridged a significant gap between Republicans who oppose President Bush’s policies and the antiwar movement only if there had been Republicans willing to be associated with the antiwar crowd and vice versa. Rather than joining a hybrid organization that they might find distasteful (perhaps because they associate antiwar groups with the abhorred “hippie” identity), many antiwar Republicans preferred to raise their grievances through more traditional channels.

Contributing to the campaign of an antiwar Republican presidential candidate Ron Paul and his Campaign for Liberty proved to be more comfortable to Republicans than direct involvement in the antiwar movement. Thus, our argument is not that any organization with a hybrid identity would successfully span a structural hole or achieve a central network position. Rather, we argue only that such organizations are more likely to do so, especially when they tap into a genuine, but overlooked, intersectional identity (C. Cohen 1999; Strolovitch 2007).

**Examples of Antiwar Hybrids**

Before stating a series of empirically testable hypotheses, we offer three examples of organizations with hybrid identities that are active in the contemporary American antiwar movement. These organizations help to connect the antiwar movement with the women’s, environmental, and antiracism movements. These examples illustrate how identity, maintenance, and strategic position work in specific hybrid organizations.

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5 During the Fall of 2007, Congressman Ron Paul began to attract a noticeable following among antiwar Republicans and to raise considerable campaign funds through the Internet (Bosman 2007).
Women's and Antiwar Movements: Code Pink: Women for Peace. The relationship between movements for women’s rights and peace has long been the product of mutual interaction (Meyer and Whittier 1994). The organization Code Pink: Women for Peace, pictured in Figure 1, is the latest incarnation in this long tradition. Other women’s peace organizations include the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Women’s Action for New Directions (WAND), Women in Black, the Granny Peace Brigade, and Grandmothers for Peace International. Founded in 2002, Code Pink’s name was intended to mock the Department of Homeland Security’s color-coded alert system (“When they say ‘Code Red’, we say ‘Code Pink’”). The group’s activists wear hot pink clothing and use the pink metaphor in virtually every conceivable way, for example, proposing to “Pink Slip Bush” (i.e., to remove the president from office). Code Pink is among the most visible organizations in the antiwar movement, attracting considerable media attention for its disruptive protests on Capitol Hill (Grim 2007). It is a primary target of pro-war countermovement organizations, such as the Gathering of Eagles (Bushnell 2007). In 2007, Code Pink’s antics brought a direct response from President Bush, who said that “some in Washington should spend more time responding to the warnings of terrorists like Osama bin Laden and the requests of our commanders on the ground, and less time responding to the demands of MoveOn.org bloggers and Code Pink protesters” (Bush 2007).

Insert Figure 1 Here

Involvement in Code Pink is more than an opportunity to protest the Iraq War and other policies of the Bush Administration. Participating in Code Pink events allows activists to reinforce and revise their identities as women. Samantha Miller, a 22-year old
Code Pink staff member from Los Angeles, notes that Code Pink helps to reappropriate stereotypes of women and prompts its members to reconsider their identities. “I find that most of the women in Code Pink, myself included, were the kind of women that never wore pink,” explains Miller, “I wore black all through high school. . . . So for me to wear pink was a very radical shift in a lot of things. I find that almost across the board [about Code Pink activists]” (Miller 2007). Renay Davis, a 57-year old Code Pink member from San Francisco, is active in the group in part because it provides the opportunity to meet many like-minded women. In contrast to male-dominated organizations that have hierarchical power structures (cf. Polletta 2002), Davis sees Code Pink as a place where “women as leaders are a little more accepting of any and all ideas . . . it is friendlier and warmer” (Davis 2007). While the women in Code Pink are fiercely antiwar, the organization is about much more than just changing public policy. It is about exploring women’s identities and proposing new roles for women in social movements, government, and society.

*Environmental and Antiwar Movements: No War, No Warming.* By the early 2000s, the American environmental movement found itself going through hard times. Numerous observers declared that the environmental movement was “dead” or at least needed to be revamped in order to address the challenges of global warming (M. Cohen 2006; Moser 2007; Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2004). Leading activists began to search for ways to reframe environmentalism. Given that the antiwar movement led the protest cycle, the environmental movement could potentially benefit by linking more strongly to the antiwar movement. This linkage was plausible because many antiwar activists are sympathetic to the environmental cause, and long-standing environmental organizations,
such as Greenpeace, identify with the peace movement. Indeed, part of the weakness of
the environmental movement may have been due to spillout to the antiwar movement.

The organization No War, No Warming was founded in February 2007 by climate
activists who sought to partner with antiwar leaders to better link the Iraq War to global
warming. \(^6\) The organization stressed connections among several issues such as that oil is
the mutual cause of war and warming, military operations consume enormous quantities
of fossil fuels, and war and warming similarly harm the neediest populations of the world
(No War, No Warming 2007). In October 2007, it organized protests in Washington, DC
and around the United States. Drawing upon the repertoire of antiwar demonstrations, at
least 61 people were arrested – six of whom were dressed as polar bears – for allegedly
blocking an intersection on Capitol Hill on October 22 (Marcrum 2007; see also Olzak
and Uhrig 2001). These tactics are designed to use the antiwar movement to help
maintain the environmental movement while it is in the doldrums. Steve Kretzmann,
Executive Director of Oil Change International, explained that No War, No Warming will
likely benefit the environmental movement because its grassroots “infrastructure got
reactivated and it trained a whole new generation of activists” (Kretzmann 2007). \(^7\) Many
environmental activists hope that antiwar events will serve as a launching pad to

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\(^6\) While the formal work of No War, No Warming was sponsored jointly by antiwar and
environmental activists, the key leadership was provided by long-term environmental activists Ted Glick
and Nadine Bloch (Kretzmann 2007).

\(^7\) Oil Change International is one of the organizations that endorsed the No War, No Warming
actions in October 2007. Kretzmann (2007) explained that Oil Change self-consciously sees itself as a
hybrid organization that is attempting to locate the nexus of the antiwar and environmental movements.
From his point of view, the environmental movement has more experience gaining legislative success,
while the antiwar movement has a broader grassroots base. Thus, the value of the hybrid approach comes
in combing these advantages of the two movements.
revitalize the environmental movement (see Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Isaac, McDonald, and Lukasik 2006).

*Antiracism and Antiwar Movements: ANSWER Coalition (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism).* Peace movements historically have done a poor job of attracting participation from minority groups (Chatfield 1992, p. 144; Small 2002, pp. 57-59; Westheider 2008, pp. 65-68; Zaroulis and Sullivan 1984, p. 137).[^1] Thus, any organization that is able to bridge the structural hole between white activists and communities of color is likely to have an advantageous position within antiwar networks (LeBlanc 2007). The ANSWER Coalition was founded in 2001 explicitly in the hope of uniting these communities, with its name specifying the joint goals of stopping war and ending racism. To this end, ANSWER has persistently attempted to link the Iraq War to a wide range of causes, including support for justice in Palestine, Haiti, Cuba, and Venezuela, and domestic issues concerning immigrants rights, housing, and police brutality (Puryear 2007).

ANSWER has been successful in helping to link the antiwar movement to Muslim-Americans, Palestinians, Haitians, and various diasporadic communities in the United States, but has been no more effective in reaching African Americans than have other major antiwar organizations (Heaney and Rojas 2007). Thus, its antiracist strategy has augmented ANSWER’s strategic position in the movement, though noticeable lacunae remain in the antiwar network. In an attempt to close these gaps, ANSWER took up the case of the Jena Six, a group of six black teenagers whom many believe to have received usually harsh treatment in response to their alleged attack on a fellow white

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[^1]: When African Americans organized to express antiwar sentiment during the Vietnam War, for example, they often did so through racially homogenous organizations such as the Black Panthers rather than by cooperating with white-led peace organizations (Westheider 2008, pp. 65-68).
student. On November 7, 2007, ANSWER called for nationwide protests (in twelve cities) to “Free the Jena Six” (ANSWER 2007). These actions reflect the continual effort of ANSWER to bridge the networks between racial groups, though the difficulties of establishing these connections limits its success.

Model and Hypotheses

The preceding discussion outlines a series of ways in which organizations with hybrid identities facilitate spillover through interorganizational networks. In this section, we formulate empirically testable hypotheses that compare the role of hybrids to other types of organizations involved in the antiwar movement. We argue that hybrid organizations are pivotal in assembling a movement out of other allied movements operating in their broader environment. Hybrids help to create the links that make it possible for the antiwar movement to draw support from labor, women, environmentalists, and other allied constituencies.

We develop a model that posits three mutually exclusive types of organizational identity: (1) primarily antiwar/peace; (2) hybrid; and (3) non-antiwar/peace. Primarily antiwar/peace organizations operate mostly within the antiwar movement, though they sometimes join coalitions for related issues and social justice causes. They include groups such as United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ), the DC Anti-War Network (DAWN) and Troops Out Now, which give the overwhelming majority of their attention to stopping the war in Iraq or to preventing future wars with Iran and other nations. Hybrid organizations combine antiwar work with substantial identification with at least one other movement, as discussed in the previous section. Non-antiwar/peace organizations are
focused on causes other than war and peace, even though they occasionally venture into the antiwar arena. The National Organization for Women (NOW) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) are examples of non-antiwar/peace organizations that follow this pattern.

A multi-movement model of mobilization using the primarily antiwar, hybrid, and non-antiwar distinction is represented in Figure 2. This model is intended to explain the number of supporters an organization mobilizes for the antiwar cause by contacting them directly. The model depicts hybrid organizations as situated between primarily antiwar and non-antiwar organizations. It anticipates that network ties between hybrids and primarily antiwar organizations, as well as ties between hybrids and non-antiwar organizations, have positive effects on the success of these organizations in mobilizing. It allows that primarily antiwar and non-antiwar organizations may benefit by working directly with one another, especially if appropriate hybrids are absent. Each organization is assumed to have an advantage in reaching out to a different set of constituents, so overlapping network ties facilitate, rather than undermine, mobilization. However, network ties among antiwar organizations are expected to reduce one another’s success in mobilization. Since both groups attempt to contact many of the same constituents, their efforts tend to be directly competitive, rather than cooperative. Network ties between these similar groups tend to stimulate redundant requests for time and contributions from the same pool of supporters, thus diverting organizers’ attention toward group differentiation rather than achieving movement goals.

INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
For ease of illustration, the model in Figure 2 references only three social movements: the antiwar movement, the labor movement, and the environmental movement. The model could be generalized to include a larger set of social movements surrounding the antiwar movement (or another, non-antiwar movement). A key feature of the model is that the non-antiwar movements are assumed to be roughly disconnected from one another; or, at least, the extent of those connections is assumed to be insignificant for the purpose of antiwar mobilization.¹ Network effects are expected to be positive if they run vertically through the mobilization chain, but are expected to be negative or insignificant if they cut across the model horizontally.

The hypotheses derived from the multi-movement model can be stated both at the individual level and the organizational level (summarized in Table 1). At the individual level, two hypotheses follow. First, the more an individual has a history of involvement in movements outside the antiwar movement, the more likely to join hybrid organizations as locations to realize those identities. Second, individuals with a history of involvement in past antiwar movements are less likely to join hybrid organizations because they are able to realize those identities within primarily antiwar organizations.

At the organizational level, two hypotheses follow from the model. First, because hybrids operate as brokers between primarily antiwar and non-antiwar organizations, they are hypothesized to have greater centrality in interorganizational networks than non-hybrid types, other things equal. Second, network ties are hypothesized to have a

¹ One could imagine cases in which social ties between non-antiwar movements became relevant for antiwar mobilization. For example, elements within two different social movements could form an alliance to attempt to undermine the antiwar cause. In that case, network ties between non-antiwar movements could be expected to reduce antiwar mobilization. However, such an instance is outside the scope of the particular case under investigation.
positive effect on mobilization if they connect organizations within a primarily antiwar/hybrid/non-antiwar chain, but they are hypothesized to have a negative or insignificant effect if they cut across the chain. That is, when network ties are formed across organizational types, they add value to the mobilization process. However, networks ties within organizational types lead to competition rather than cooperation. In summary, the off-diagonal elements of the mobilization equations in Table 1 are hypothesized to be positive, while the diagonal elements are hypothesized to be negative or insignificant.

Research Design

We assess the relationship between spillover, networks, and hybrid identities through statistical analysis of data from two, year-long studies of people who attended major antiwar demonstrations and the organizations that mobilized them. First, we fielded surveys of participants at demonstrations held throughout the United States from August 2004 to September 2005 (year one) and from January 2007 to November 2007 (year two). Second, we used the responses from the 2004-2005 surveys to construct a list of organizations that mobilized participants in the demonstrations and collected information about these organizations through an Internet search. Third, we estimated statistical models of individual organizational memberships, organizations’ network positions, and organizational mobilization success by combining data from individual surveys with organization-level indicators.

Survey Data. The 2004-2005 data analyzed in this paper were collected at the following events: the August 29, 2004 march outside the Republican National
Convention in New York City; the January 20, 2005 protests at the second Inauguration of President George W. Bush in Washington, DC; the March 19, 2005 protests in multiple cities on the second anniversary of the Iraq War; the May Day demonstrations on May 1, 2005 in New York City; and the September 24, 2005 march on Washington, DC. These events were identified through discussions with antiwar activists, by monitoring movement websites and mailing lists, and by following mainstream and alternative media coverage (e.g., Indymedia). The March 19, 2005 demonstrations occurred in dozens of cities and we fielded surveys at the demonstrations held in Washington (DC), Fayetteville (NC), New York City, Chicago, Indianapolis, San Francisco and San Diego. These events occurred in the North, Midwest, South, and West. While we did not cover every significant protest event in 2005, we surveyed demonstrators at the largest events in major metropolitan areas. Additional sites were chosen because they were designated as important by leading antiwar movement organizations (e.g., Fayetteville) or they provided opportunities to collect data from smaller metropolitan areas (e.g., Indianapolis). During the May Day 2005 protests, we attended the events sponsored by the UFPJ-Abolition Now coalition and a separate event organized by the Troops Out Now-Million Worker March coalition. In total, we collected 2,276 surveys and had an overall response rate of 89%.10

The 2007 data analyzed in this paper were collected at the following events: the January 27, 2007 March on Washington organized by; the March 17, 2007 March on the

10 Analysis of non-response by race and gender revealed small, but statistically significant demographic differences: 86% of solicited men agreed to participate in the survey, while 91% of solicited women participated. The response rate (79%) among African-Americans was significantly lower than among other racial/ethnic groups. Whites, Asians and Latinos responded at a rate similar to the rest of the sample. The implication of these differences is that organizations to which men and African-Americans belong may be slightly underrepresented in our analysis.
Pentagon; the September 15, 2007 March on Washington; and the October 27, 2007
National Mobilization to End the War. The October 27 rallies were held in eleven major
cities around the United States. We elected to conduct surveys in three of these cities,
New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, with the aim of achieving rough geographic
representation across the country. In total, we collected 2,082 surveys in 2007.  

At each event, we hired a team of four to ten surveyors, depending on the
expected size of the crowd. We distributed surveyors widely throughout the crowd to
facilitate sampling as broad a cross-section of the participants as possible. Each surveyor
was instructed begin by choosing a person from the crowd as an initial “anchor” for
sampling. We instructed the surveyor not to sample the anchor because this initial choice
might be biased (based on approachability or social desirability considerations). Instead,
the surveyor started with the anchor and counted five more persons into the crowd,
invited that person to participate in the survey, and then repeated the counting process
using the respondent as the new anchor. The anchor-selection method was designed to
reduce sampling bias because the surveyor does not influence who is standing a fixed
distance away from a selected person. Questionnaires were completed at the rally and
collected immediately by the surveyor. After three surveys were completed, surveyors
chose a new anchor, and repeated the selection of respondents. Although generating a
perfectly random sample is not feasible in such circumstances, prior protest survey
research indicates that data from such a quasi-random sample are reliable and valid
(Walgrave 2007; see also Fisher, Stanley, Berman, and Neff 2005; Goss 2006).

11 We have not yet calculated the response rate for these surveys. However, our understanding is
that the response rate is roughly the same as the 2004-2005, probably in the 85%-90% range.
In 2005, the surveys consisted of eleven short questions on political participation, attitudes toward the war, and demographics. In the organizational level analysis, we drew data from two questions on the survey. First, “Are you a member of any civic, community, labor, or political organizations? If ‘yes,’ which organizations are you a member of?” Responses to this question reveal the respondent’s spectrum of membership affiliations, which frequently extend beyond issues of war and peace. Second, “Were you contacted to attend today by any particular organization? If ‘yes,’ which organizations?” Responses to this question indicate which organizations actively mobilized individuals specifically to participate in antiwar demonstrations.

The 2007 survey included the same eleven questions as in 2004-2005, but expanded to include a total of twenty-one questions. The additional questions allow the estimation of an individual-level equation explaining membership in hybrid organizations. They included question on past movement participation (“Over the course of your entire lifetime, which protests have you attended?”), education, and income. Along with questions on sex, race, age, political party identification, and organizational memberships from the original survey, these variables allow us to predict membership in a hybrid organization.

Sample of Movement Organizations. We collected data at the individual level and employed it to make inferences at the organizational level. We used responses by individuals on questions about organizational memberships and contacts to draw inferences about the relative size of organizational contingents at demonstrations and the interconnectedness of organizations. Network ties between organizations are estimated on the basis of overlapping memberships and contacts. This approach, known as
“hypernetwork sampling,” produces results in which the organizations listed by individuals are sampled in proportion to the number of contacts between groups and participating individuals (McPherson 1982; Kalleberg, Marsden, Aldrich, and Cassell 1990). This method samples large organizations with greater probability than small organizations, so many smaller movement organizations will not appear in hypernetwork samples. In total, we identified 293 distinct organizations that contacted individuals in our sample.\textsuperscript{12} Network ties similarly are sampled according to their frequency, so dyads with fewer co-contacts were less likely to be represented in the estimated network structure than were dyads with a greater number of co-contacts.

We supplemented the data provided by respondents with information available on the Internet about the organizations that contacted them. We were able to locate Web pages (or at least some on-line organizational information) for 93% of the contacting organizations. These sources helped us to determine the geographic scope of the organization (International, National, Regional, State, or Local), the accessibility of the organization to potential participants (i.e., whether or not it holds open meetings), and the founding year of the organization. Further, we categorized each organization as primarily antiwar, hybrid, or non-antiwar based on the organization’s mission statement and/or the “about us” section of the Web page. We used complete-case imputation to estimate the values of missing observations (Wood, White, Hillsdon, and Carpenter 2005).

\textit{Statistical Models}. We estimate three sets of statistical models to evaluate the hypotheses summarized in Table 1. The first model tests the relationship between

\textsuperscript{12} This count includes only organizations that directly contacted individuals to encourage them to attend the rally in question. If an individual indicated that she or he was a member of a particular organization, that organization is not included in this count. In total, we identified 1,149 unique membership organizations in the data.
individual participation in social movements and the likelihood of joining a hybrid organization. The second set of models tests the relationship between hybridity and the centrality of an organization in mobilization networks. The third set of models tests the relationship between network contacts and organizational success in mobilization.

In Model (1), the dependent variable is individual membership in a hybrid organization. The first explanatory variable is the Total Number of Organizational Memberships than an individual has. Inclusion of this variable accounts for the fact that as a person’s propensity to join organizations increases, the chances that she or he will join a hybrid organization at random increases; that is, people who are “joiners” may have a high likelihood of becoming members of hybrid organizations, even if the hybrid quality of the organization was not what attracted them. Since this variable is endogenous, we estimate a first-stage equation estimating total number of organizational members using party membership, sex, race, age, education, income, and city of protest as predictors. The second explanatory variable is Participation in Non-Antiwar Movements. This variable enables a test of the first hypothesis that involvement in non-antiwar movement increases the likelihood that a person joins a hybrid organization. The third explanatory variable is Participation in the Vietnam Antiwar Movement. This enables a test of the second hypothesis that persons with involvement in other antiwar movements are less likely to turn to hybrid organizations than other movement participants. Control variables in the model include individual betweenness in the organizational network, sex, age, race, and the location of the protest.

The second set of models examines organizational centrality in mobilization networks as the dependent variable. Because centrality can be conceptualized and
measured in multiple ways, we use three common and intuitive centrality measures (L. Freeman 1979). In Model (2), the dependent variable is *Degree Centrality*, which is the number of other organizations to which an organization is tied within the network. In Model (3), the dependent variable is *Closeness Centrality*, which measures the inverse of the average distance to all other organizations in the network (i.e., the higher the values, the closer the organization is to others). In Model (4), the dependent variable is *Betweenness Centrality*, which specifies how often an organization lies on the shortest path between two other organizations, thus revealing the tendency of an organization to be “between” others in the network. In each of these three models, network position is determined based on the contacts an organization made in the mobilization network (i.e., which organizations contacted the respondent specifically to attend the event under investigation). Two-mode data on individual ties to organizations are converted to one-mode data, which assigns each organization a position in the network (Breiger 1974). Across Models 2-4, centrality is estimated as a function of an organization’s identity type and a series of control variables.

In the second set of models, the dependent variable is the number of successful organizational contacts by each organization. The sample is split into three sets according to organizational identity. In Model (5), the dependent variable is *Mobilization by Primarily Peace/Antiwar Organizations*. In Model (6), the dependent variable is *Mobilization by Hybrid Organizations*. In Model (7), the dependent variable is *Mobilization by Non-Antiwar/Peace Organizations*.

The key independent variables in Models 5-7 are the number of *Member Network Ties* with organizations by identity type. These variables are counts of the number of
other organizations of a specific identity type with which an organization has co-membership relationships. The data to construct these variables are drawn from the first network question in the survey, which elicits information on membership in civic, community, labor, or political organizations. Using the membership data allows assessment of how the preexisting relationships among members of organizations shape the success of organizations in contacting individuals in the mobilization process for specific events. Across Models 5-7, mobilization is estimated as a function of network ties and a series of control variables.

Models 2-7 all include the same set of control variables. These variables were selected because we believed that they influence the strategic position and mobilization of organizations separate from the focus variables. First, *National or International Organizations* are expected to occupy more central positions and mobilize more supporters than organizations that function strictly at the local, state, or regional levels. National and international organizations are able to reach out to broader constituencies than organizations with a narrower geographic scope, thus providing them with an advantage in prominence and effectiveness. Second, organizations that *Hold Open Meetings* are expected to have a greater potential to build grassroots support than organizations that interact with their supporters only through the Internet or postal mail (Skocpol 2003). Third, organizations with a more distant *Founding Year* are expected to be more central and effective at mobilizing support than are younger organizations because they are better adapted to their environments and are more likely to obtain the resources that they need to achieve their objectives (Stinchcombe 1965).
We wish to underscore that the organizational data from these models are drawn from two different questions on the survey. Data for the dependent/endogenous variables in Models 2-7 are based on which organizations contacted people to attend antiwar demonstrations. These data describe the current activities of the movement which we wish to explain: **Centrality** in Models 1-3 and **Mobilization Count** in Models 4-6. Data for the focal independent/exogenous variables in Models 4-6 are based on the organizations in which the respondents indicated membership. Organizational memberships may extend far beyond organizations that mobilized support for the antiwar movement. Instead, organizational co-memberships reveal the underlying patterns of connections among organizations that exist independent of any particular mobilization effort. For example, an individual may have been a member of the Sierra Club, but the Sierra Club did not contact her or him to attend an antiwar rally. Conversely, an individual may have been contacted by an organization of which she or he was not a member. For example, an individual may have been contacted to attend an antiwar rally by UFPJ without being a member of the organization. These data yield different kinds of insights on how individuals and organizations are connected through social movements.

**Empirical Findings**

Descriptive statistics from the survey are reported at the individual level in Table 2. The results of the two-stage mixed process estimator are reported in Table 3. The first stage is an Ordinary Least Squares regression on the **Total Number of Organizational Memberships**. The second stage is a Probit regression on **Membership in a Hybrid Organization**. The second stage results yield the tests of the hypotheses under
investigation. As expected, the coefficient on Total Number of Organizational Membership shows a significant, positive effect of the individual propensity to join organizations and the likelihood of being in a hybrid organization. While this finding is not substantively important in and of itself, omission of this variable would bias estimates on other coefficients (since they would spuriously absorb the propensity to join). The significant, positive coefficient on Participation in Non-Antiwar Movements shows that activity in other social movements increases the likelihood that an individual joins a hybrid organization, thus supporting the paper’s first hypothesis. The significant, negative coefficient on Participation in the Vietnam Antiwar Movement supports the second hypothesis that individuals with a history of involvement in antiwar movement are less likely to join hybrid organizations than those who do not have this background. None of the control variables were significant in the second-stage equation. However, in the first stage, membership in a third party, age, education, and income were all significant contributors to the propensity to join organizations.

INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE

Descriptive statistics from the survey are reported at the organizational level in Table 3. The 293 organizations that contacted respondents in our survey reached an average of 2.904 respondents each. The organizations which contacted the most respondents – those with the largest Mobilization Counts – were UFPJ (116 contacts), the ANSWER Coalition (74), MoveOn.org (56), and Code Pink: Women for Peace (27). In the data, there were 90 primarily antiwar/peace organizations (30.7%), 38 hybrid organizations (13.0%), and 165 non-antiwar/peace organizations (56.3%). Although non-antiwar/peace organizations were the most common type of organization, they were the
least successful in mobilizing opposition to the war, contacting an average of 2.152 respondents each. Primarily antiwar/peace organizations contacted an average of 3.222 respondents. Despite their minority status, hybrids contacted an average of 5.421 respondents, making them more successful on a per-organization basis than the other identity types.\(^{13}\)

\[\text{INSERT TABLE 4 HERE}\]

Examining which organizations co-contacted the same respondents reveals the structure of the antiwar mobilization network. The four largest mobilizing organizations are also the most central in terms of Degree Centrality, Closeness Centrality, and Betweenness Centrality.\(^{14}\) However, below the top four, significant differences emerge between the two lists. For example, organizations such as the National Organization for Women, the American Friends Service Committee, and the Campus Antiwar Network are highly central within the antiwar co-mobilization network, but are not as successful in generating \textit{Mobilization Counts} as are organizations such as the International Socialist Organization, the International Action Center, Not in Our Name, and Troops Out Now. The difference between the two lists is a matter of strategic network position (represented by \textit{Centrality}) versus raw mobilizing success (represented by \textit{Mobilization Count}). For example, the International Socialist Organization has a well-organized internal structure that allows it to get people into the streets, but it is not as adept at relating to other peace organizations.

\(^{13}\) A one-tailed test that hybrids contacted more respondents than non-hybrids is significant at the 0.05 level of significance (\(t=1.863, p=0.03\)). A two-tailed test that hybrids are statistically different than non-hybrids is significant at the 0.10 level of significance (\(t=1.863, p=0.06\)).

\(^{14}\) We do not discuss the numerical values of the centrality results because it is more instructive to conceptualize centrality in relative terms than to attempt to attach substantive interpretations to the numerical values of centrality. In the discussion of the regression results below, we assess the coefficients in terms of standard deviations.
organizations as is the American Friends Service Committee, which has an ideological perspective that makes it easy for many groups to work with it.

The centrality and mobilization success of organizations that contacted individuals to attend antiwar demonstrations are visualized in Figure 3. The nodes in this network are primarily antiwar/peace organizations (red circles), hybrid organizations (green triangles), and non-antiwar organizations (blue squares). Organizations are connected in this network if they co-contacted the same individuals to attend demonstrations. Organizations that did not have any co-contacts in our sample are scattered randomly throughout the diagram. The figure reveals that each type of organization plays a central role in the network, though hybrid organizations appear to be proportionately more central; for example, they appear disproportionately in the main component of the network and less frequently in the periphery. The success of organizations in generating mobilization counts is represented in the network according to the size of the nodes, with relatively more successful mobilizers depicted with larger nodes. The figure reveals that most of the highly successful mobilizers appear close to the center of the network. However, not all of the organizations close to the center are successful mobilizers.

When examining co-membership Network Ties among organizations, considerable differences exist among identity types. Organizations are most likely to form ties with non-antiwar/peace organizations (5.007 per organization), partly because these organizations are most numerous in the environment. Organizations form a roughly

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15 The spring embedding algorithm in Netdraw 2.046 was used to position organizations close to one another in the network if they have a similar pattern of contacts with activists (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2007).
equal number of ties with primarily antiwar/peace organizations (1.212) and hybrids (1.044). More than half of the organizations in the sample are organized at the national or international level (51.2%). A slightly greater percentage (55.2%) holds open meetings. The average founding year was 1978.

Multivariate statistical analysis yields strong support for the theory that organizations with hybrid identities play a key role in creating spillover through interorganizational networks. Models 2-4 are fitted using a Tobit estimator and are reported in Table 4 (Tobin 1958). Since not all of the co-contacts in the population appear in the sample, some organizations are assigned centrality values of zero when they have a positive value of centrality in the population. A Tobit estimator is required to account for this truncation in the centrality estimates when estimating the regression coefficients.

The Tobit estimates show that hybrids are significantly more central than organizations with other types of organizational identities. This finding is robust to the measure of centrality used, holding up for Degree Centrality (Model 1), Closeness Centrality (2), and Betweenness Centrality (3). The estimates reported in the first row of Table 3 show that hybrid organizations are two-thirds of a standard deviation more central than non-hybrids in terms of degree centrality and closeness centrality. They are almost two standard deviations more central than non-hybrids in terms of betweenness centrality. These results strongly support the hypothesis that hybrid organizations are positioned as intermediaries in antiwar networks. With respect to the control variables, National or International Organizations are more central than local, state, and regional
organizations in antiwar networks. They are approximately three-quarters of a standard deviation more central in terms of degree centrality, one-half of a standard deviation more central in terms of closeness centrality, and three standard deviations more central in terms of betweenness centrality. However, neither Holding Open Meetings nor Founding Year make a difference in the centrality of an organization’s position.

Models 5-7 are fitted using a Negative Binomial estimator and are reported in Table 6 (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, pp. 70-72). The Negative Binomial estimator is required to account for a dependent variable that counts the number of supporters mobilized by each organization.16 Eight of the nine coefficients of primary interest are consistent with hypotheses outlined above. First, the results for Model (4) of Mobilization by Primarily Antiwar/Peace Organizations are consistent with the hypothesized effects. The negative coefficient on Member Network Ties with Primarily Antiwar/Peace Organizations supports the hypothesis that antiwar organizations compete with one another for supporters when they are closely networked with one another. One additional network co-membership tie between primarily antiwar organizations leads to an expected reduction of 0.370 contacts by each organization. The positive coefficient on Member Network Ties with Hybrid Organizations supports the hypothesis that antiwar organizations are more successful in mobilizing support when they are closely networked with hybrids. One additional co-membership tie with hybrids increases mobilization by 0.377 contacts. The positive coefficient on Member Network Ties with Non-

16 The Poisson estimator is a potential alternative approach to fitting these equations. If $\alpha$ is significantly greater than zero, then Negative Binomial is the appropriate estimator. If $\alpha$ is not significantly different than zero, then the Poisson and Negative Binomial estimators are asymptotically equivalent. The $\alpha$ statistics are reported in the bottom of Table 4. The results show that $\alpha$ is significantly greater than zero in Models (4) and (6), but is equal to zero in Model (5), making Poisson a potentially appropriate estimator in this case. Thus, we re-estimated Model (5) using a Poisson approach. We found no differences from the Negative Binomial in the pattern of statistically significant and insignificant coefficients.
Antiwar/Peace Organizations supports the hypothesis that antiwar organizations boost their mobilization potential when they forge ties with non-antiwar organizations. One additional co-membership tie with non-antiwar organizations spurs 0.991 more contacts. Among the control variables, National or International Organizations are more successful at mobilizing than organizations with a narrower geographic scope, though Holding Open Meetings and Founding Year do not make a statistically significant difference.\textsuperscript{17}

INSERT TABLE 6 HERE

Second, the results for Model (6) of Mobilization by Hybrid Organizations are consistent with the hypotheses outlined above. Positive coefficients on the Member Network Ties with Primarily Antiwar/Peace Organizations (one more tie leads to 0.286 more contacts) and Non-Antiwar/Peace Organizations (one more tie leads to 0.111 more contacts) support the hypotheses that hybrids are more effective when they build relationships both within and outside the antiwar movement. The insignificant relationship between mobilization by hybrids and network ties with other hybrids is similarly consistent with our hypotheses. While hybrids are stronger when they establish connections with their co-identified movements, there is no direct mobilization advantage to forming networks with hybrids from other movements. None of the control variables were statistically significant in this model.

\textsuperscript{17} We suspected that there may be a difference between organizations that were founded before and after September 11, 2001. Specifically, we thought that organizations founded in 2001 or later might have an advantage in reaching out to constituencies opposed to the policies of the Bush Administration. If this is the case, it could potentially mask positive effects normally flowing from organizational longevity. To explore this possibility, we experimented with a post-2001 dummy variable and a variety of interaction variables in Models 1-6. However, we failed to find any such effect. Therefore, we conclude that the across-the-board insignificance of Founding Year is not due to a year-2001 induced nonlinearity in the data.
Third, the results for Model (7) of *Mobilization by Non-Antiwar/Peace Organizations* offer mixed support for the stated hypotheses. As expected, forming ties with hybrid organizations has a positive effect on mobilization by non-antiwar groups, with one additional co-membership tie inducing 0.348 new contacts. However, forming ties with primarily antiwar organizations did not have the expected positive effect, but was insignificant instead. It may be that non-antiwar organizations mobilize when they are connected to hybrids with whom they closely identify, but that ties with primarily antiwar organizations are too peripheral to the organization’s mission to make much of a difference. Non-antiwar organizations are more likely to mobilize against the war when they are national or international in orientation or when they reach their supporters through open meetings. The founding year of these organizations did not make a difference to their mobilization potential.

**Discussion**

Our analysis of the survey data verifies the critical role that organizations with hybrid identities play in mobilizing the antiwar movement. The more individuals engage in social movement activity outside the antiwar movement, the more likely they are to join hybrid organizations. In contrast, individuals with histories of antiwar activism are less likely to turn to hybrids. Hybrids occupy central positions in antiwar mobilization networks and mobilize more supporters on a per-organization basis than do non-hybrid organizations. Co-memberships with hybrids help to enhance the mobilization success both of primarily antiwar and non-antiwar organizations. Further, hybrids are a more effective part of the antiwar movement when they forge close ties with other types of
organizations. Hybrids help to put in place the organizational infrastructure to make spillover a reality.

By distinguishing among primarily antiwar, hybrid, and non-antiwar types, we clarify the functions of interorganizational networks during mobilization. Networks do not have a uniform, positive effect on mobilization. Rather, the benefits of networks are conditional on how they connect organizations. When networks cut across organizational types, they add value to the mobilization process. Hybrids provide especially valuable links in networks because they have the potential to bridge otherwise hard-to-connect constituencies. When networks are formed among organizations of the same type, they tend to generate competition rather than cooperation during mobilization. There may well be non-mobilization-based benefits to interorganizational ties within the antiwar movement. For example, intra-movement ties may facilitate solidarity building, smooth communication, and augment coalition formation (Corrigall-Brown and Meyer 2007; Heaney 2004a; Kitts 1999). However, during mobilization, intra-movement co-memberships promote redundant contacts and impede movements from reaching out more broadly (cf. Uzzi 1997).

These results do not imply that all antiwar organizations necessarily ought to hybridize if they wish to maximize their potential for mobilization. Primarily antiwar/peace organizations are needed to unify and lead the movement. As the peak organization in the antiwar movement, United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ) has the capacity to assemble and activate constituencies than cannot be matched by any hybrid organization. The same is true of state and local peace groups, such as the North Carolina Peace and Justice Coalition and the San Diego Coalition for Peace and Justice, which are
essential for staging regional and metropolitan events. The results do imply, however, that hybrids are one part – indeed, a vital part – of a chain of mobilization. Given that there are many constituencies that are not represented (or are underrepresented) by hybrid organizations, the antiwar movement could expand its reach by aiding the operation of existing hybrids and sponsoring the establishment of new hybrids.

Some insight on where the antiwar movement has benefitted from spillover, and where it has fallen short, can be gleaned from the types of hybrids observed in our sample. A tally of hybrid organizations by their allied movements is reported in Table 7. The most common type of hybrid in our data crosses antiwar concerns with student and educational activism. Organizations such as College not Combat serve as movement liaisons to college campuses in their efforts to oppose military recruitment. Given the history of universities as incubators for peace movements, and for social movements in general, this finding is not overly surprising (Gitlin 1980; Rhoads 1998; Rojas 2007; Zhao 2001).

Hybrid organizations of veterans and military families are second to educational groups in their antiwar involvement (cf. Lutz 2001; Heaney and Rojas 2006). Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW), for example, has encouraged current soldiers to resist the war and recent veterans to speak out against it. They are sponsored by Veterans for Peace, which integrates the veterans’ movement at home (which is concerned with veterans health care, mental health, and reintegration with society) into the antiwar movement. The presence of hybrids with explicit anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist agendas may be responsible for causing some of the spillout from the global justice
movement observed by Hadden and Tarrow (2007). Organizations that hybridize peace with religion, social justice, antiracism, and women’s issues reflect the antiwar movement’s strength in mobilizing these constituencies.

Just as the presence of hybrid organizations reveals the strength of the antiwar movement in mobilizing students, veterans, women, communities of faith, and others, the absence of hybrid organizations points to places where the movement has failed to build sturdy bridges.\[18\] For example, only one contacting organization in our data – the now-defunct Environmental Peace Action – hybridized the peace and environmental movements in 2004-2005.\[19\] The absence of mobilization by environmental peace organizations reflects a considerable missed opportunity for both movements. Indeed, it was not until 2007 that activists began aggressively to seize the opportunity to merge the two movements with efforts such as No War, No Warming.

Our results also reflect the failure of the antiwar movement to bond authentically with well-organized ethnic constituencies. Organizations such as the ANSWER Coalition framed their missions in terms of antiracism, but did not do so in ways that resonated broadly within the African American, Latino American, or Asian American communities. This failure to connect may be due to a combination of several factors. First, the leadership of ANSWER and other antiracism peace groups did not come from established leaders in the corresponding ethnic communities. Second, these organizations

---

\[18\] We must emphasize that our data contain only a sample of mobilizing organizations. Thus, just because a particular organization does not appear in our sample does not mean that it does not exist or that it does not mobilize antiwar activists. At the same time, we believe that our sample does a good job of capturing the broad types of organizations that helped people to turn out. We are confident that veterans and student organizations were significant leaders in antiwar demonstrations. Similarly, we are confident that “Republicans for Peace” (or an analogous organization) was not a significant mobilizing force.

\[19\] Hybrid environmental peace organizations did appear in our sample of membership organizations. For example, 14 respondents reported memberships in Greenpeace. However, these organizations did not contact any of our respondents to attend antiwar demonstrations.
have close ties with communist groups such as the Workers World Party, thus
discouraging many “mainstream” community leaders from affiliating with them (cf.
Tierney 2005). Third, the general focus of these organizations on racism in U.S. foreign
policy did not squarely address concerns that many of these ethnic constituencies had
with domestic policies concerning employment discrimination, health care, immigration,
housing, and poverty. In short, there are no robust grassroots organizations of “African
Americans for Peace,” “Latino Americans for Peace,” “Asian Americans for Peace,” or
the like.20 This gap is perilous for the movement, especially since African Americans
and Latinos registered much higher levels of disapproval of the U.S.-Iraq War in opinion
surveys than did the population at large (Moniz 2005; Pew Hispanic Center 2007). Our
analysis strongly suggests that the antiwar movement could expand its mobilization
potential within these communities by increasing the resources devoted to hybrid ethnic
peace organizations.

Conclusion: Beyond the Antiwar Movement

Hybrid organizations are especially important to antiwar movements. Since wars
occur episodically, antiwar movements rely heavily on hybrids to attract leadership,
resources, and activists on short notice from more continuously-organized movements for
social justice, women’s rights, and other progressive causes. This demand for spillover is
part of the reason why peace movements are the most cosmopolitan of the left-leaning
social movements (Carroll and Ratner 1996).

20 An organization named “Latinos for Peace” does indeed exist, but we have encountered no
evidence that it has undertaken broad or effective grassroots organizing.
At the same time, hybrid organizations have been vital to a plethora of historical and contemporary social movements. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference hybridized the civil rights movement with the black church to lead nonviolent civil disobedience against the Jim Crow South, mostly notably including the Montgomery Bus Boycott (McAdam 1982). Catholics for a Free Choice (CFC) was founded in 1972 to hybridize the social justice tradition of the Catholic Church with the pro-choice movement for women’s reproductive rights (Staggenborg 1991, p. 60). Since the Catholic Church has taken such a strong stand against abortion, CFC is one of the few institutionalized links between the pro-choice movement and America’s millions of Catholics. Similarly, the Log Cabin Republicans began in California in 1978 as an effort by ideologically conservative gay and lesbian citizens to stop a statewide ballot initiative that would have banned gays and lesbians from teaching in public schools (Rimmerman 2000, p. 67). Log Cabin became a national organization in 1990 and today is the most prominent link between the gay rights movement and the Republican Party.

Given the ubiquity of organizations with hybrid identities and spillover between movements, this research has implications beyond the antiwar movement. The patterns observed among antiwar activists and organizations are unlikely to be replicated exactly in other movements, but the same mechanisms are frequently at work. Thus, we conclude by suggesting a few ways in which our results speak to the broader themes in the study of social movements, networks, and organizations.

Implications for the Study of Social Movements. The interdependency view of social movements – originally articulated by McAdam (1995) and Meyer and Whittier (1994) – has become the consensus view in this field. If social movements must be
understood in relation to one another, then there is a need to reexamine myriad aspects of movements in the context of this insight. Our analysis takes an important step in this direction by documenting the effects of intermovement interdependency on the strategic interactions during recruitment and mobilization. A similar approach could be taken to topics such as leadership, coalition dynamics, and media relations. For example, how do interorganizational networks affect the way that movements recruit leaders from allied movements? Do leaders govern differently depending on whether they are “home grown” or “transplants” from other movements? The question of how a given dynamic is affected by inter-movement relationships should become a standard component of any social movement investigation.

The presence of intermovement interdependency also has important implications for the methodology of social movement research. In particular, it hints at the benefits of using biography in a wider range of social movement studies (cf. Jasper 1997). Our finding that movements expand by combining with other movements implies that successful mobilizations bring movements closer together and accelerate the migration of activists between movements. A result of this dynamic is the creation of a pool of activists with multi-movement histories. Under these circumstances, the biographies of these activists become stories of how movements spill into each other and how individuals tie organizations together and hybridize them. Exploring these activists’ biographies in greater depth has the potential to deepen our appreciation of, for example, organizational maintenance and abeyance structures. Since the individuals active in a movement during its low points also tend to distribute their involvement among several other more active movements, biographical analysis could reveal how abeyant
movements borrow from their allies at the micro level. In general, if movements have long-term interdependent effects on one another (cf. Isaac and Christensen 2002), then biography is essential to unpacking how these effects play out through the lives of individuals.

**Implications for the Study of Networks.** This research adds to the accumulating body of knowledge about the contingencies of when and how networks matter (cf. Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, and Dowell 2006; Kitts 1999; Uzzi 1997). In particular, we provide another important example of a network whose structure is determined by heterophily, the attraction of dissimilar actors (Rogers and Bhomwik 1970; see also Bearman, Moody, and Stovel 2004). We show that the core of the antiwar network is composed of all three major types – primarily antiwar, hybrid, and non-antiwar organizations – and that interaction among these actors contributes to successful mobilization. This finding provides a counterweight to research that emphasizes the operation of networks when similar actors form ties (e.g., Mark 1998; McPherson, Lovin, and Cook 2001). These studies have emphasized that organizations and voluntary associations might be incubators for networks formed from homophilic association (McPherson and Ranger-Moore 1991; McPherson and Rotolo 1996; Rotolo and McPherson 2001). In contrast, our findings suggest that network studies should routinely explore whether actor heterogeneity modulates the differential effects of network ties.

**Implications for the Study of Organizations.** This research builds on a growing literature on the advantages to organizations of possessing hybrid identities (cf. Chadwick 2007; Kraatz and Block 2008; Minkoff 2002; Padgett and McClain 2006). Importantly,
we show that hybridity leads to positive performance effects in the mobilization process and makes organizations desirable network associates. We highlight that the uniqueness of hybrids comes not only from their organizational structures, but from their multiple, sometimes competing identities. These findings contrast with studies of markets which show that a firm with a hybrid identity may dilute its efforts and create cognitive dissonance among consumers (Hannan, Polos, and Carroll. 2007; Hsu 2006). Further research is needed to better appreciate the conditions under which hybridity is an asset to organizations and those under which it is a liability. Indeed, some environments may favor organizational hybridity, while others may punish hybrids for nonconformity. Similarly, hybridity may enhance the “political” functions of organizations – that is, their support-building efforts – but undermine the stability of their resource flows by instilling nervousness among their financial backers. In summary, our findings portend the need for more complex theories of how hybridity factors into organizational dynamics.
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Figure 1. Code Pink: Women for Peace

Figure 2. Multi-Movement Model of Mobilization

Legend
- Social Movement Organization
- Individual Activist
- Interorganizational Network Tie
- Organization-Activist Contact
+ Tie has positive effect on mobilization
- Tie has negative effect on mobilization
Figure 3. Antiwar Mobilization Network, 2004-2005

Legend
- Red: Primarily Antiwar/Peace Organization
- Green Triangles: Hybrid Organization
- Blue: Non-Antiwar/Peace Organization

Node: Mobilization Count
Size: Frequency of Co-Mobilization
Line: Frequency of Co-Mobilization Width
Table 1. Hypotheses for Networks and Mobilization by Organizational Identity

**INDIVIDUAL LEVEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership Equation</th>
<th>Likelihood of Joining a Hybrid Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in non-antiwar movements</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in other antiwar movements</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network Equations</th>
<th>Centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid Organization</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Equations</th>
<th>Mobilization by Primarily Antiwar/Peace Organizations</th>
<th>Mobilization by Hybrid Organizations</th>
<th>Mobilization by Non-Antiwar/Peace Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member Network Ties with Primarily Antiwar/Peace Organizations</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Network Ties with Hybrid Organizations</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Network Ties with Non-Antiwar/Peace Organizations</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Individual Protesters, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Percent Imputed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership in Hybrid Organization</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Org. Memberships</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>1.038</td>
<td>1.886</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Non-Antiwar Movements (# of moves)</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>2.052</td>
<td>1.703</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in the Vietnam Antiwar Movement</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Betweenness in Org. Membership Network</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.390</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age in Years</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>41.04</td>
<td>17.774</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity is White</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity is Black</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity is Latino</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity is Asian</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>5.004</td>
<td>1.826</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Level</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>3.309</td>
<td>3.309</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party Member</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party Member</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveyed in Washington, DC</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveyed in New York, NY</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveyed in Chicago, IL</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Data are drawn from surveys of 2,082 protesters who participated in large-scale antiwar demonstrations during 2007.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1 Total Number of Organizational Memberships</td>
<td>0.442*** (0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Non-Antiwar Movements</td>
<td>0.106*** (0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in the Vietnam Antiwar Movement</td>
<td>-0.211* (0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Betweenness in Org Membership Network</td>
<td>0.337 (0.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.073 (0.82) -0.027 (0.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age in Years</td>
<td>0.014 (0.003) 0.002 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity is White</td>
<td>0.233 (0.150) 0.035 (0.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity is Black</td>
<td>-0.297 (0.199) -0.078 (0.228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity is Latino</td>
<td>0.123 (0.198) -0.198 (0.206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity is Asian</td>
<td>-0.031 (0.255) 0.122 (0.246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.096*** (0.273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.083** (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Parameter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party Member</td>
<td>0.697***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party Member</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveyed in Washington, DC</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveyed in New York, NY</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveyed in Chicago, IL</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N (Individuals)                              | 2,082     |
| Log Likelihood                               | -4,795    |
| Likelihood Ratio $\chi^2$                    | 151.96*** |

*Note: * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$  
Data are drawn from surveys of 2,082 protesters who participated in large-scale antiwar demonstrations during 2007.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Percent Imputed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization Count – Total</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>2.904</td>
<td>8.965</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization by Primarily Antiwar/Peace Organizations</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3.215</td>
<td>13.018</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization by Hybrid Organizations</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5.421</td>
<td>12.591</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization by Non-Antiwar/Peace Organizations</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>2.152</td>
<td>4.774</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree Centrality in Mobilization Network</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td>1.130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.848</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness Centrality in Mobilization Network</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness Centrality in Mobilization Network</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.709</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Network Ties with Primarily Antiwar/Peace Organizations</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1.212</td>
<td>2.713</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Network Ties with Hybrid Organizations</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1.044</td>
<td>2.051</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Network Ties with Non-Antiwar/Peace Organizations</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>5.007</td>
<td>11.031</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National or International Organization</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holds Open Meetings</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founding Year</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1681</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>15.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Data are drawn from surveys of 2,276 protesters who participated in large-scale antiwar demonstrations during 2004-2005 and organizational Web sites.*
## Table 5. Tobit Regression on Organizational Centrality in Mobilization Network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Degree Centrality in</td>
<td>(3) Closeness Centrality in</td>
<td>(4) Betweenness Centrality in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilization Network</td>
<td>Mobilization Network</td>
<td>Mobilization Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hybrid Organization</td>
<td>0.775* (0.324)</td>
<td>0.176* (0.081)</td>
<td>1.055* (0.536)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National or International Organization</td>
<td>0.886*** (0.238)</td>
<td>0.131* (0.058)</td>
<td>1.882*** (0.526)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Holds Open Meetings</td>
<td>0.125 (0.247)</td>
<td>0.027 (0.061)</td>
<td>0.234 (0.445)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Founding Year</td>
<td>0.002 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.240 (6.006)</td>
<td>-0.327 (1.460)</td>
<td>-7.135 (9.247)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (Organizations) 293 293 293
Left-Censored N 144 144 257
Uncensored N 149 149 36
Log Likelihood -383 -195 -135
Likelihood Ratio $\chi^2$ 20.550*** 10.600* 22.440***
$\sigma$ 1.725 0.432 2.092

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$.
Data are drawn from surveys of 2,276 protesters who participated in large-scale antiwar demonstrations during 2004-2005 and organizational Web sites.
Table 4. Negative Binomial Regression on Mobilization by Organizational Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>(5) Mobilization by Primarily Antiwar/Peace Organizations</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
<th>(6) Mobilization by Hybrid Organizations</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
<th>(7) Mobilization by Non-Antiwar/Peace Organizations</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member Network Ties with Primarily Antiwar/Peace Organizations</td>
<td>-0.211** (0.080) [-0.370]</td>
<td>0.103*** (0.037) [0.286]</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.103*** (0.037) [0.286]</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Network Ties with Hybrid Organizations</td>
<td>0.215*** (0.096) [0.377]</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.090) [-0.059]</td>
<td>0.218***</td>
<td>0.218*** (0.090) [-0.059]</td>
<td>0.218***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Network Ties with Non-Antiwar/Peace Organizations</td>
<td>0.056** (0.024) [0.991]</td>
<td>0.040*** (0.014) [0.111]</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.040*** (0.014) [0.111]</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National or International Organization</td>
<td>0.439* (0.215) [0.865]</td>
<td>0.427 (0.253) [1.138]</td>
<td>0.411*</td>
<td>0.427 (0.253) [1.138]</td>
<td>0.411*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holds Open Meetings</td>
<td>0.144 (0.191) [0.252]</td>
<td>0.210 (0.210) [0.112]</td>
<td>0.328*</td>
<td>0.210 (0.210) [0.112]</td>
<td>0.328*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founding Year</td>
<td>0.004 (0.005) [0.006]</td>
<td>0.008 (0.006) [0.022]</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.008 (0.006) [0.022]</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (Organizations)                         | 90 | 38 | 165
Log Likelihood                          | -144 | -67 | -255
Likelihood Ratio $\chi^2$                | 125.730*** | 75.300*** | 133.120***
$\alpha$                                | 0.128*** | 0.000 | 0.145***

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

Data are drawn from surveys of 2,276 protesters who participated in large-scale antiwar demonstrations during 2004-2005 and organizational Web sites.
Table 7. Allied Movements of Hybrid Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allied Movement</th>
<th>Number of Hybrids</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students and Educators</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans and Military Families</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Imperialism and/or Anti-Capitalism</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiracism</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antinuclear</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Impeachment (Bush, Cheney)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>