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# Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... ix  

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... xii  

1 The Gap between Environmental and Structural Theories of the Organization .............. 1  
1.1. Introduction: Organizational Environments versus Internal Processes .................. 1  
1.2. The New Institutionalism and the Organizational Environment ......................... 5  
1.3. Organizational Autonomy and Resistance to the Environment ............................... 10  
1.4. Structural Resistance to the Environment ................................................................. 12  
1.5. Summary: A Model for the Study of Organizational Change ................................. 14  
1.6. Hypothesis Testing I: The Bureaucratic Response to Social Movements ............. 15  
1.7. Hypothesis Testing II: The Bureaucratic Response to Competition ..................... 18  
1.8. Methodology .................................................................................................................... 20  
1.9. Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................. 21  

2 The Diffusion of African-American Studies and the Bureaucratic Response to Social 
Movements ....................................................................................................................................... 22  
2.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 22  
2.2. A Historical Overview of African-American Studies .................................................. 23  
2.3. Hypotheses: Protest, Copying, and Constraint ............................................................. 33  
2.3.1. Protest ........................................................................................................................... 33  
2.3.2. Legitimacy and Organizational Mimicry ................................................................. 36  
2.3.3. Internal Structure and Organizational Change ......................................................... 40  
2.4. Control Variables ............................................................................................................. 44
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.5. Data</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6. Definition of the Independent Variables</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7. Methodology</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8. Missing Data</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9. Results</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10. Discussion and Conclusion</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Introduction</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Theories of Philanthropy, Social Change, and the Academy</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. Data</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4. A Note about the Case Study Method</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5. A Note about Terminology</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6. The Context of The Ford Foundation's Sponsorship of Black Studies</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7. The Ford Foundation and Black Studies: Goals and Visions</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8. The Ford Foundation and Black Studies: Patterns of Grant Making</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9. The Debate over Nationalism in Black Higher Education</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10. The Ford Foundation Confronts Black Nationalism</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11. Black Studies Programs Respond to Nationalism</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.12. Interdisciplinary Black Studies at Howard University</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.14. The Black Think Tank: The Institute for the Black World</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.15. Summary and Conclusion</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 Niche Dynamics, Internal Politics, and the Diffusion of Undergraduate Computer Science Programs

4.1. Introduction


4.3. Ecological Hypotheses about the Creation of Computer Science Programs

4.4. Structural Hypotheses about the Creation of Computer Science Programs

4.5. Data and Methods

4.6. Results

4.7. Summary and Conclusion

5 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research

5.1. Summary of the Empirical Results and Commentary

5.2. Theoretical Implications: Movements and Bureaucracies

5.3. Directions for Future Research

Appendix: Interview Instruments for Ford Foundation officers and Black Studies

Program Chairs

A.1. The Ford Foundation and Black Studies – Questions for Program Officers

A.2. The Ford Foundation and Black Studies – Questions for Black Studies Program Chairs

References
List of Tables

Table 1.1: An Outline of the Dissertation ................................................................. 20
Table 2.1: Data Sources and Years Measured ................................................................. 46
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................. 47
Table 2.3: Effects of Protest on the Creation of Black Studies Programs ....................... 53
Table 2.4: The Effects of Prior Black Studies Program Creation on Future Program
  Creation 1968-1980 .................................................................................................. 53
Table 2.5: The Effects of Enrollments, Age, Curricular Diversity, Per Capita Endowment,
  and Percentage of Students Who are Black on Black Studies Program Creation .... 55
Table 2.6: The Effects of Internal Organizational Structure on the Creation of Black
  Studies Programs ..................................................................................................... 55
Table 2.7: The Effects of Protest, Prior Program Creations, and Internal Structure on
  Black Studies Program Creation ............................................................................. 57
Table 3.1: Black Studies Grant Applications Submitted to the Ford Foundation for Black
  Studies ....................................................................................................................... 84
Table 3.2: List of Ford Foundation Black Studies Grants 1969-1971 ............................. 86
Table 3.3: Total Amount of Ford Foundation Grants by Year ..................................... 87
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................. 135
Table 4.2: Effects of Demand for Computer Science Major and Niche Density on the
  Creation of Computer Science Programs .................................................................. 136
Table 4.3: Effects of University Enrollments, Age, Per Capita Endowments, and Number
  of Academic Programs on the Creation of Computer Science Programs ............ 138
Table 4.4: Effects of the Proportion of Bachelor's Degrees Awarded in the Physical Sciences on the Creation of Computer Science Programs.................................139

Table 4.5: Estimated Effects of Demand, Niche Density, Engineering and Physical Science Enrollments, Internal Structure, and Control Variables on Creation of Computer Science Programs.........................................................140
List of Figures

Figure 1.1: A Model of Structural Change in Organizations.............................................15

Figure 2.1: Black Studies Degree Program Creations by Year 1960–1998 .........................29

Figure 2.2: Black Riots by Year 1960-1980................................................................30

Figure 4.1: Niche Overlap of Two Colleges.........................................................................123

Figure 4.2: Total Number of Computer Science Programs..............................................130

Figure 4.3: Average Niche Density Per Year .....................................................................132

Figure 4.4: Average Estimated Percentage of Graduating High School Freshmen in A

College's Niche that Intends to Major in Computer Science........................................134
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Abstract

Sociologists have developed environmental and structural approaches to the analysis of an organization's structure and behavior. Environmentalist theories, such as neoinstitutionalism and population ecology, focus on social norms, legal environments, and economic competition as motivations for bureaucratic behavior. In contrast, structuralist theories link bureaucratic behavior to the internal features of an organization, such as resources, internal politics, and the division of labor. While both approaches have experienced empirical and theoretical success, few scholars have tried to integrate both approaches in their work, and the lack of an organizational theory drawing from both perspectives is a gap in the literature.

This dissertation presents three empirical studies testing environmentalist and structuralist hypotheses about organizational change with statistical and historical data on the creation of academic programs in American universities. These three studies seek to address the gap between environmentalist and structural approaches in organizational analysis. Each study examines the effect of external events on the creation of academic programs and the role internal processes have in facilitating or suppressing the growth of academic programs. The first chapter tests hypotheses about social movement activity and the diffusion of Black Studies degree programs. The second chapter presents historical evidence concerning how philanthropic organizations influence universities by sponsoring model programs. The third chapter tests population ecology hypotheses about the market for computer science education and the diffusion of undergraduate computer programs.
Drawing from the protest event scholarship, the first study tests the hypothesis that campus unrest has a significant effect on the creation of Black Studies programs. I also test the neoinstitutionalist mimicry hypothesis, which asserts that an increase in the number of organizations adopting a particular form—such as the Black Studies program—increases the future rate at which other organizations adopt this form. I also argue that organizations might display resistance to their political environment, called "organizational inertia," because internal university structures such as size, resources, and student demography might prevent change.

I test my hypotheses with longitudinal data on universities and the creation of Black Studies programs. I estimate the effects of campus unrest, prior program creations, and internal structure on the rate at which Black Studies programs are founded. Campus unrest and prior program foundings have significant positive effects on the rate at which Black Studies programs are created. Size is found to have significant positive effects on the growth of Black Studies programs. The proportion of students who are black has a significant negative quadratic effect, indicating an inverted "U-shaped" relationship between ethnic enrollments and Black Studies program creation.

The second chapter addresses the definition of organizational change. Neoinstitutionalists have sometimes argued that powerful or wealthy actors, such as philanthropies, define organizational change by sponsoring model organizations. I assess this hypothesis through a case study of the Ford Foundation's sponsorship of Black Studies programs in the 1970s. Using the Foundation's archives and secondary sources, I find that Foundation officers sponsored programs in which faculty members rejected separatism and taught Black Studies as an interdisciplinary field. Documentary evidence
suggests that most sponsored programs retained an integrationist orientation. 

However, some programs adopted nationalist approaches to Black Studies, indicating the influence of criticisms of the Civil Rights project and the articulation of an alternative agenda for black higher education. 

The final chapter tests ecological hypotheses about the growth of computer science programs. Population ecologists hypothesize that available resources—“niche size”—and competition over resources—“resource partition”—affect market entry. According to ecological theory, total resources correlate with entry and competition over resources deters entry. I test ecological hypotheses with data on high school seniors’ intended college major and the creation of computer science programs in universities. Drawing from the college choice literature, I define the “niche” of the university to be those college-bound high school seniors who reside in the university’s geographic region and whose S.A.T. score falls within the university’s 25%-75% percentile range. I find that increases in the proportion of students in a university’s niche intending to major in computer science have a significant positive effect on the probability that a university will open a computer science program. I also find that the number of universities occupying the niche has a negative effect on the probability that a university in the niche will create a computer science program. I also test hypotheses about the internal structure of universities. As in the analysis of Black Studies programs, size has significant positive effects. The proportion of students majoring in either engineering or physical sciences also has a positive effect. These results hold when controlling for niche width and density, suggesting that internal structure and economic competition both contribute to the growth of computer science programs.
Chapter 1

The Gap between Environmental and Structural Theories of the Organization

1.1. Introduction: Organizational Environments versus Internal Processes

Sociologists have developed two distinct approaches to the study of formal organizations: an environmental perspective emphasizing the economic and political contexts of each organization’s behavior and a structuralist perspective focusing on the internal features of each separate organization, including its size, age, and authority structures and the division of labor. Although both approaches have enjoyed considerable success, and although organizational theorists consistently acknowledge the importance of both environment and internal structure (Grusky and Miller 1981; Scott 1981; Blau and Scott 1981), there appears to be few empirical studies integrating the insights of both approaches without granting privilege to one or the other. The goal of this dissertation is to bridge the gap between environmental and structural organization theories by testing hypotheses about the diffusion of academic programs among American universities.

The motivation for the environmentalist perspective in organizational studies is best summarized by Stinchcombe’s (1965) article on organizations, in which he argues that organizations created in an historical era possess similar internal structures as a response to similar social expectations:
“Organizational types generally originate rapidly in a relatively short historical period, to grow and change slowly after that period... The explanation is that organizations that are founded at a particular time must construct their social systems with the social resources available. Particularly, they have to build their elites so that they can recruit necessary resources from the society and to build the structure of the organizations so that in the historically given labor market they recruit skills and motivation of workers.” (Stinchcombe 1965: 168)

The transmission of values and work practices to organizations is called “environmental imprinting,” and the implications of environmental imprinting have been most fully developed in the “New Institutionalism,” which was developed by Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Scott (1991, 2000, 2001), and others (Fligstein 1991, 2001; Clemens and Cook 1998; DiMaggio 2001; Zucker 1987; Ingram and Clay 2000).

The New Institutionalism placed the environment at the center of organizational analysis and argued that organizational structures were not necessarily solutions to technical problems associated with tasks such as serving customers or making durable goods, but responses to social pressures created by the state, accreditation agencies, occupational groups, and other interest groups. In the view of New Institutionalists, organizational structure is not an optimal economic response to market conditions but an attempt to manage the demands imposed by these groups. New Institutionalism argues that organizations should be conceived of as parts of larger political systems defined by regularized economic and political practices. According to Scott’s (1991, 2000) version of the theory, which resumes Parsons’ (1959, 1960) thinking on organizations, polities are social systems defined by underlying values, which are translated into norms and
enforced on organizations by specific actors such as the state. Organizations are extensions of the larger social system.

In contrast to environmental theories, many sociologists pursue a structuralist approach. Kimberly (1976) summarizes the goals of structural analysis:

“The structuralists have asked three separate, but related, questions. What are the relationships between the structural characteristics of organizations? What are the determinants of variability in the structural characteristics of organizations? What are the consequences of structural variability for variability in organizational outcomes?” (Kimberly 1976: 571)

The structural approach goes back at least to Weber (1946), who emphasized the importance of authority structures and formal written codes, and Adam Smith (1776), who argued that the division of labor in firms was necessary for the execution of complex tasks required in market societies.

Structural theories tend to focus on what occurs inside the organization. Typically, structural analysis focuses on one aspect of an organization and tries to explain the emergence of this structure or its effects on behavior on other structures in the organization. Classical examples of structuralist analysis include Barnard’s (1968) argument that executives provide goals for organizations and Chandler’s (1990) argument that the multidivisional form is a response to information-processing problems inside firms. The structural approach is very prominent among management scholars trying to understand the links among firm organization, profitability, and other desirable business outcomes.

Despite the prominence of environmental theories and the New Institutionalism, sociologists have had a longstanding interest in structuralist theory, probably because it
deals with broad sociological concerns such as the definition of work roles and authority within a social group. Perhaps the most enthusiastic supporter of structuralist analysis in organizational sociology was Peter Blau, whose work with Schoenherr (1971) defined the structuralist agenda in organizational sociology. He justifies the emphasis on internal structure in the following reading of Weber:

"Weber recognized the vital importance the subdivision of responsibilities has for administrative organizations and placed it first in his famous enumeration of the characteristics of modern bureaucracy. His focus on a structure of differentiated responsibilities is also evident in his emphasis on the division of labor, specialized competence and particularly the hierarchy of authority (see Weber, 1946: 196–197, 1947: 330–331). An apparent implication of this stress on structural differences is that the analysis of differentiation in the formal structure constitutes the core of the systematic study of organizations..." (Blau 1971: 203)

Blau produced a series of works that developed structuralist theory and was able to support many of his hypotheses with data on different kinds of organizations, including employment agencies and universities (Blau 1973; Blau and Schoenherr 1971; Scott and Blau 1962).

While environmental and structural approaches have had much success, it has been noted that organizational theory has evolved into a collection of somewhat separate theoretical camps (Haveman 2000). The disarticulation of environmental and structuralist theory building and empirical research appears to be inefficient and perhaps counterproductive. Environmentalist and structuralist theories are not intrinsically contradictory. Environmentalist and structuralist theories appear to supplement and complement the other, and hypotheses derived from one do not obviate hypotheses derived from the other. Furthermore, research may confound the effects of different
processes present in a single organization or population of organizations by testing hypotheses derived from one at the expense of the other.

This dissertation reviews the New Institutionalism and argues that organizations have boundaries shielding them from external pressures. The boundary between workers within the organization and the environment allows for "inertia," or resistance to pressures exerted by interest groups, state actors, other organizations, or economic conditions. Therefore, sociologists of organizations should test both environmentalist and structural hypotheses.

Toward this end, this dissertation presents three empirical studies of organizational change testing environmentalist and structuralist hypotheses. Two studies test institutionalist and structuralist hypotheses about the adoption of academic programs promoted by social movement participants—the Black Studies program. A third study tests hypotheses about the effects of competition and internal politics on the creation of Computer Science programs.

1.2. The New Institutionalism and the Organizational Environment

The environmental approach to organizational sociology originates in the works of Selznick (1948), Merton (1948), and Parsons (1959, 1960). These sociologists argued that bureaucracies must not be understood as autonomous social systems but as social systems embedded in a larger society. Selznick (1948) argued that government agencies are constantly changing their mission to placate interest groups, a process he called co-option. Selznick also argued that decision making in organizations must not be
understood as the detached implementation of rules but as the outcome of interactions among managers, workers, clients, and political constituents. Merton (1948) elaborated this analysis when he argued that a bureaucrat’s emotional attachments to the bureaucracy and her profession played as much of a role in decisions as the application of written rules and codes.

Parsons (1959, 1960) extended this argument in his two articles, “Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations I and II.” In these articles, Parsons used functionalist theory to describe how rationally ordered social structures (i.e., the formal organization) fit into their larger social context. According to the Parsonsian theory, any social system must be able to set goals and mobilize resources within the system to extract resources from outside the organization. Parsons then described the different parts of the organization in functionalist terms. For example, management carried out the goal attainment function by setting policies within the organization. Parsons did note that no matter how well managed the organization was, it had to satisfy social norms to acquire legitimacy. Failure to do so might result in the organization’s closure:

“The essential point is that the conduct of the affairs of an organization must in general conform with the norms of ‘good conduct’ as recognized and institutionalized in the society. The most general principle is that no one may legitimately contract to violate these norms, nor may authority be used to coerce people into their violation.” (Parsons 1959: 84–84)

Not only does this quote summarize Selznick’s and Merton’s observations about bureaucratic sensitivity to social norms, but it sets the stage for later theorizing about organizational environments.
Starting in the 1970s, sociologists developed a new approach to organizational environments. The New Institutionalism draws heavily from the work of Selznick, Merton, and Parsons and retains their emphasis on legitimacy, values, and norms. The New Institutionalism argues that organizations are sensitive to social norms but that large, powerful actors such as the state exert pressure on bureaucracies instead of local political constituencies. The two seminal statements of the New Institutionalist theory are Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) articles on organizational ceremony and isomorphism. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that organizations are constantly signaling their conformity to social norms. The failure to do so might result in the organization’s closure. Meyer and Rowan provide the example of the routine medical procedure, which must be done for every patient regardless of the patient’s medical needs. Such procedures are done in order to prevent lawsuits or de-legitimization. Meyer and Rowan provide other examples of organizational behavior as conformity signal: the school that adopts a standardized curriculum or firms with standard hiring practices that have little relation to how employees are actually chosen.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) develop this theory further and argue that the organizational environment exerts such a strong influence on organizations in a given industry that they become identical in their internal organization and work patterns. Because organizations are responding to a common environment, they exhibit “isomorphism.” According to DiMaggio and Powell, the central task for organizational analysis should not be the analysis of variation among organizations but understanding the processes that lead to conformity:
“Much of modern organizational theory posits a diverse and differentiated world of organizations and seeks to explain variation among organizations in structure and behaviors... Hannan and Freeman begin a major theoretical paper (1977) with the question ‘Why are there so many kinds of organizations?’... We ask, instead, why there is such startling homogeneity of organizational forms and practices, and we seek to explain homogeneity, not variation. In the initial stages of their life cycle, organizational fields display considerable diversity in approach and form. Once a field becomes well established, however, there is an inexorable push towards homogenization.” (Powell and DiMaggio 1983)

An organization’s structure was less interesting because most organizations shared the same structure; attention should be paid to the mechanisms that result in conformity.

DiMaggio and Powell then offer three hypotheses about sources of environmental conformity: coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism refers to the power that the state has to enforce public opinion. Mimetic isomorphism denotes the copying of successful organizations by less successful organizations. The mimetic hypothesis asserts that when managers don’t know how to solve political or technical problems, they copy the behavior of managers who have solved these problems. Normative isomorphism refers to occupational groups who try to control the work in an organization, such as physicians setting standards in hospitals or teachers defining the proper boundaries of classroom work.

Subsequent institutionalist scholarship refines and extends neoinstitutional theory as laid out by Meyer and Rowan and DiMaggio and Powell. Scott (2000) reformulates institutional theory by describing three components of institutions, which he defines as the cognitive, normative, or cultural schemas and practices that provide regularity and structure in social life. These three “pillars of institutions” include the regulative practices that organize work, the role that values have in defining goals, and the cognitive “taken
for granted” aspects of social life that provide meaning to work and social interaction. Scott then argues that an institution is essentially an abstract entity that must be reinforced and reproduced over time. He then introduces the concept of the “institutional carrier” who transmits or enforces institutional practices.

In this reformulation of institutional theory, two environmental processes determine an organization’s internal structure. First, there is a process by which norms, values, and the cognitive taken for granted frameworks of social world are determined. Neoinstitutional theory says relatively little about this process except to stress its importance for determining the form and content of organizational practices. The second process is one in which vague, possibly contradictory values and schemas are transformed into specific practices by the state, occupational groups, and other actors. These actors translate values and cognitive frameworks into practices by enacting laws, establishing codes of conduct for professions, and creating work roles. In Scott’s institutionalism, the mechanisms described by Meyer and Rowan and DiMaggio and Powell belong to this second set of processes. Coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism all are examples of organizational structure being determined by actors enforcing norms.

The responses to neoinstitutional theory have been varied. Some have opted to empirically test neoinstitutionalism’s predictions with varying results (see Mizruchi and Fein 1999 for a survey). Others have sought to criticize and refine neoinstitutionalism (Perrow 1985). Clemens and Cook (1999) summarize some of the most important criticisms in an attempt to expand neoinstitutional theory. The focus of their attention is
the criticism that institutional theories provide a rich account of why organizations might share similar structures, but they fail to address organizational change:

“As a reaction against methodological individualism, technological determinism, and behavioralist models that highlight the flux of individual action or choice, the resurgence of institutionalist analysis in recent years has forcefully reminded social scientists of the significance of this ‘relative permanence of a distinctly social sort.’… This important contribution has generated new puzzles. One challenge follows from institutionalism’s emphasis on enduring constraint… Insofar as institutional arguments maintain that variation and change are minimized, those same arguments are ill suited to the explanation of change.” (Clemens and Cook 1999: 441–442)

Clemens and Cook then describe the different ways in which institutional change and, consequently, organizational change might occur. These include technical innovation, imperfect transmission of norms, and political contestation. Scott (2000) expands this list to include changes in public opinion, the occurrence of major political events such as wars or revolutions, and changes in professional norms such as management fads. Scott (2000: 148) argues that institutionalist scholars need to “extend theoretical and empirical efforts to better understand how stable structures become destabilized, how inertia gives way to innovation, how institutional change occurs.”

1.3. Organizational Autonomy and Resistance to the Environment

While institutionalists have recognized the need to understand how change occurs, they still focus on macro-level social structure. The emphasis on external events has led institutionalist theory to focus on political events and cognitive structures framing all social behavior while underemphasizing the ability of organizations to resist externally imposed change. The emphasis is still on internal change as a side effect of
environmental change. At best, organizations change institutions through errors in transmission of norms and practices or in the reinterpretation of norms. What is lacking in this approach is a sense that organizations themselves have substantial and meaningful responses to external pressures. While environments are no doubt important, organizations have more autonomy than institutionalists frequently acknowledge, and this must be included in any theory of how environments interact with internal structure.

Organizational autonomy can be justified by Coase’s theory of the firm and the theory of loose coupling; both show how organizations can maintain their independence from environmental forces. These theoretical approaches suggest that organizations do not automatically respond to every change in public opinion and other external events. Organizations by their very nature are social systems designed to resist political or economic pressures. In *The Nature of the Firm* (1937), Ronald Coase argues that transaction costs set organizational boundaries. Coase’s theory of the firm asserts that firm boundaries protect manager-work relationships from external economic forces: “It can, I think, be assumed that the distinguishing mark of the firm is the suppression of the price mechanism.” (Coase 1937: 389) Firms exist so that fluctuations in the labor market do not disrupt regularized work patterns. The costs of finding labor and negotiating contracts provide an incentive to create an organization in which some employees are on internal payroll and other work is performed at a price determined by market conditions.

Similarly, students of organizational boundaries have frequently noted that organizations exist not only to collect specialized laborers together for task completion but also to establish a boundary between the work group and outside forces (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978; Weick 1976; Orton and Weick 1990). Managers use organizational boundaries to protect work by disconnecting the most important work from those parts of the organization that are most susceptible to political interference, a process called loose coupling.

The depiction of the organization as an entity that shields work groups from the political and economic environment suggests that organizations are not slavish followers of political trends. Even in some versions of neoinstitutional theory, organizations are able to resist environmental pressures and managers set internal structures and work roles. Meyer and Rowan (1977) discuss loose coupling in their original article and suggest that environmental influences might end at the organizational boundary. Meyer and Scott’s (1983) work on school politics also suggests that political influence ends at the administrative level of the school, when they find that teachers’ understandings of school policy differ greatly from administrators but that administrators seem to closely follow state policy and public opinion. In that study, organizational ceremony occurred at the administrative level so that interested groups would not interfere with teaching inside the school.

1.4. Structural Resistance to the Environment

If organizations have some agency, that is, independence from external political or economic influences, institutional theory must recognize an independent role for organizational structure, which facilitates or suppresses the response to environmental pressures. Two broad kinds of theorizing about internal structure, theories of bureaucratic
rigidity and organizational politics, provide a framework for understanding how internal organizational processes and external events interact.

Hannan and Freeman (1989) argue that bureaucratic structures slowly change because organizations move toward an equilibrium with their environment. The more successful the organization, the more the internal structure of the organization is tailored toward obtaining resources from the environment. As time passes and the environment changes, organizations are faced with the problem of changing their internal structure to fit new circumstances:

"Nevertheless, we hold that selection processes tend to favor organizations whose core structures are difficult to change quickly. That is, we claim that high levels of structural inertia in organizational populations can be explained as an outcome of an ecological-evolutionary process." (Hannan and Freeman 1989: 67)

Hannan and Freeman identify at least two sources of resistance to change within the organization: bureaucratic structure and internal politics.

Bureaucratic structures allow managers to mobilize resources for change. In the passage cited above, Hannan and Freeman suggest that successful organizations employ difficult-to-change structures. They hypothesize that older and larger organizations tend to have the most extensive bureaucracies because they have complex tasks and manage more workers and resources. Hannan and Freeman also mention internal organizational politics as a source of inertia. Although Hannan and Freeman do not discuss internal politics further in their work, other scholars have developed the theory of internal politics in more detail (Bidwell and Kasarda 1987 review this literature). Scholars focusing on internal politics or on demography argue that groups in organizations protect their
position by resisting change. Organizational demography theorists argue that change can occur when new groups enter the organization and disrupt existing political arrangements (Stewman 1988). Some social psychologists have argued that changes in organizational demography create intergroup tension that can be resolved through organizational change (Williams and O'Reilly 1998).

1.5. Summary: A Model for the Study of Organizational Change

The discussion of New Institutionalism and organizational inertia can be summarized and used to formulate a model of organizational change. First, institutionalism emphasizes the transmission of norms and values from persons outside an organization to persons inside the organization. Scott (2000) calls the persons who transmit values institutional carriers. For example, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that states use their authority to force organizations to comply with government regulation.

Second, organizations have boundaries that shield some activities from political interference or market fluctuations. Boundaries can be created through contracts, loose coupling, or organizational subunits dedicated to managing relationships with investors and political constituents. These boundaries create some inertia, or resistance to these external pressures, because workers inside the organization have reached equilibrium with their environment by establishing internal structures that efficiently extract and process resources from their environment. Consequently, these structures tend to be rigid and change slowly when economic or political circumstance changes.
Third, resistance to the environment achieved through boundaries allows for internal processes to play a role in defining future organizational structure. Hannan and Freeman’s theory of bureaucratic rigidity, described above, implies that older and larger organizations are well adapted to their environment and are difficult to change. Hannan and Freeman also argue for the importance of internal politics. Figure 1.1 summarizes the argument.

![Diagram of structural change in organizations](image)

Figure 1.1: A Model of Structural Change in Organizations

1.6. Hypothesis Testing I: The Bureaucratic Response to Social Movements

The first two empirical studies of this dissertation address the interaction between organizations and their political environment. In chapters two and three, environmental and structural hypotheses about the diffusion of Black Studies programs are deduced.
from institutionalist and structuralist theory. The first empirical study examines the diffusion of Black Studies programs throughout the population of four-year colleges and universities. Chapter two formulates hypotheses about the effect that campus protest and off-campus insurgency might have on the creation of a Black Studies program. I also test hypotheses about the effects of a university’s internal structure on the creation of a Black Studies program.

The second empirical study addresses the transmission of norms from a philanthropic organization to universities in order to further study the relationship between an organization’s environment and its internal structure. Exploring the concept of environmental imprinting through a case study of a large organization and its sponsorship of organizational change, the second study focuses on how program officers at the Ford Foundation decided to focus their support on a specific model for Black Studies programs. That case study also presents some evidence of how Black Studies programs responded to the Ford Foundation’s involvement in the Black Studies field, exploring the issue of resistance to external pressures in more detail.

These two chapters contribute to the literature on politics and organizations by focusing on a movement’s effects on nongovernmental organizations. The New Institutionalist literature usually recognizes political processes as crucial in determining organizational structure. However, few institutionalists have explored organizational responses to social movements; most institutionalist research on politics and organizational behavior focuses on state regulation of industry and the enforcement of occupational standards (Dobbin 1994; Dobbin and Sutton 1998). The literature on social
movements and organizational environments usually focuses on the organizational forms adopted by a movement (Clemens 1993, 1998; Minkoff 1995), not on how bureaucracies respond to movements. Surprisingly, recent reviews of the institutionalist literature do not even mention social movements as a source of change in organizations (for example, Scott 2000; Clemens and Cook 1998; Ingram 2000). This may be due to an emphasis on equilibrium and homogeneity, as suggested in the citation from Clemens and Cook; social movements are about disrupting and changing institutions.

These two empirical studies also contribute to the research on movements and their effects on organizations by focusing on their effects on nongovernmental organizations. The literature on social movements and their effects frequently focuses on changes in government, through electoral victories, legislation, or the courts (Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam 2001; Guigni 2000). Some of the literature on movement-initiated policy innovations focuses on the spread of innovations among states, nations, or municipalities (Amenta 1992; Strang 1993).

Similar studies for populations of nongovernmental organizations are less frequent and often focus on the dynamics of the movement, not the movement’s target. For example, there are some studies of the antinuclear movement in the United States and Europe, but these studies usually focus on how the movement emerged, recruited members, and mobilized against nuclear power (Schumaker 1975, 1978). These scholars rarely ask how a power utility’s internal structure affects its response to protest. Similarly, while there are studies of schools and social movements, few of them discuss
how internal organizational processes may affect the response to demands for curricular reform (Yamane 2000; Rhoades 1995).

Binder (2002) best summarizes this gap in the literature in her discussion of school responses to the creationist and Afrocentrist movements of the 1980s and 1990s:

“Because so much research effort has flowed toward the question of movement formation and emergence, we have few keys for understanding the conditions and circumstances that led to the eventual rebuke of both Afrocentrists and creationists, the processes leading to their temporary success and failure, or the actual effects gained by either movement. We are even less prepared to know why subject bureaucracies (the organizations being challenged) respond positively or negatively to their challenger’s demands, how they deliver certain kinds of victories and defeats, or about their very ability to accommodate Afrocentrists’ and creationists’ claims.” (11)

Chapters two and three address this gap.

1.7. Hypothesis Testing II: The Bureaucratic Response to Competition

The third empirical study focuses on the interaction between a university’s economic environment and its internal structure by testing hypotheses about the creation of Computer Science programs in American universities. This third chapter derives hypotheses about a university’s economic environment from population ecology theory (Hannan and Freeman 1978, 1989; Carrol and Hannan 2000), which makes predictions about the effect of resource competition on an organization’s behavior. Unlike the New Institutionalism, which theorizes about legitimacy and political process, population ecology theorizes about the aggregate resources available to a population of organizations. Population ecologists develop theories of how organizations “crowd each
other” while competing for resources and the effects of crowding on an organization’s growth.

The third empirical study of the dissertation contributes to the population ecology literature by testing hypotheses about the effects of both internal structure and resource competition on organizational change. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, there has always been a recognition that internal structure and organizational environment both affect organizational change. In the population ecology literature, some scholars have tried to understand how internal structure influences the response to resource competition. For example, there is now a substantial ecological literature on the relationship between competition and an organization’s size and age (Ranger-Moore 1997; Banaszak-Holl 1991; Delacroix and Swaminathan 1991; Baum and Mezias 1992; Dobrev 1998). Such empirical studies are intended to demonstrate how resource scarcity might influence the decision to adopt a new form. The third empirical study contributes to this literature by focusing on internal politics in addition to size and age. Specifically, the third chapter hypothesizes that some work groups within universities, such as engineers, might oppose the creation of Computer Science programs because computer science was not recognized as a legitimate academic discipline. By testing the hypothesis about the effects of internal politics while controlling for the effects of competition, the third chapter addresses the gap between population ecology and structuralist theory.
1.8. Methodology

This dissertation employs quantitative and qualitative methods. To evaluate environmental and structural hypotheses about the spread of Black Studies and Computer Science programs among American universities, I employ statistical methods to analyze longitudinal data on universities and the creation of academic programs. For the first and third empirical studies, I collected yearly data on a university’s enrollments, age, finances, and degrees offered. I collected data on protest events for the chapter on the diffusion of Black Studies programs, and for the chapter on Computer Science programs, I gathered data about the demand for a Computer Science major by college-bound high school seniors. I use Cox regression to estimate the effects of a university’s internal structure and the political or economic environment on the creation of new academic programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 Introduction</td>
<td>Review of environmentalist and structuralist theory</td>
<td>Theory Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 Diffusion of Black Studies Programs</td>
<td>New Institutionalism</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 Philanthropic sponsorship of Black Studies Programs</td>
<td>New Institutionalism</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 Diffusion of Computer Science Programs</td>
<td>Population Ecology</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5 Conclusion</td>
<td>Implications for New Institutionalism and Population Ecology</td>
<td>Theory Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Outline of the Dissertation
The second empirical study on the transmission of values from philanthropic organizations to universities is a case study that uses documentary evidence and interviews to develop a narrative about the awarding of grants to Black Studies programs and the response of some academics to targeted grant making. The case study method allows for the detailed examination of the politics surrounding organizational change. To conduct my case studies, I traveled to the archives of the Ford Foundation and conducted interviews with former Black Studies program chairs and Foundation program officers.

1.9. Summary and Conclusion

This chapter began by noting that the sociology of organization tends to emphasize either the internal structure of an organization or the influence of external actors such as the state. Drawing from various organizational theories, I argued that organizations should display some inertia, that is, resistance to external influences. Subsequently, one should expect that both environmental and internal processes contribute to an organization's behavior and the development of hypotheses from one set of theories does not mitigate the need for the testing of hypotheses derived from other theories. I then discussed the organization of the dissertation: two chapters addressing the interaction between internal structure and political context and a third chapter testing hypotheses about internal structure and competition over resources.
Chapter 2

The Diffusion of African-American Studies and the Bureaucratic Response to Social Movements

2.1 Introduction

This chapter applies the theoretical arguments of the previous chapter to the growth of Black Studies (also referred to as African-American Studies) programs in American colleges and universities from 1968 to 1980. Briefly, this chapter argues that social movements affect organizational change through direct confrontation and by introducing new organizational forms. I also argue that organizations might display resistance to change because they are too large or bureaucratic.

The plan of this chapter is as follows. First, I offer a narrative description of the growth of Black Studies programs. Next, I review the literature on social movements and hypothesize that disruptive movement tactics have positive effects on the growth of Black Studies programs. I then argue that some of the growth of Black Studies programs might be attributed to mimicry. Neoinstitutional theory suggests that Black Studies might have gained legitimacy after some universities opened Black Studies programs in response to campus unrest and that an organizational form's legitimacy correlates with its spread throughout an organizational population. The hypothesis is that the number of Black Studies programs created in a given time period has a positive effect on the creation of Black Studies programs in a future time period. Finally, universities might not start a
Black Studies program because the university does not have the resources or flexibility required for change.

I test my hypotheses with longitudinal data on universities and founding dates of Black Studies programs. Cox regression analysis is used to estimate the effects of disruptive tactics, organizational mimicry, and internal structure on the rate at which Black Studies programs are founded. I conclude by discussing how the hypotheses and theories developed in this chapter might be used to analyze other examples of movement-initiated organizational change.

2.2. A Historical Overview of African-American Studies

It is difficult to unambiguously identify the origins of African-American Studies, because research and teaching about African-American history and culture goes back to the nineteenth century (Crouchett 1971). One can plausibly argue that African-American Studies can be found in the writings of sociologists and historians such as W.E.B. DuBois (1899), St. Clair Drake (1945), and E. Franklin Frazier (1957). DuBois’s sociological works such as *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899) and the reports issued by his research center at Atlanta University all discuss the African-American community and make a case for the intrinsic worthiness of studying African-American institutions.

Early twentieth-century scholarship on the African-American community coincided with a criticism of educational institutions and the establishment of intellectual organizations. Perhaps the most well known black criticism of American education is to be found in the writings of Carter G. Woodson, a prominent educator and historian and the founder of the *Journal of Negro History*. He criticized predominantly white
educational institutions because they produced subservient blacks who could not recognize their domination by mainstream educational institutions. His most well known book, *The Mis-Education of the Negro* (1977 [1933]), articulated a radical critique of American schools that has remained influential among skeptics of mainstream educational institutions. For example, Woodson argues that universities were too busy educating white students and ignored the needs of African-Americans:

"Northern and Western institutions, however, have had no time to deal with matters which concern the Negro especially. They must direct their attention to the problems of the majority of their constituents, and too often they have stimulated their prejudices by referring to the Negro as unworthy of consideration. Most of what these universities have to offer as language, mathematics, and science may have served a good purpose, but much of what they have taught as economics, history, literature, religion and philosophy is propaganda and cant that involved a waste of time and misdirected the Negroes thus trained." (3–4)

The belief that educational institutions were misleading blacks became a theme in later criticisms of mainstream educational institutions.

In "The Study of the Negro," the last chapter of *The Mis-Education of the Negro*, Woodson makes an argument very close to the arguments made by Black Studies' advocates almost forty years later. Woodson asserts that African-Americans spend too much time learning about the history of other races. There is a false belief that the history of blacks is unworthy of study. According to Woodson, this belief is used to maintain blacks' inferior position in American society:

"Let him learn to admire the Hebrew, the Greek, the Latin and the Teuton. Lead the Negro to detest the man of African blood—to hate himself. The oppressor may then conquer, exploit, oppress and even annihilate the Negro by segregation without fear or trembling." (192)
Woodson's scholarly organization, the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, aimed to place black history among the history of other races and to avoid disseminating "spectacular propaganda or fire-breathing agitation" (194).

Between the time that *Mis-Education* was published—1933—and the year of the first Black Studies program—1968—there were many more attempts to establish scholarly and literary discourses about the African-American community (Carr 1998). Examples include the many writings of Lerone Bennett (1969), an intellectual successor to Carter Woodson who writes voluminously about black history. Bennett's extensive writings in various black political opinion journals urged blacks to learn about their own past. Another example is Cheikh Diop (1954), an early proponent of the theory that African-American culture has roots in ancient Egyptian culture. Diop was instrumental not only in articulating early Afrocentric theories but in developing an intellectual network. Diop was responsible for founding a scholarly organization and for coordinating various conferences in which scholarship on Egypt and the African-American community was discussed (Carr 1998: chapter 8).

The transition from intellectual movement to institution occurred in the 1960s. Historians usually identify college desegregation and the emergence of "Black Power" as the precipitating events leading to Black Studies (Huggins 1987; van Deburg 1992). The literature on Black Studies often discusses the role that student groups and campus unrest had in making Black Studies a pressing issue (Pitts 1975; van Deburg 1992; Johnson and Nichols 1977), but surprisingly few articles discuss exactly how student activists came up with the idea of a freestanding Black Studies program. How did this new organizational form—the Department of Black Studies—emerge from preexisting academic
organization? Did students innovate the concept in 1968? What was distinctive about San Francisco State College in the 1968–1969 academic year? How did college bureaucracies respond to protest?

A government report made to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Orrick 1970) chronicles the emergence of unrest at San Francisco State College. Based on interviews and written records, the report describes how African-American students developed the Black Studies concept and how protest was crucial in getting the program established. The report also describes the administrative response to student demands and the events preceding the opening of the Department of Black Studies, showing how internal organizational processes interacted with protest and resulted in the first Department of Black Studies.

According the report, black students were first admitted to San Francisco State College in appreciable numbers in the early 1960s (81). By 1963, a Black Student Association was chartered, and the group became a focal point for campus politics (83). In the mid-1960s, students with ties to the Student Non-Violence Coordinating Committee (SNCC) enrolled at the campus and started to recruit others into the Black Student Association (83). Members of the Black Student Association also started to organize their own educational activities. For example, a reading program for poor youth in the neighborhood surrounding San Francisco State College was established. The report notes that this was a turning point for many students; they realized that they could organize their own educational activities (85). Although the report does not say precisely who invented the Black Studies idea, it is telling that members of the Black Student Association participated in the experimental studies program, which permitted students to
teach courses on “current events.” B.S.A. students taught Black History and assigned Woodson’s text, *The Mis-Education of the Negro*. Perhaps this was the first example of “Black Studies,” a course with a self-consciously African-American orientation that was not affiliated with an existing social science or humanities program.

The report notes that Black Studies was on the agenda of a faculty senate meeting in 1966 but that there was little progress in approving or rejecting the proposal for a Department of Black Studies (121). In 1967 and 1968, Black Studies became a more urgent issue when members of the Black Panther Party enrolled at San Francisco State College with the explicit intention of recruiting students and training them in protest tactics (84). During these two years, some students participated in the freedom rides and others traveled to Cuba to attend an international socialist student conference. Having learned organizing tactics, these students staged protests at San Francisco State College, and there were occasional episodes of violence between black and white students. Relations between students and administrators were strained by the fall of 1968, when the president of the college suspended George Murray, a Black Panther and English Department graduate student, because Murray had vandalized the offices of the student newspaper and punched the editor (115–121).

The Black Student Association’s response to Murray’s suspension was a campus-wide strike (1). With other student groups, the black students were able organize mass demonstrations and sit-ins. They were also able to maintain picket lines. It is important to note that the precipitating event was the suspension of George Murray, not Black Studies. However, the general atmosphere of unrest may have emboldened students, and when they presented their demands to the administration, the first demand was a Black Studies
program. The reinstatement of Murray as an instructor in the English Department was the last demand on the list. The first nine demands concerned the creation of Black Studies, its staffing, and affirmative action.

The strike started in November 1968 (43), continued into the winter, and was eventually resolved in March 1969 (76). George Murray was not reinstated and black applicants were not automatically admitted to the college, as student protesters demanded, but Black Studies at San Francisco State College was approved. The Department of Black Studies was funded through donations of budget lines from larger departments such as English, and the program offered courses in the Fall 1969 semester.

San Francisco State College was not the only campus to experience black student protests. There has been no systematic count of black student protests, but there were protests at many branches of the California State College system and the University of California, Ivy League schools such as Harvard, Yale (Huggins 1985), Cornell (Downs 1999), and Columbia (Huggins 1985), Howard University (Myles 1970), and liberal arts colleges such as Amherst College and Gustavus College (Astin 1969; Astin et al. 1975). This list omits many examples, but it suffices to demonstrate that black student protest had spread across the country, and many Black Studies programs were founded as responses to student protest.

How did Black Studies evolve after the first programs were founded amid campus unrest? A comprehensive review of the field of Black Studies is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few developments can be noted. Most Black Studies degree programs were founded by 1975; Figure 2.1 shows the number of Black Studies programs founded each year from 1966 to 1998. The data were collected by the author and are described in a later
section of this paper. Except for 1990, no more than two Black Studies programs were founded per year after 1973. Black Studies experienced the most growth, as measured by program creations, from 1968 to 1973.

![Bar chart showing Black Studies Degree Program Creations by Year 1960–1998](image)

**Figure 2.1: Black Studies Degree Program Creations by Year 1960–1998**

The trend in Black Studies program creations can be attributed to many factors. In this paper, I test the hypothesis that disruptive tactics have positive effects on the creation of a Black Studies program. This hypothesis will be tested using more sophisticated methods in later sections, but some descriptive statistics can be presented. For example, Figure 2.2 shows the yearly number of civil disturbances by or on behalf of minorities from 1960 to 1980. A plausible hypothesis is that the atmosphere created by black riots and other disturbances might have led campus administrators and faculty to perceive Black Studies
as urgent. The data on black protest events are compiled from the *New York Times*, *Facts on File*, *Riot Report*, *Congressional Quarterly*, and other sources (Fording 2000).

![Figure 2.2: Black Riots by Year 1960–1980](image)

The peak of black insurgency coincides with the peak in the number of Black Studies program creations—1969. The decrease in black protest events post-1969 also coincides with a decrease in the yearly number of program creations.

Although protest is crucial in the history of Black Studies, it is by no means the only process contributing to the growth of Black Studies. One of the few surveys of Black Studies program directors in the 1970s found that 50% (N=30) of Black Studies programs were not founded as responses to protest (Black and Cobb 1976). This finding suggests that some of Black Studies’ growth might be attributed to factors other than campus unrest. Perhaps Black Studies was becoming an acceptable academic discipline.
Writings on the development of Black Studies programs suggest that Black Studies had acquired some degree of legitimacy by the early 1980s. Darlene Clark Hine (1990), then Professor of History at Michigan State University, noted the increasing legitimacy of Black Studies in a Ford Foundation report. Early in Black Studies’ history, administrators opposed Black Studies programs because they believed such programs lowered academic standards. By the time she interviewed administrators in the mid-1980s, Hine found that the field’s legitimacy increased because there was now a pool of qualified scholars:

"The tide has turned, there has been a discernible shift among college administrators from amused contempt or indifference to enthusiastic support of Black Studies. Now administrators are eager to improve the quality of their programs and departments. One important factor has been the availability of productive, well-trained scholars willing, indeed anxious, to head and/or work in Black Studies. No longer do administrators have to rely on the local minister or community activist to oversee and teach Black Studies. If they put up the money, administrators can recruit black scholars." (17)

Clark goes on to argue that there is also an element of political expediency in Black Studies’ new legitimacy

"Another motivation fueling the change in attitude toward Black Studies is institutional expediency. Faced with the specter of declining black student enrollments, university administrators are increasingly using strong Black Studies departments, programs, centers and institutes as recruitment devices. Moreover, as is often the case, the only critical mass of black faculty working at many of these institutions is housed in Black Studies divisions." (17–18)

Clark then opines that ethnic studies programs are the only source of faculty racial diversity on many campuses.

Although it can be argued that Black Studies programs eventually gained some legitimacy, there is also evidence that these programs struggled. For example, Mario
Small's (1999) sociological analysis of the programs at Harvard and Temple Universities focuses on how two programs employed radically different survival strategies. Harvard's program faced extinction when enrollments reached almost zero and the program had lost so much status that it had only one instructor and a very dismal office. Temple's program faced some different problems. Administrators at Temple believed that the program's offerings overlapped with existing programs too much and that this was sufficient grounds for closure. Each program responded in its own way. Temple reconstructed itself as a center of Afrocentric thought, while Harvard's program forged strong ties to other departments through a series of highly visible joint appointments. This de-legitimization of the field has been reported in at least two other sources. Cunningham's (1990) overview of ten Black Studies programs found other instances of de-legitimization. Program chairs reported frequent criticisms of their program on the grounds that it offered no unique courses and had low academic standards. Criticisms at one of the universities studied by Cunningham were not countered and the program closed. An earlier study by Frye (1976) of three universities reports the same process occurring as early as the 1970s. Drawing from faculty interviews and survey responses, Frye reports that the program most accepted by faculty as legitimate was the one in which faculty felt that the Black Studies program had defined a unique role and offered classes on topics not covered by existing departments.
2.3. Hypotheses: Protest, Copying, and Constraint

The overview of Black Studies’ history focuses attention on three processes related to the growth and development of African-American Studies programs. First, student mobilization played a key role in creating African-American Studies programs. Without protest, African-American Studies might never have developed an organizational apparatus. The field might have remained a specialty within existing humanities and social science disciplines. Student protesters were sometimes members of groups such as SNCC that had experienced prior success. Members of these groups could use successful tactics in new situations, such as the pursuit of an African-American Studies program. Unrest unrelated to African-American Studies also provided opportunities for students to raise the issue. Second, the perceived legitimacy of African-American Studies contributed to the growth and decline of African-American Studies programs. If the field was deemed legitimate, then administrators and faculty might be more likely to approve a program and to allocate resources for program development. Third, internal organizational processes contributed to the growth and stability of African-American Studies programs. At San Francisco State College, excess financial resources in the form of surplus FTEs (full time equivalent) made the creation of Black Studies possible. At Harvard and Temple, resources were available for the renovation of programs. Student demography also had a role in promoting African-American Studies; African-American students are natural internal constituencies for African-American Studies programs.

2.3.1. Protest

William Gamson argued in The Strategy of Social Protest (1990) that social movements employing disruptive tactics are more likely to achieve their goals than
nondisruptive movements. Analyzing data on American social movements in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Gamson argued that movements employing strikes,
violece, and other disruptive techniques are more able to draw attention to their goals
and impose costs on political incumbents. Since the publication of Gamson’s work, other
scholars have reanalyzed Gamson’s data (Goldstone 1980) and tested Gamson’s
hypothesis with other data (Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992; Mirowsky and Ross 1981;
Ragin 1987; Stedley and Foley 1979). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess
the voluminous research on Gamson’s hypothesis, there is much evidence that disruptive
tactics do correlate with a movement’s goal attainment (Cress and Snow 2000), while it
should be noted that some scholars argue that protest damages the reputation of a social
movement and should have negative effects on goal attainment (Schumaker 1975, 1978).

Research on protest and movement outcomes offers two explanations of how
protest leads to organizational change: protest might change public opinion, and
protesters can extract concessions from political incumbents in exchange for ending
protest. According to the first approach, movements participate in the process by which
problems are defined and new policies are debated. Rank-and-file members of the
movement engage in protest drawing attention to issues, while movement leaders interact
with the media and sympathetic political elites (Piven and Cloward 1977).

The process by which political incumbents concede to movements in exchange
for ending public disruptions has been called “social control” by some scholars (Piven
to these researchers, state actors—legislators, law enforcement officials, etc.—have a
strong interest in preventing public challenges to their authority. If movement leaders
succeed in mobilizing a large number of persons and publicly challenge the state, then state actors might perceive their authority eroding. In a broad sense, protest is a conflict over state-society relations that might be resolved by repressing the movement, ignoring the movement, or making concessions that redefine state-society relations. For example, the Civil Rights movement succeeded in extending voting rights and labor movements of the early twentieth century resulted in workplace legislation.

Social control theories of state response to protest imply that state actors will aim to mollify disruptive groups through changes in legislation or the establishment of institutions catering to movement actors. Scholars have tested this hypothesis in various contexts by estimating the effect of the number of protest events on the level of state spending. For example, it has been argued that increases in black insurgency have a positive effect on payments through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program (Fording 2001).

How do theories of disruptive protest tactics apply to the growth of Black Studies programs? First, an overall atmosphere of unrest in the late 1960s and early 1970s may have legitimized demands for Black Studies. Protest drew attention to the demands of student protesters and, perhaps, made administrators more willing to consider Black Studies proposals. Second, there is the social control thesis; university administrators might approve a Black Studies program as a concession to students for the sake of calming campus unrest. The first hypothesis is about black insurgency in general:

Hypothesis 1: Location in a state with black insurgency has a positive effect on the creation of Black Studies program.
The second hypothesis is about Black Studies as a concession aimed at mollifying protesters:

Hypothesis 2: University administrators will approve Black Studies as a concession to student protesters. Campus unrest in the 1960s will have a positive effect on the creation of a Black Studies program.

2.3.2. Legitimacy and Organizational Mimicry

Legitimacy might also contribute to the growth of Black Studies. Once some university administrators concede to student protesters and open African-American Studies programs, students and staff at universities without Black Studies programs might perceive a Black Studies program as a proper form of academic organization.

Many organizational sociologists have theorized about the process by which the acceptance of an organizational form correlates with the number of existing organizations employing that form. Theorizing on organizations and legitimacy goes back to at least Weber, who wrote that individual actions in bureaucracies were guided by a belief in a set of "determinable maxims" delineating behaviors that are "obligatory or exemplary for him" (cited in Scott 2000: 152). Parsons (1959, 1960) elaborates on Weber in arguing that individuals in organizations can be understood as units within larger social systems. Organizational forms must not violate or contradict the norms of the larger social system.

Contemporary work on organizations and legitimacy often focuses on studies such as Meyer and Rowan's (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) neoinstitutional arguments. Theories of organizational legitimacy are best expressed by Meyer and Rowan's statement that organizational behavior must not contradict what is widely
thought to be appropriate behavior. Work must follow the rules and patterns of models sponsored by the state or other elites, even at the expense of efficiency:

“By designing a formal structure that adheres to the prescriptions of myths in the institutional environment, an organization demonstrates that it is acting on collectively valid purposes in a proper and adequate manner. The incorporation of institutionalized elements provides an account of activities that protects the organization from being questioned. The organization becomes, in a word, legitimate, and it uses its legitimacy to strengthen its support and ensure its survival.” (Meyer and Rowan 1991 [1977]: 50)

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) develop Meyer and Rowan’s argument further by hypothesizing that organizations can acquire legitimacy through three actions: satisfying government regulations, copying successful organizations, or the influence of occupational groups.

How does this legitimation theory apply to the growth of Black Studies programs? It should be noted that one of the mechanisms discussed by DiMaggio and Powell seems to be absent from the history of Black Studies—the coercive pressure applied by the state through regulation. It is true that federal and state governments regulate colleges and universities somewhat, and accreditation agencies enforce some standards. But I have not found much evidence in the literature on Black Studies that accreditation agencies or state governments ever required the creation or dismantling of Black Studies programs. DiMaggio and Powell also discuss the influence of occupational groups. The hiring of professionals might be an important factor leading to the growth of African-American Studies. As noted in the overview, some observers claimed that a cohort of African-American Ph.D.s contributed the field’s legitimacy. While this is a plausible hypothesis,
it is not tested in this paper; data on faculty ethnicity are not available for the late 1960s, when African-American Studies first started.

The last process described by DiMaggio and Powell is mimicry—the tendency for organizations to copy each other in uncertain times. When organizational leaders experience uncertainty, they copy successful organizations. DiMaggio and Powell suggest that copying may be more important than the drive toward technical efficiency:

"Organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to more legitimate or successful. The ubiquity of certain kinds of structural arrangements can more likely be credited to the universality of mimetic processes than to any concrete evidence that the adopted models enhance efficiency." (DiMaggio and Powell 1991 [1983]: 70)

The implication of this line of reasoning is that organizations copy each other, and as more organizations adopt a particular form, the more legitimate the form becomes, a process called "constitutive legitimacy." (Carrol and Hannan 2000)

Drawing from constitutive legitimacy theory, sociologists argue that an organizational form's legitimacy is proportional to the number of organizations adopting that form. This number, often called "density," is hypothesized to have a positive effect on the future probability that more organizations will adopt that form. An increase in the number of universities adopting a new academic program should have an increase in the probability that more universities will adopt the program. The creation of a new academic program signals to others that the new academic discipline has attained some status. Applied to Black Studies,
Hypothesis 3: The number of universities creating a Black Studies program in a given time period has a positive effect on the future probability that a university will create a Black Studies program.

The mimicry hypotheses can be refined by taking geography and group membership into account. Organizational sociologists have argued that diffusion of organizational change may have a geographical component because proximate organizations are more likely to observe each other than distant ones, resulting in the geographical clustering of organizational change (Soule and Strang 1998; Knoke 1982; Hedstrom 1994; Myers 1997). Some observers have noted that the movement for Black Studies appeared to be concentrated in California, New York, and a few other areas of the country. Some of the prominent Black Studies programs, such as San Francisco State’s and the one at the University of California, Berkeley, are in these regions. A variant of hypothesis 3 is:

Hypothesis 3A: The number of universities in a geographic region creating a Black Studies program in a given time period has a positive effect on the future probability that a university in the same region will create a Black Studies program.

In this paper, I use the U.S. Census Bureau regions—Northeast, South, Midwest, and West. See U.S. Census Bureau (2002).

Organizational researchers have also argued for the importance of reference group effects. Some scholars have found that individual organizations are more likely to adopt an innovation if the innovation is first adopted by similar organizations. For example, Haveman (1993a) found that banks are more likely to enter consumer credit markets
when banks of similar size do so. Mimicry effects have been reported in numerous studies (Haveman 1993b; Starr 1982; Knoke 1982; Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Fligstein 1985).

Applied to the growth of Black Studies programs, this theory of reference groups implies that a university is more likely to open an African-American Studies program when similar universities open a program. A test of this hypothesis requires a classification of universities. A commonly used classification of universities by types of degrees offered and research orientation is the Carnegie Classification. Four-year colleges are usually sorted into one of four categories: research universities, liberal arts colleges, doctoral universities, and comprehensive universities.¹ Research universities award at least fifty doctoral degrees each year and receive at least $35 million in funding, and liberal arts colleges receive little funding and award mostly undergraduate degrees (Carnegie Foundation 1987: 7–8, see “Definitions”). Doctoral universities and master’s colleges award graduate degrees, with doctoral institutions awarding more Ph.D.s and receiving more federal research grants. The reference group hypothesis is

Hypothesis 3B: The number of universities in a Carnegie Classification group creating a Black Studies program in a given time period has a positive effect on the future probability that a university in the same Carnegie category will create a Black Studies program.

2.3.3. Internal Structure and Organizational Change

Structural factors may inhibit change, even when protesters disrupt an organization or the organization’s environment strongly pressures the organization to

¹ The other categories include schools not offering four years undergraduate degrees and highly specialized institutions: tribal colleges, free standing professional schools, junior colleges, corporate for-profit institutions and biblical colleges.
change. Such factors include the organization’s size, its internal complexity, slack resources, and internal constituencies. In this section, I discuss the literature on each of these factors and present hypotheses about the diffusion of Black Studies programs.

*Size and Slack:* There is not much consensus in the organizational literature on the effects of size on organizational change. One strand of organizational theory argues that size contributes to inertia. Large organizations must have detailed regulations that govern the allocation of resources and an elaborate formal command structure (Merton 1957; Downs 1967; Tsouderos 1955; Aldrich and Auster 1986). Some scholars have additionally argued that large organizations are more heavily embedded in their economic environments. Large organizations have investors, regulators, and other stakeholders who can veto change (Starbuck 1965; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).

Other organizational scholars have found that size facilitates change (Haveman 1993b). They often argue that large organizations have more total resources (Cyert and March 1963; Thompson 1967; Mohr 1969) and more unused resources at any given time (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). Unused resources, referred to as “slack,” allow organizations to engage in risky behavior or to allocate resources to unforeseen problems. Paulsen (1990) found that endowments correlate with the number of academic programs at liberal arts colleges.

In the present paper, confrontation with a social movement is a problem that can be solved with slack. A large university is more likely to have discretionary funds that allow the university to create a new academic program or manage conflicts with student protesters. Aside from money, slack resources in a university could include unused office space and faculty who can be reassigned to a new academic unit. The history of the Black
Studies program at San Francisco State College lends credence to this theory. At that college, sympathetic department chairs donated 1.5 FTEs to the Black Studies department so that full-time appointments could be made (Orrick 1970). This probably would not have been possible if San Francisco State College had been a small organization with a highly constrained budget.

*Internal Complexity:* Unlike the debate over size and slack, organizational theorists have reached a relative consensus on the effects of internal complexity, the degree to which an organization has a highly refined division of labor. Zammuto and O’Connor (1992) and Hage (1999) summarize the consistent empirical finding that organizations with highly specialized workers innovate the most. Researchers tend to argue that such complex organizations are more likely to have the highly specialized knowledge that is needed to create new products. Specialization also correlates with more refined formal structures that allow coordination and make innovation feasible.

These arguments apply very well to universities and the creation of academic programs, even those demanded by social movements. New academic programs require instructors with various specialties. Black Studies programs, for example, might require specialists in black literature, the history of slavery, and the sociology of race relations. Many Black Studies programs retain their interdisciplinary character and frequently have faculty with appointments in other departments. The more academic units that a university has, the more likely a Black Studies program will be able to offer a variety of courses and attract students.

*Organizational Demography:* Research suggests that organizational demography might play an important role in promoting change because workers and clients are
internal constituencies that demand change or because racial heterogeneity creates conflicts that might be resolved through organizational change.

According to some economic theories of organizational behavior, organizational structure is the outcome of negotiations between groups within the firm (Kreps 1996). The emergence of a new group within an organization might alter these negotiated arrangements. The demographic change that triggered demands for Black Studies was the entrance of blacks into college campuses in the 1960s. Data from the Higher Education General Information Survey and the Current Population Survey show that black college enrollments increased drastically in the late 1960s and that most of the increase was in nonhistorically black colleges (Koretz, Lewis, and DeSilets 1990). The sudden concentration of black students on previously segregated campuses contributed to the feeling that the college curriculum did not address the history of blacks. One resolution was to create new academic units that specialized in African-American topics.

Organizational psychology research suggests another link between student demography and organizational change: the documented correlation between racial heterogeneity and interpersonal conflict. Organizational psychologists have consistently found that racial heterogeneity correlates with conflict and the decline of communication within educational institutions (Blau 1977; Hallinan and Smith 1988) and work groups (Phinney 1996; Williams and O’Reilly 1998; Ibarra 1992; Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale 1997; Lott and Lott 1965; O’Reilly et al. 1989; Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin 1997; Smith et al. 1994). Such findings imply that changing racial composition of college campuses in the 1960s may have generated conflicts that might have been resolved through the establishment of Black Studies programs and centers.
Psychological and equilibrium-based interpretations of student demography have different empirical predictions. The psychological explanation focuses on the contact between blacks and whites. Thus, there should be little conflict when a college is predominantly black or white, but there should be conflict when there is mixture of blacks and whites. In contrast, the internal politics—equilibrium model suggests a linear effect of the proportion of black students, with mostly black campuses being more likely to establish a Black Studies program.

_Age:_ Organizational researchers contend that age contributes to inertia. They contend that like size, age correlates with elaborate control mechanisms, constituencies than can veto or delay change, and a general inability to quickly mobilize resources in response to environmental pressures (Barnett 1990; Barron, West, and Hannan 1994; Ranger-Moore 1997). This school of thought suggests that age will have a negative effect on an organization’s ability to change in response to movement activity. The following hypothesis summarizes the discussion of organizational structure:

Hypothesis 4: A university’s internal structure affects adoption of a Black Studies program. A university’s size, proportion of black students, and complexity of division of labor will have positive effects on the probability that a degree-granting Black Studies program will be established. Age will have a negative effect, and the square of the proportion of students who are black will have a positive effect.

2.4. _Control Variables_

The empirical analysis includes dummy variables for public ownership, the university’s status as a historically black institution, and the Carnegie category as control variables. Public ownership might be hypothesized to have a negative effect on the growth of Black Studies programs, because politically appointed Boards of Trustees
might be reluctant to approve controversial academic programs. Historically black colleges might be hypothesized to be more receptive to Black Studies because of a commitment to black higher education. The Carnegie category might also be hypothesized to have an effect on Black Studies program creation because research orientation should correlate with the tendency to open innovative academic programs.

2.5. Data

Hypotheses are tested with longitudinal data on university size, age, and other structural features, campus unrest and off-campus insurgency, and founding dates of degree-granting Black Studies programs. The cases in the data set are universities. Data were collected for all institutions of higher education that offer four-year degrees.

Information pertaining to the organizational features of the college, such as total enrollments, is drawn from the Integrated Post-secondary Education Survey (IPEDS) and its predecessor, the Higher Educational General Information Survey (HEGIS). Data on the racial composition of enrollments are obtained from IPEDS, which collected ethnic enrollment data in the post-1978 period. For the years 1968–1976, racial decomposition of college enrollments is gathered from the United States Civil Rights Survey, a survey conducted by the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Organizational features not reported in HEGIS, IPEDS, or the Civil Rights Survey are gathered from other sources. For example, university age is taken from the Higher Education Directory. Table 2.1 lists all variables and data sources. Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Years Measured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total enrollment</td>
<td>HEGIS/IPEDS</td>
<td>1966–1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curricular diversity/degrees awarded</td>
<td>HEGIS/IPEDS</td>
<td>1976–1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita endowment</td>
<td>HEGIS/IPEDS</td>
<td>1966–1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>HEGIS/IPEDS</td>
<td>1966–1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically black college</td>
<td>HEGIS/IPEDS</td>
<td>1966–1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnegie Classification</td>
<td>HEGIS/IPEDS</td>
<td>1966–1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Campus Unrest</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of reported protest events in 1968</td>
<td>Survey of Campus Unrest (Urban Institute 1970)</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black Insurgency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total events by state</td>
<td>Database compiled from NY Times, Riot Data Review, etc; see Fording (2001)</td>
<td>1961–1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black Studies Programs Creations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Data Sources and Years Measured
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1982.02</td>
<td>9.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Black Studies Program created</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1972.9</td>
<td>7.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment (thousands of dollars per student)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7390924</td>
<td>24535</td>
<td>147970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curricular diversity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.242</td>
<td>3.606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All enrollments</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66887</td>
<td>5077.2</td>
<td>7222.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% black enrollments</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.99944</td>
<td>0.09584</td>
<td>0.1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus protest events reported in 1968</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University age</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>95.5886</td>
<td>44.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-campus protest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>4.87227</td>
<td>12.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Number of cases varies by year. See Table 1 for the years for each variable. Total N=1525 in 1966 and N=1825 in 1996.

**Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics**

Campus unrest data is collected from the Survey of Campus Incidents as Reported by Presidents, Faculty and Student Body Presidents (Urban Institute 1970). This was a survey conducted by the Urban Institute in 1970 on behalf of the National Commission on Violence. Questionnaires were mailed to all institutions of higher education listed in the 1970 edition of the Directory of Higher Education published by the National Center for Education Statistics (1970). Buchanan (1970) reports an overall response rate of 68%. Respondents were asked about the number of protest events in the academic years
starting in 1967, 1968, and 1969. They were also asked about protest tactics, administrative response, and issues motivating unrest.

Black insurgency is defined as an act of civil unrest on behalf of blacks or other ethnic minorities. The number of yearly insurgency events per state from 1960 to 1980 is gathered from a variety of sources, including the *New York Times*, the *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder*, *Riot Data Review*, *Facts on File*, and *Congressional Quarterly*. It is the data used in Fording (1997, 2001).

I collected Black Studies program founding dates as follows: a list of Black Studies programs was compiled from all editions of the College Board’s “The Index of College Majors” (1977–1998). I collected founding dates of programs from historical accounts of Black Studies programs (such as Orrick 1970; Myles 1970; Downs 1999; Huggins 1985), reference books (*Mitchell’s Multicultural Guide to Education*, 1996), on-line college catalogs, and departmental Web sites and brochures. If a program’s founding date was not found in these public sources, I then contacted the current chair by telephone or e-mail. I was able to acquire the founding dates of all degree-granting programs except one.

### 2.6. Definition of the Independent Variables

*Organization Variables*: The *size* of the school is defined to be the total number of students enrolled in a given year. The other measure of organizational *size*, the number of instructors, is not reported in IPEDS until 1972, after the establishment of many Black Studies programs. To mitigate the effect of exceptionally large colleges, the logarithm of size is used in the analyses. The logarithm of enrollments is used to control for the effect
of unusually large organizations. Per capita endowment will be a measure of a university’s organizational slack. The internal complexity of a college is measured on a scale from one to fourteen indicating the degree of curricular diversity. Fourteen majors from the humanities, social sciences, and sciences were chosen, and a college was awarded one point for each field in which it awarded degrees. The fourteen fields are biology, chemistry, physics, mathematics/statistics, English, history, psychology, anthropology, sociology, political science, economics, electrical engineering, civil engineering, and mechanical engineering. The percentage of black students is the reported number of black students divided by the total number of students. Age is defined to be the year of the observation minus the university’s founding year, which comes from the Higher Education Directory (Higher Education Publications 2002). A college is public if it is part of a state college or university system, and it is historically black if it is a school whose mission is the education of black students as reported in IPEDS/HEGIS. Organizational type will be the Carnegie category of the school. There are four dummy variables for Carnegie class: Research, Doctoral, Masters, Liberal Arts. Organizational type data is taken from IPEDS.

**Mimetic Variables:** These are computed from founding dates. **Protest Variables:**

*Campus unrest in the ’60s* is defined to be the number of campus unrest events as reported in 1968 by administrators from the Survey of Campus Unrest. *Off-Campus Unrest* is the number of black protest events in a state in a given year.

*Lagged Effects:* Because universities operate on a yearly schedule, it may be the case that the hypothesized effects do not immediately occur, especially for protest and
mimicry variables. In order to account for this possibility, lagged mimicry and protest variables are included in the analyses.

**The Dependent Variable:** The dependent variable is the year a university created a degree-granting Black Studies program. A degree-granting program is defined to be an instructional unit of a college or university that awards a bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral degree in the study of African-American history and culture. The academic unit may be an “interdisciplinary program” or a department. This includes instructional units self-identified as Black Studies, Afro-American Studies, African-American Studies, Pan-Africana Studies, or Africana Studies.

I found that “program” sometimes designates units that do not offer academic degrees and operate as research centers. Since research centers are not the focus of this chapter, they are not included in the analysis. Other programs that do not fall under my definition include African Studies, American Studies, or courses of independent study in which a student can elect to study African-American history and culture, because they do not self-identify or specialize in awarding degrees in the study of the African-American community and its culture.

2.7. Methodology

Event history analysis is used to test the hypotheses about the effects of the independent variables on the rate at which colleges establish a degree-granting Black Studies program. The model used is a proportional hazards model of one-way transitions, the Cox model:
\[ h_i(t) = h_0(t) e^{\sum \beta_k X_{ik}(t)} , \]  

where \( X_{ik}(t) \) is the value of the \( k \)th independent variable at time \( t \) for college \( i \) and the hazard function is \( h_i(t) \). Yamaguchi (1990) discusses the Cox model and partial likelihood estimation. The Breslow method for breaking tie data is used. Robust standard errors are used in all the model estimates.

### 2.8. Missing Data

Missing values in the time-dependent organizational variables, such as yearly enrollments, were imputed through complete case analysis (Little and Rubin 1987). Using observations with complete data for the variable, I regressed the variable in year \( T \) on the variables in year \( T-1 \) and \( T+1 \). The imputed values for the values in a variable in year \( T \) are the predicted values obtained from the regression using the variables in year \( T-1 \) and \( T+1 \). Missing values for the protest data were imputed using complete case analysis with Carnegie Classification dummy variables (see above) and total enrollments as predictors in the complete case regression. Carnegie Classification and size were used in the data imputation as independent variables, because student movement research shows that campus unrest is positively correlated with the elite status of the schools as measured by its status as a research university and size (Bloom 1987; Lipset 1971; Orbell 1971; Soule 1997; Van Dyke 1998; Scott and El-Assal 1969).
2.9. Results

Table 3 shows the results of bivariate Cox regressions with protest variables. The estimates support hypotheses 1 and 2—unrest, both on-campus and off-campus, has positive effects. The size of the campus protest effect changes little when off-campus protest is included in the analysis; the campus protest effect may not be attributed to being in a region with black insurgency. Are the effects large? According to model 3, the effect on the hazard rate of one incident of campus protest in 1968 is 1.69 = \exp(1 \times 0.0530), while one black riot in the university’s state has an effect of 1.022 = \exp(1 \times 0.022). In model 3, the effect on the hazard rate is much larger for a single instance of campus protest than a single episode of black protest in the college’s state. However, the average university’s contribution to the hazard rate is similar for campus unrest and black insurgency. The average college experienced .294 campus protest events in 1968, yielding an effect of 1.34. The average college in 1969 was located in a state with 17.63 protests, yielding an effect of 1.47. On the average, campus unrest increases the hazard rate by 34%, while black insurgency increases the hazard rate by 47%.

The next table presents the results of a bivariate Cox regression with the mimicry variables as the independent variables. The peer group contagion hypothesis 3B is supported but not the geographic contagion hypothesis 3A. Why might this be? One possibility is that a geographic region contains many kinds of schools that are not responsive to demands for Black Studies. A geographic region includes small liberal arts colleges, large research universities, and master’s colleges focusing on vocational education that might not all equally respond to the demands for African-American Studies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Failures</th>
<th>Log-Likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus unrest in the '60s</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1258</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black protest events</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>1388</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus unrest in the '60s</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1258</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black protest events</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: Effects of Protest on the Creation of Black Studies Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Log-Likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program creations in Carnegie category</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1388</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program creations in geographic region</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>1388</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4: The Effects of Prior Black Studies Program Creation on Future Program Creation 1968–1980
This following table presents the bivariate Cox regressions with structural variables as the independent variables. In general, Table 5 supports the hypotheses that size and age promote the creation of Black Studies programs. Surprisingly, the table does not support the hypothesis that endowments or black enrollments have significant effects on the creation of Black Studies programs. Table 6 presents the simultaneous effects of the structural variables. Age ceases to have statistically significant effects, while endowments and black enrollments have significant effects. The measure of internal complexity has positive effects in all analyses, even when controlling for size: organizational complexity correlates with the creation of African-American Studies programs.

Model 13 is the saturated model with control variables. The results for the most part do not differ from the bivariate analyses, but there are some exceptions. Campus unrest still remains significant, while off-campus unrest does not have significant effects. This finding suggests that it is specifically campus unrest that effects the creation of African-American Studies programs, not the general atmosphere of unrest associated with urban riots. The mimicry effect—copying universities in the same Carnegie category—is not significant at the $\alpha = .05$ level. The P-value is .08, which might be due to having fewer cases with complete data than in model 4. The structural variables behave much in the same way: resources, as measured by size, internal complexity, and endowments, have a positive effect, but age has no significant effect.

The effect of black enrollments—squared is negative, indicating an inverted U-shaped effect. Using differential calculus, one calculates that the maximal black enrollment effect is .51. This supports the hypothesis that mixtures of black and nonblack
| Model 7  | Coefficient | Standard Error | z   | P>|z| | Cases | Failures | Log-Likelihood |
|---------|-------------|----------------|-----|-----|-------|----------|----------------|
| Log-enrollments | 1.103 | 0.096 | 11.45 | 0.000 | 1388 | 100 | -633.6 |
| Model 8  | -0.001 | 0.000 | -7.4 | 0.000 | 810 | 74 | -482.4 |
| Age | 0.425 | 0.033 | 13.07 | 0.000 | 1388 | 100 | -637.7 |
| Model 9  | Per capita endowments | 7.84E-04 | 5.39E-04 | 1.45 | 0.146 | 1388 | 100 | -715.2 |
| Model 10 | % students who are black | 0.159 | 0.58 | -0.27 | 0.784 | 1388 | 100 | -715.4 |

Table 2.5: The Effects of Enrollments, Age, Curricular Diversity, Per Capita Endowment, and Percentage of Students Who are Black on Black Studies Program Creation 1968–1980.

| Model 12 | Coefficient | Standard Error | z   | P>|z| | Cases | Failures | Log-Likelihood |
|---------|-------------|----------------|-----|-----|-------|----------|----------------|
| Log-enrollments | 0.811 | 0.183 | 4.45 | 0.000 | 810 | 74 | -417.674 |
| Per capita endowments  | 0.035 | 0.006 | 6.26 | 0.000 |
| Number of programs | 0.187 | 0.063 | 2.98 | 0.003 |
| Age | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.49 | 0.624 |
| % students who are black | 7.447 | 2.049 | 3.63 | 0.000 |
| % students who are black$^2$ | -8.245 | 2.532 | -3.26 | 0.001 |

Table 2.6: The Effects of Internal Organizational Structure on the Creation of Black Studies Programs.
students have the largest effects on the creation of Black Studies programs. Colleges with mostly black or nonblack students are less likely to have Black Studies programs than universities with a mixture of black and nonblack students. I hypothesized this effect because some of the organizational psychology literature finds that racial homogeneity correlates with conflict. The results reported in Table 2.7 support the theory that the desegregation of American higher education was a prerequisite to the rise of Black Studies programs.

2.10. Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, I focus on the diffusion of African-American Studies programs in order to understand how one movement—the Black Studies movement of the late 1960s—started the diffusion of organizational change in American higher education. Drawing from the social movement literature on protest and the neoinstitutionalist and structural literature in organizational analysis, I posited that organizations first respond to disruptive tactics, then copy each other. I also argued that internal features of organizations, such as resources and constituencies, should affect the response to a social movement.

Campus unrest in the 1960s had positive effects on the creation of an African-American Studies program, but a university’s location in a state with black protest did not. This finding lends support to social control theories of challenger-incumbent interactions, which describe concessions to protesters as exchanges in which incumbents maintain control over institutions while satisfying protesters. The lack of a significant
| Model 16                  | Coefficient | Standard Error | z   | P>|z|  | Cases | Failures | Log-Likelihood |
|--------------------------|-------------|----------------|-----|------|-------|-----------|----------------|
| Protest variables        |             |                |     |      |       |           |                |
| Campus unrest in the '60s| 0.302       | 0.109          | 2.780 | 0.005 | 773   | 57        | -315.130       |
| Black protest events     | 0.004       | 0.013          | 0.320 | 0.748 |       |           |                |
| Mimicry variable         |             |                |     |      |       |           |                |
| All program creations in Carnegie category | 0.088 | 0.052 | 1.710 | 0.086 |       |           |                |
| Structural variables     |             |                |     |      |       |           |                |
| Log-enrollment Age       | 1.067       | 0.266          | 4.020 | 0.000 |       |           |                |
| Age                      | 0.000       | 0.003          | 0.180 | 0.855 |       |           |                |
| Per capita endowments    | 0.025       | 0.005          | 4.670 | 0.000 |       |           |                |
| Number of programs       | 0.151       | 0.071          | 2.120 | 0.034 |       |           |                |
| % black                  | 7.046       | 2.844          | 2.480 | 0.013 |       |           |                |
| % black$^2$              | -6.824      | 2.725          | -2.500 | 0.012 |       |           |                |
| Control variables        |             |                |     |      |       |           |                |
| Research                 | -1.459      | 0.673          | -2.170 | 0.030 |       |           |                |
| Doctoral                 | -1.084      | 0.620          | -1.750 | 0.081 |       |           |                |
| Master's                 | -1.479      | 0.463          | -3.190 | 0.001 |       |           |                |
| Public                   | -0.212      | 0.341          | -0.620 | 0.535 |       |           |                |
| Historically black       | -1.123      | 0.892          | -1.260 | 0.208 |       |           |                |

Table 2.7: The Effects of Protest, Prior Program Creations, and Internal Structure on Black Studies Program Creation.
effect of protest in a university’s state in the saturated model 16 suggests that it is not merely exposure to unrest but direct contact with movement participants that leads to organizational change.

Much institutionalist theory focuses on “normative carriers”—those persons or organizations enforcing norms in organizations (Scott 2000). Theorizing on organizational responses to environmental pressures focuses on state actors as enforcers of public opinion. The finding here—that campus unrest correlates with new academic programs while black protest in general does not—indicates that changes in political discourse are not enough to trigger change. Protesters on campus act as “carriers” of new ideas and use disruptive tactics to extract concessions. Universities, in this instance, do not respond to broad changes in discourse accompanying protest, which might be a consequence of black riots. Why not? There are a number of hypotheses that future research might address. Faculty members and administrators might be buffered from their political environment because they derive their status from the academic profession, not current public opinion. Another hypothesis is the lag between broad intellectual change and the appearance of new ideas and organizational forms in the academy.

The findings on organizational mimicry suggest that social movements might have their strongest effects by starting the process of change within peer groups. Universities in the same Carnegie category might be connected by joint Boards of Trustees, collaborating faculty members, and other formal and informal ties. Future research can investigate the role that networks have in promoting the organizational change demanded by social movements.
Perhaps the most interesting results are in the structural analysis. As expected, size, curricular diversity, and endowments have positive effects, supporting theories that slack resources and size both contribute to change. Once other structural variables are included in the analysis, age does not have significant effects. The interesting finding is that ethnic enrollments have an inverted U-shaped effect. African-American Studies programs are most likely to be created when there are mixtures of black and white students, even when controlling for whether the college is historically black. This supports the theory that internal conflict causes organizational change. In this case, conflict is the outcome of changing student demography, a theme commonly found in the literature on African-American Studies.

These empirical results describe a process by which a movement can enact change by creating opportunities, taking advantage of opportunities, and unintentionally starting processes leading to change. Protest is the part of this process in which a movement actively creates opportunity. The analysis showed that campus unrest leads to more Black Studies programs; once a few universities start African-American Studies, then more are created. Movements can also take advantage of opportunities; African-American Studies programs tend to be created at campuses with many resources and students. Some opportunities are indirectly created; the legitimacy created when universities adopt African-American Studies is such an example.

Overall, these results suggest that the movement for African-American Studies was most successful in the center of the higher education system. African-American Studies programs are more likely to appear in larger, wealthier, and internally complex universities. Campus protest, which correlates with the spread of African-American
Studies, also tends to appear in more elite settings. The implication for the theory of institutional response to social movement is that the opportunities leading to change in organizational fields are concentrated in positions of high status within the field. In higher education, the actors who create opportunities via protest and the resources making change possible are both to be found in more elite institutions. The finding that there is no geographical contagion but organizational peer group contagion adds plausibility to this hypothesis.

Future research can attempt to replicate these findings in other circumstances and increase our knowledge of protester-target interactions (Eiwohner 2001). The hypotheses presented in this paper can be tested with data from other movements. In higher education, a similar study can be conducted for various kinds of ethnic studies and women’s studies programs. Other academic reform movements are amenable to the approach used in this paper. For example, the South African divestiture movement can be analyzed in this way. One could estimate the effects of protest, mimicry, and previously existing policies and internal structure on changes in university investment patterns. Noneducational movements that can be approached in a similar way include labor movements targeting specific industries, antinuclear movements wishing to shut down or change the behavior of power utilities, and movements targeting local and state governments, such as the recent term limits movement. The collection of more data could lead to better understanding of how disruptive tactics, the legitimacy of the movement’s demands, and processes internal to the targets interact to create opportunities for change.
Chapter 3


3.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the transmission of norms and values from a prestigious philanthropy to newly created academic programs through a historical case study of the Ford Foundation's sponsorship of Black Studies programs in the 1970s. The historical case study seeks to examine the process by which a large and wealthy organization asserts influence on grantees through the sponsorship of structural change in organizations. Sociologists, historians, and popular writers have a longstanding interest in philanthropists as promoters of social change, because philanthropists financially support educational institutions, social movements, and political interest groups (Abramson and Spann 1998; Ostrander 1997; Dowie 2001; Frumkin 2002; Lagemann 1999). Other researchers have had an interest in philanthropists because they sometimes promote change by sponsoring the development and dissemination of new models for occupations and organizations (DiMaggio 1991; Schlossman and Sedlak 1988). I focus on three theories of philanthropy as an agent of social change that have emerged from this literature: (1) a critical perspective arguing that philanthropists favor politically moderate groups, (2) a neoinstitutional perspective focusing on philanthropy as a sponsor of legitimate organizational models, and (3) a “complex environment” perspective suggesting that philanthropists compete with others for influence over grantee organizations.
I argue that critical, neoinstitutional, and complex environment theories each describe some of the motivation and actions of the Ford Foundation. As suggested by critical scholars, the Ford Foundation chose to sponsor Black Studies programs at prestigious universities and preferred grant applicants who conceptualized Black Studies as an extension of existing academic disciplines. As suggested by neoinstitutionalist theory, Ford Foundation officers hoped that sponsored academic programs would become models for the emerging Black Studies field. However, some black intellectuals developed an alternative nationalist\(^1\) model for Black Studies in opposition to Foundation officers. There is some evidence suggesting that Foundation officers responded to criticisms by sponsoring some organizations adopting this alternative model for Black Studies and that some sponsored programs moved toward this nationalist alternative.

3.2. Theories of Philanthropy, Social Change, and the Academy

The Ford Foundation’s sponsorship of Black Studies programs is an example of the philanthropic support of social change in higher education (for examples, see Schlossman and Sedlak 1988 for business education; Grant 1999 for child development studies; Han 1998 for China Studies; Proietto 1999 for women’s studies; Flexner 1910 for medical schools). Sociologists, historians, and educational researchers have used critical, neoinstitutional, and complex environment theories to understand the philanthropic sponsorship of academic change.

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\(^1\) In this paper, “nationalism” denotes the black political ideology emphasizing African-American autonomy. Dawson (2001: 21) states that black nationalism’s core concepts include “African-American autonomy and various degrees of cultural, social, economic, and political separation from White America.” In this essay, “nationalist Black Studies” denotes Black Studies developed from this perspective. See the section on terminology.
Marxist scholarship on philanthropy frequently asserts that educational organizations receive grants only when they reinforce existing social hierarchies and decline to fund individuals or groups that advocate serious reform. For example, sociologist Marshall Berman (1982) argues that the Ford Foundation aided universities in their development of area studies programs, which trained foreign policy specialists who legitimized American foreign policy. Historian Han Tie (1998) chronicles the Ford Foundation’s sponsorship of China Studies in American universities and maintains that the Foundation selected academics that would produce uncritical scholarship. He also concludes that the Ford Foundation’s sponsorship of China Studies was crucial in the development of an academic field that legitimated the State Department’s Cold War foreign policy.

Educational historians have also analyzed philanthropic support of black education from this critical perspective. Historian Thomas Anderson (1982) argues that Northern white philanthropists paid for black education in the South as long as it did not challenge racial hierarchies. Anderson claims that many philanthropists supported Booker T. Washington’s program because it emphasized vocational education, which allowed white philanthropists to promote universal education without challenging whites’ superior position in the Southern work regime. Other sociologists claim that philanthropic giving patterns favor politically moderate social movements and educational institutions, which results in the “cooling out” of radical movements (Jenkins 1998; Jenkins and Halcli 1999).

Another theory emphasizes the role that philanthropies have in creating an academic organization’s normative environment. Drawing from DiMaggio and Powell’s
New Institutionalism, these scholars argue that academic organizations exist in political environments defined by large, prestigious philanthropies (DiMaggio 1991). Wealthy philanthropies can use their resources to define legitimate behavior through the publication of reports urging colleges and universities to follow some course of action or through grants made to selected academic programs. Sponsored programs can encourage others to adopt the philanthropy’s recommendations because sponsorship may confer prestige and legitimacy to an academic program’s activities.

Noninstitutional scholars sometimes use the “model program” argument. For example, historians Schlossman and Sedlak (1988) argued that the Ford Foundation was able to redefine business education through a well-publicized 1955 report advocating research and graduate education in business schools and the reduction of undergraduate teaching. In their book on Northwestern University’s business school, Sedlak and Williamson (1983) show how Ford Foundation money helped transform the Kellogg School of Management into a research-oriented academic organization that could have been a model for American graduate business education. Schlossman and Sedlak, however, conclude that the model program approach was not entirely successful because of intervening factors. Some universities were too dependent on undergraduate tuition, which made them reluctant to transform their undergraduate business college into a smaller graduate education program. Internal politics prevented change in other universities, as older faculty cohorts opposed the abolition of undergraduate business education.

Neoinstitutional theory does not predict the selection of politically moderate programs, but it does emphasize the role that philanthropies have in defining
organizational environments. As DiMaggio (1991) emphasizes in his analysis of the Carnegie Foundation’s involvement in the art museum field, philanthropies can act at the level of the organizational field. Institutionalist theories suggest that high-status philanthropies can influence other organizations by drawing attention to their recommendations and supporting model programs. The model program approach adopted by many philanthropists is consistent with neoinstitutionalist theories.

Some scholars (Alexander 1998; DiMaggio 1987) have begun to focus on conflict in the organizational environment, a development sometimes called “complex environment” theory. According to this perspective, a wealthy philanthropy is an important actor in an academic organization’s environment, but it is by no means the only one, even if it does substantially subsidize the academic organization or define its legitimate organizational behavior. Academic organizations have other constituencies such as professional groups, the state, and students, each providing resources for the organization. The academic organization—an entire university or a small department—will have to manage its relationships with all these groups. Observing that organizations have multiple political constituencies, these scholars have argued that organizations may respond to conflict between constituencies by internalizing the conflict. The conflict between philanthropists and other political constituencies may project itself onto organizational fields that depend on these constituencies for financial resources and legitimacy. Contentious political conflict may even cause the philanthropy to change its own giving patterns to accommodate critics.

To summarize, critical theories predict that philanthropies give to politically moderate groups. Neoinstitutional theories are consistent with the philanthropic
sponsorship of model programs, and complex environment theories suggest that
organizational fields might be split along lines defined by conflicts between actors who
provide legitimacy and other resources.

3.3. Data

This study uses three data sources: Ford Foundation archives, interviews with
retired Foundation officers and Black Studies program chairs, and periodicals of the era.

Ford Foundation archives contain documentation of all grants that the Foundation
has made during its history. Using the Foundation’s electronic database, I compiled a list
of all archival materials whose title or description contains the words “Black Studies,”
“Afro-American Studies,” or “African-American Studies.” The list showed a cluster of
grants made in the early 1970s.\(^2\) Annual Foundation reports indicated that support for
Black Studies was initially confined to a set of thirty grants made in the early 1970s, and
the Foundation’s archive contained the materials for all these grants. I also found some
documentation supporting this periodization. In 1970, Foundation vice president Harold
Howe II wrote a memorandum discussing how support for Black Studies was to be
limited to the grants awarded in 1969 and 1970.\(^3\) Annual reports confirm this; they show
that the Foundation did not award any more grants to Black Studies programs until the

\(^2\) Untitled document listing grants with “Black Studies,” “African-American Studies,” or “Afro-
American Studies” in description or title. No author given. October 2000. Generated from Ford
Foundation’s electronic database of archived grant files.

\(^3\) Howe II, Harold, Untitled Interoffice Memorandum written to McGeorge Bundy discussing
Boston University’s master’s degree program, April 12, 1972. PA 70-302. Ford Foundation Archives.
Howe says that he is satisfied with the Black Studies grants and recommends to Bundy that they “call it a
day” concerning Black Studies.
early 1980s. Annual reports show that the only support for Black Studies in the mid-1970s was for programs that started to receive grants by 1970.

The Foundation staff allowed me to view all the pertinent grant files containing grant proposals, budgets, positive and negative grant evaluations, press releases, correspondence, interoffice memoranda, and informal documents. The archival staff appears to have preserved the files as they received them. The Foundation does not allow researchers to examine files for active grants or files with any other confidentiality issues pertaining to legal actions. None of the files that I requested fitted into these categories.

The Foundation does not regularly collect materials on rejected grant applicants or correspondence not associated with a grant. Much of the correspondence from students, professors, and college administrators may have been lost unless it was related to an application that was ultimately approved. However, I was able to find some documentation on rejected Black Studies grants. The archives’ microfilm collection contains an undated list of Black Studies grant applications. The archivists told me that they stopped collecting materials on rejected grant applications in 1973, which implies that the list is from about 1971 or 1972. This document does not provide much information; each applicant is described by a one-sentence summary followed by a single word—“rej.”—or the grant’s tracking number. Descriptions of rejected grants were often cryptic, and I have not been able to find someone who can decipher them. I showed the list to some retired Foundation officers who administered Black Studies grants, and they

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could not remember any of the rejected applicants. In some cases in which the
description was clear, I attempted to contact the university or organization that submitted
the application, but I found that the person who submitted the application had died or left
the organization, that current staff had no knowledge of what happened thirty years ago,
or that the organization simply ceased to exist, which was a problem when contacting
student organizations. Even though I was not able to contact any of the rejected
applicants, the list of rejected applicants does illustrate the range of proposals that
Foundation officers considered.

The Foundation also collects reports, publications, and office papers of former
presidents and vice presidents. These documents sometimes provide detailed information
on aspects of Foundation decision making that the grant files do not cover. For example,
the presidential papers of McGeorge Bundy contain correspondence between Bundy and
various Foundation officers concerning Black Studies. Presidential office papers also
contain external evaluations solicited by Bundy. I also had the opportunity to read
internal Foundation reports that discussed Black Studies grants and the Foundation’s
efforts in promoting education for ethnic minorities.

After reading these files, I compiled a list of program officers who administered
Black Studies grants and academics who directed programs that received grants. I was
able to contact three program chairs and six former Foundation officers. One former
Foundation officer declined to be interviewed.

Interviews were semistructured: respondents were asked a series of questions but
were allowed to add information as they saw fit. I wrote two interview instruments: one
for Ford Foundation officers and one for Black Studies chairs. I asked Foundation
officers about perceptions of Black Studies at the Ford Foundation, the goals of the Ford Foundation, and whether Black Studies grants were perceived as successful. I asked Black Studies program chairs about how they came to chair their program, how they came to apply for Ford Foundation grants, and whether they thought that the Foundation was promoting a specific agenda for Black Studies. These individuals were located across the United States, which made personal interviews with all of them very costly. As a consequence of advanced age, some declined telephone interviews because of hearing problems and would respond only to written questions. Other respondents would insist on having very short interviews because they were still working as academic administrators and could only schedule short sessions.

The interviews are not presented as accurate representations of thirty-year-old Foundation decisions. Responses are treated as supplementary data and corroborating evidence. Retrospective interviews are known to be unreliable, and I use interview data to reinforce points made in the documentary evidence or as indicators of broad attitudes instead of memories of specific events. There is another reason to treat interviews as secondary evidence: respondents tended to avoid sensitive topics or remember events in ways that put them in a favorable light. For example, all of the former Foundation officers refused to comment on specific grants and would talk only about Black Studies in general terms, even when granted anonymity. Furthermore, most of the persons I interviewed insisted that I cite them by name, even though I offered them anonymity. Many of the interviewees are public figures, such as Harold Howe II (former U.S. Commissioner of Education in the Johnson administration) and Benjamin Payton (current president of Tuskegee University), and they considered their opinions and recollections to
be a matter of public record. Although nonanonymous interviews require that I retain some skepticism toward the responses, an advantage is that future researchers can replicate my research by consulting the same persons (Duinier 2000).

Black opinion journals constitute a third data source. Journals such as *The Crisis*, *Ebony*, and *Negro Digest* were forums in which prominent individuals, black and white, would discuss black education. Respondents reported that many of the debates over Black Studies occurred in such forums. When I read these journals, I found that some contributors would later become involved with the Ford Foundation, either as consultants or recipients of Ford Foundation grants for Black Studies. Therefore, the discussions in these journals not only indicate the intellectual milieu among pertinent groups in the 1960s, but they record the opinions and attitudes of the people who would eventually become involved in Foundation decisions.

3.4. A Note about the Case Study Method

The case study method requires that the researcher explain the selection of the case and the larger class of cases to which it belongs (Ragin 1992; Stake 2000). The Ford Foundation is an example of a wealthy organization promoting social change through aid to individuals and organizations. Unlike states or occupational groups with state-sanctioned authority, philanthropies wield no coercive power and depend on their own legitimacy and the legitimacy of their grantees for influence over others. I chose the Ford Foundation because it is an organization that has been very influential in higher education and its leadership has chosen to promote social change through financial assistance to governments, interest groups, and educational institutions. I focused on the Ford
Foundation's sponsorship of Black Studies because it is an example of political and intellectual change promoted through grant making, and the Foundation played a crucial role in providing financial stability for Black Studies programs.

3.5. *A Note about Terminology*

In my examination of Foundation documents and in interviews, I found that a crucial issue was whether Black Studies should be an extension of existing academic disciplines or whether Black Studies should be based on a new intellectual and organizational model. In this paper, I have attempted to adopt a terminology capturing the ideas in this debate as they were used by the participants.

Foundation officers felt that Black Studies ought to be "interdisciplinary," by which they meant that teaching and research into African-American history and culture should employ the ideas of the existing social sciences and humanities. "Interdisciplinary Black Studies" is often associated with "liberalism," by which I mean the political ideology advocating racial equality. Dawson (2001:15) identifies different strains of black liberal ideology and concludes that black liberalism, as well as American liberalism in general, rejects racism and segregation and views American institutions as objects of political reform. From this perspective, Black Studies could be a tool for racial equality as long as it was conceptualized as an extension or reform of American academia.

Some intellectuals and academics felt that Black Studies should remain distinct from mainstream academia and should strive toward a unique intellectual model. This is sometimes called "nationalist" Black Studies, because nationalism often denotes the political ideology advocating distinct African-American communities and institutions. As
noted above (Dawson 2001: 21), black nationalist ideologies emphasize African-American autonomy. Black Studies based on a new set of concepts and distinct from the social sciences and humanities embodies nationalism in higher education.

I should note that liberal and nationalist ideologies are not mutually exclusive categories but positions in a broader spectrum of political opinion, and these terms are used as flexible, organizing concepts. Also, in some of the literature, “interdisciplinary Black Studies” has a different definition and denotes a Black Studies instructional unit that does not have department status (for example, Ford 1973). I avoid this usage to prevent confusion. In this chapter, any instructional unit in a university will simply be denoted “program.” Its status as a department will be indicated in the accompanying text.

3.6. The Context of The Ford Foundation’s Sponsorship of Black Studies

The central argument of this paper is that the Ford Foundation sponsored Black Studies programs if they were constructed along interdisciplinary lines and hoped that this model for Black Studies would be widely emulated. The roots of this approach to Black Studies can be traced to two events within the Ford Foundation—the appointment of McGeorge Bundy as Foundation president and the development of a program of financial support for black higher education preceding Bundy’s tenure. As is discussed below, Bundy was not afraid to use Foundation money to support controversial ideas, such as Black Studies, if they promoted racial equality. When grants were awarded, Foundation officers selected programs that they felt were academically legitimate and often saw Black Studies as an extension of previous work improving black higher education. The current section of the paper describes Bundy’s attitudes and the support of
black higher education that preceded him. Subsequent sections describe how Black Studies grants were awarded, the conflict over Black Studies, and how the Foundation and some sponsored programs responded to this conflict.

_Bundy Becomes President and Embraces Black Studies_: Created in 1936 so the Ford family could retain control over the Ford Motor Company, the Ford Foundation quickly became the wealthiest American philanthropy. By the mid-1960s, the Board of Trustees decided that the Foundation should become more politically active. The move toward social activism involved a reworking of the Foundation’s public image and the appointment of McGeorge Bundy as president. Bundy was a former Dean of Harvard and Kennedy administration official who did not hesitate to put the Foundation at the forefront of the Civil Rights movement. For example, Bundy repeatedly expressed his desire to work on race relations on a grand scale. He told the _New York Times_ in 1965 that the nation should commit resources equal to that deployed in Vietnam in order to fight racism. In a 1968 speech, he said, “The most deep-seated and destructive of all the causes of the Negro problem is still the prejudice of the white man.” He was prepared to take the Ford Foundation into controversial areas. Bundy told the _New York Times_, “Our job is to make decisions, to defend and explain them, and then go on to the next with serenity. Otherwise, we might as well throw our money up and see where it blows down.”

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6 Nielsen (1962) discusses the early days of the Ford Foundation.

7 Interview with James Armsey. November 2001. This change is also documented in Bird (1998).

8 Ibid, 380.

9 Ibid.
Bundy also told friends that he wasn’t afraid to be a “lightning rod” for criticism and that previous Foundation work reflected “conventional wisdom.”

When Bundy assumed the presidency of the Foundation in 1966, he wasted no time in pursuing his Civil Rights agenda. With almost $200 million per year to spend, Bundy soon turned the Ford Foundation into a major financial backer of the Civil Rights movement. Over the next two years, Bundy directed $40 million toward projects related to the Civil Rights movement. Grants included $230,000 to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1966 and $175,000 to the Congress of Racial Equality in 1967. Grants also went to older, more established black political groups such as the NAACP and the Urban League.

Bundy funded court litigation and the negotiation of racially motivated campus disputes. In 1967, the Foundation awarded grants to groups in Wilmington, Delaware, and St. Paul, Minnesota, who were suing for school desegregation. In 1969, the Ford Foundation paid Samuel Houston, a well-known labor negotiator and Johnson administration official, to mediate the San Francisco State College strike, a strike the ultimately led to the creation of the nation’s first Black Studies program.

Bundy’s involvement with black politics and education was not limited to grant making. He personally met with black leaders and student activists. As the black student

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10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
movement peaked in the late 1960s, Bundy became interested in the Black Studies movement. In 1969, he attended a symposium at Yale University, his alma mater, on the topic of "Black Studies in the University" and spoke at length on Black Studies. The conference’s proceedings indicate McGeorge Bundy’s thinking on Black Studies and how others may have perceived the Foundation.

Bundy agreed with students that Black Studies was a legitimate expansion of the college curriculum and that the study of the black experience should become an important topic in the social sciences and the humanities. However, Bundy carefully defined his position with respect to Black Studies. Responding to an earlier speech by Maulena Karenga, a political activist and future author of influential Black Studies texts, Bundy asserted that Black Studies’ legitimacy should rest not on political motivations but on intrinsic historical merits and their relevance to the academy’s mainstream:

“It was made very clear by Maulena Karenga that his interest in these matters is a political interest, and that his purpose is to establish a balance of power. That seems to me a first-class purpose and a proper target. It also seems to me not to be the way to define the interesting topics in Black history. The people that he named and the people that he left out in his description of the Black experience historically are people that a man of one position and one strongly held view might properly name and people that such a man might well omit. But no professor teaching in a university could treat the history of the Black man in the United States in those terms without a fundamental failure in his obligation as a member of the academic community.”

Bundy also took a sharp stance against Black Studies as a tool for developing black students’ identity. While admitting that there was nothing intrinsically wrong with improving the personal validity of black students’ experiences, Bundy clearly stated that Black Studies had to provide a rationale for existing independent of its appeal to black

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students. Ultimately, Black Studies had to serve universalistic academic goals appropriate for the era of racial desegregation:

"Now, as I say, there is nothing wrong with providing a sense of direction, identity and purpose; but it is a very dangerous thing to start pushing around the subject for that purpose. It has to be taken on its own terms—and I took that both with respect to the politics at the edge of the subject and with respect to the quest for personal identity at another edge of the subject, we were being warned by one or two of the speakers, with whom I found myself in agreement, that it was important to distinguish. When Professor Kilson told us that he smelled a rat, he was speaking of a political worry, and once or twice in other parts of the discussion it seemed to me that other speakers were saying, 'Look, these topics will help you whether you're Black or White'—and I had great sympathy with the point that the white man has at least as much to learn as the Black man here."\(^{15}\)

When asked about the role of foundations in Black Studies, Bundy responded at length. Without making any firm commitments, Bundy suggested that Black Studies was in a situation similar to that of Slavic Studies post World War II: Black Studies was an academic discipline whose time had come because of political events. These political events, presumably racial desegregation and the black student movement, forced campus administrators and philanthropies to seriously consider how the field's institutions would be organized. Bundy told the audience at Yale that he was open to supporting research centers and academic programs. In order to determine his funding priorities, he was consulting black and white scholars, but he conceded that he could find no consensus among these experts.

*The Ford Foundation Supports Black Education:* Before Bundy led the Foundation toward highly visible social activism and Black Studies, program officers within the Foundation had been developing a program of support for minorities in higher

\(^{15}\) Ibid, 173.
education, which began with the support of historically black colleges in the late 1950s. Foundation officers felt that the impact of Brown vs. Board of Education had not been felt in higher education, and some thought that many colleges had done little to recruit black students. The best strategy was to support historically black colleges. Program officer John Scanlon expressed this strongly in his 1974 report to the Foundation on educational initiatives for ethnic minorities:

"Although the Supreme Court decision of 1954 outlawed segregation in higher education as well as in public schools, most colleges and universities throughout the country dragged their feet throughout the Fifties and early Sixties in admitting black students. As a consequence of this reluctance, the eighty-six degree granting colleges and universities that had been established to serve Black Americans continued to represent the one best avenue into higher education for thousands of Black students in the South as well as for many outside the South."

Support for black colleges was enormous. From the early 1950s to 1974, the Ford Foundation had given at least $250 million to historically black colleges. Many grants went to organizations prominent in black higher education. For example, in 1953, the Foundation gave $1 million to the United Negro College Fund. Other grants included a gift to the Atlanta University Center so that they could coordinate the activities of its constituent colleges and a grant to Howard University for faculty development. The grants were designed to improve every aspect of a college, including a college’s accounting system, its admissions office, or the quality of its faculty:

"We developed over a period of time in that program what I called a coordinated vertical program of general support to a wide variety of the Black colleges and

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16 This is a probably an underestimate of the Ford Foundation's contributions because it comes from a 1974 report that examined grants within the higher education and education divisions. It excludes grants made by other divisions of the Foundation.
another series of grants, that I called a horizontal structure, which meant making grants for specific parts or programs of these colleges such as curricular development or faculty development, admissions activities or fund raising activities—the whole group of areas that the Black colleges needed expertise in that they didn’t have at that time.”

Awards to black colleges and for minority education came to include an increasingly wider range of activities. With the intention of increasing graduate minority enrollments and subsequently increasing the number of minority professors, the Ford Foundation started fellowships for graduate study. The Ford Foundation also began to fund ethnic and women’s studies, research projects investigating minority history and culture, and academic programs in related fields such as urban studies and environmental studies. The Foundation continued to work through existing academic institutions when Black Studies emerged on college campuses.

3.7. The Ford Foundation and Black Studies: Goals and Visions

Foundation officers reported that Black Studies was seen to be a natural extension of their previous support for black higher education. Formally, the Foundation was not specifically interested in Black Studies or ethnic studies. Grants to Black Studies programs were often seen as an example of the Foundation’s more general efforts to eliminate racial barriers. According to Benjamin Payton, a senior program officer in the 1970s,

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"There's something I want to emphasize. Ethnic studies was one component in a larger effort to eliminate discrimination—there were fellowships, there were attempts to increase participation in some fields, although we stayed away from the professions. We primarily focused on higher education as traditionally understood; we did general grants to historically black and historically white colleges—to improve curricula, to increase faculty salaries, to challenge trustees to build endowments. We never had a program for ethnic studies per se."\textsuperscript{19}

Payton thought that Black Studies could be part of a larger intellectual trend toward producing knowledge that reflected the entire range of human experience:

"We provided resources so the public could benefit from more diverse sources of knowledge and information about the people who make up this country, and to advance the quality of higher education by ending its parochialism and introducing broader intercultural and nontraditional studies, such as African-American studies."\textsuperscript{20}

Payton compared the motivation behind the support for ethnic studies to contemporary concerns about multiculturalism:

"It's all about the Foundation's mission to increase human understanding of ourselves in a global society. In those days, we called it international studies or intercultural studies, and we saw ethnic studies as an important and growing component of intercultural studies."\textsuperscript{21}

A consistent theme among Foundation officers, from President McGeorge Bundy down to officers supervising grants, was that Black Studies was to be an extension of existing academic disciplines. During Bundy's speech at Yale’s Black Studies

\textsuperscript{19} Telephone interview with Benjamin Payton. March 2002.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
symposium, he said that he was soliciting advice from black and white social scientists about how to best support Black Studies. Benjamin Payton reported that the Foundation actively looked for individuals who were in traditional fields but who had an interest in ethnic studies. He emphasized the importance of traditional academic leadership over politics: “We looked for those qualities as opposed to people putting forward a new ideology, or political activists.”

When Foundation staff consulted with professors and administrators, they tended to select those persons in prestigious academic positions who saw Black Studies as an opportunity for the interdisciplinary study of the black experience. W. Arthur Lewis, professor of economics and international affairs at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, evaluated a collection of grant proposals sent to him by McGeorge Bundy. He opined that it was wise to avoid making Black Studies its own field. Concurring with an emerging consensus in the Ford Foundation, Lewis felt that potential Black Studies majors should stay within an existing discipline, such as economics, and take Black Studies courses as electives from across the college curriculum.

Making a freestanding Black Studies field could result in a degenerate form of Black Studies that was nothing more than an embarrassing example of black boosterism:

“We must distinguish between the history of black people, as a group or groups, and the achievements of individual blacks (X was the first American to do this or that). Black militants want the latter, for its therapeutic value, to bolster black pride. This is history as taught in grade school. History as studied in college deals

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22 Ibid.

with groups. It has no therapeutic, since it mainly reveals human folly and weakness. The Foundation should steer clear of programs desiring to teach inspirational history at the college level... Colleges which have hastily put on undergraduate inspirational courses will be caught with faculty, programs and students who are generally despised, and black studies will be just one more source of black shame and inferiority in such institutions.”

Lewis also wrote that an independent Black Studies major would not allow students to develop any expertise:

“I strongly support the overwhelming majority opinion of academics that students should major in a single discipline, taking black studies as general distribution courses. In the Woodrow Wilson School, we offer an M.A. in ‘Modernization,’ combining economics, sociology and politics. It simply does not work, except for the student who arrives with one of these as his major, and sticks with that aspect of modernization. Attempts to teach the economics of development to students without economic training do not get beyond the television level. I would discourage any college that wishes to make a major out of black studies instead of out of one of the disciplines needed for underpinning black studies.”

Bundy wrote back to Lewis saying that the Trustees just approved the first batch of Black Studies grants. He reported that Lewis’s report was circulated to others in the Foundation and that he would be surprised if there were any serious disagreements with Lewis’s conclusions.

After choosing the first set of grants in the spring of 1969, Ford Foundation officers were already assessing how black students and others would perceive the grants. Some felt that they were promoting the well-being of Black Studies by adopting a

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25 Ibid.

flexible approach and that the Foundation should be prepared to defend itself. Instead of rewarding conventional academic projects or letting grantees decide unilaterally how money is to be spent, some officers felt that the selected programs demonstrated flexibility and allowed the Foundation to avoid being maneuvered into "irreconcilable conflicts."27 This meant that the Ford Foundation's moderate stance on Black Studies had to stand strong in the face of criticism: "The point I [James W. Armsey] make is that we are doing what we are doing not because we lack information, or conviction, or fortitude but because we believe prudence is the better part of valor..."28

Aside from defending their approach to Black Studies, Foundation officers were assessing their intellectual position with respect to the different parties in the Black Studies debate. In a memo entitled "Where the Rocks Are Likely to Come From," program officer John Scanlon thought that the "middle of the road" approach would upset almost all the involved parties. By recognizing Black Studies as legitimate through grant making, the Foundation would make themselves vulnerable to the "extremes of academic intransigence." Conservative scholars and administrators could find fault because they refused to believe that the black experience merited careful study. Others would be outraged because the grants publicly rejected black separatism. Scanlon dismissed many criticisms as being trivial. Unlike W. Arthur Lewis, Scanlon found nothing wrong with students being involved in program development or the idea of the Black Studies major. He did not think black students were to be directed solely to professional education.


28 Ibid.
Overall, Scanlon concluded that "reputable scholars" would support the Foundation's middle of the road approach.\textsuperscript{29}

To summarize, Ford Foundation officers were quite favorably inclined toward the idea of Black Studies, because it promoted the understanding of black history and it could be a tool for racial integration. It was also part of a larger ongoing effort to reform black higher education. Because of this, they wanted Black Studies to be interdisciplinary, drawing from both the humanities and the social sciences. Some, like McGeorge Bundy, thought that Black Studies was best done as a specialty within a traditional discipline. Others were comfortable with the Black Studies major. Black Studies courses could promote integration because they covered a topic that both black and white students should know about.

For many at the Ford Foundation, student groups and black nationalist scholars defined an unreasonable version of Black Studies. Black Studies should not be about developing black students' identities, nor should teaching be the exclusive domain of black professors. Foundation officers did not accept the argument that Black Studies was something just for the black community or that it should be focused exclusively on black students.

\textbf{3.8. The Ford Foundation and Black Studies: Patterns of Grant Making}

By 1972, the Ford Foundation approved twenty Black Studies grants selected from over one hundred applications. About 37\% of those applications were from degree-

\textsuperscript{29} Interoffice Memorandum: "Where the Rocks Are Likely to Come From," from James J. Scanlon to James W. Armsey, May 21, 1969. Office papers of McGeorge Bundy, Box 1, Folder 5. Ford Foundation Archives.
granting programs or nondegree programs. Over two-fifths, 42%, of these applications were from professors, artists, and other intellectuals asking for grants to cover expenses for research on black topics. Grants for student groups, scholarships for black students, and other kinds of support for high school students and undergraduates constituted another large category of applications. Requests from existing or potential graduate programs and research institutes were the smallest category, making up only 7.4% of the application pool. Table 1 displays the total number of applications 1969–1971 by category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Application</th>
<th>Accepted</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Accepted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate programs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate programs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student groups/students</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research/teaching</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research organizations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All categories</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a “Students” category includes scholarships and travel grants for students. “Research/teaching" includes course development proposals and grants for research.” It also includes grants for libraries and research collections. “Research organizations” includes think tanks, publishers, and conferences.

Table 3.1. Black Studies Grant Applications Submitted to the Ford Foundation for Black Studies.
Table 2 lists the accepted grants. A few trends immediately stand out from both tables. First, the Ford Foundation rejected all applications from student groups. They also tended to reject applicants from individuals for research funds. The overwhelming majority of grants went to colleges and research organizations. This can be interpreted as an attempt to support the organizational development of Black Studies rather than individual careers. It is also consistent with the Ford Foundation’s longstanding policy of distributing funds to individuals through organizations.

Support for conferences, research institutes, and academic journals indicates a preference for developing Black Studies as an institution. Grant proposals and file précis indicate that grants were often made to organizations promoting an interdisciplinary approach to Black Studies. For example, a grant was made to the American Academy of Arts and Science for a conference on Black Studies that focused on the black diaspora.

Academics from both the social sciences and the humanities were invited to present their work, and the proceedings were published in *Daedalus*, an interdisciplinary academic journal published by the Academy.

A cursory examination of the sponsored academic programs shows that they tended to be located at elite research universities (such as Yale, Stanford, and New York University) and historically black colleges (such as Howard, Fisk, and Tuskegee). This might reflect the desire to continue supporting black colleges and an attempt at promoting reform of the college curriculum. It may also demonstrate a desire to make sure that Black Studies became a well-integrated part of existing educational institutions. Another interpretation is simply that Foundation officers exhibited status quo bias,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grantee</th>
<th>Academic Program</th>
<th>Undergraduate</th>
<th>Graduate</th>
<th>Research Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Howard University</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln University</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton University</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutgers University</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale University</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan State University</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>(syllabi project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanderbilt University</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisk University</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford University</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson University</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York University</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke University</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston University</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuskegee University</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>(library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for the Black World</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x (research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Education Institute</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x (conference)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daedalus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x (journal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Endowment for the Humanities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x (conference)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library Company of Philadelphia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x (library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Company of Philadelphia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x (library)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 3.2: List of Ford Foundation Black Studies Grants 1969-1971.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grant Recipient ^</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Howard University</td>
<td>$134,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$134,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln University</td>
<td>$57,000 (57%)</td>
<td>$34,500 (37%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$91,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton University</td>
<td>$62,300 (60%)</td>
<td>$26,000 (24%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$88,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutgers University</td>
<td>$60,000 (43%)</td>
<td>$29,800 (21%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$89,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale University</td>
<td>$115,000</td>
<td>$69,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>$184,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan State College</td>
<td>$75,000</td>
<td>$75,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>$150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanderbilt University</td>
<td>$62,220</td>
<td>$47,100</td>
<td></td>
<td>$109,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisk University</td>
<td></td>
<td>$62,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>$62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford University</td>
<td>$135,866 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$135,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson State College</td>
<td>$23,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York University</td>
<td></td>
<td>$100,000 (53%)</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke University</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston University</td>
<td></td>
<td>$65,000 (30%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta University Center</td>
<td>$100,000 (78%)</td>
<td>$100,000 (57%)</td>
<td>$115,000 (51%)</td>
<td>$315,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuskegee University</td>
<td>$33,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for the Black World</td>
<td>$100,000 (53%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Education Academy</td>
<td></td>
<td>$39,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>$39,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daedalus</td>
<td></td>
<td>$99,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>$99,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Endowment for the Humanities</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library Company of Philadelphia</td>
<td></td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>$60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Company of Philadelphia</td>
<td></td>
<td>$50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>$50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\^ Notes: Some organizations received money after 1971. Figures in parentheses are percent of total budget provided by grant, if available.

Table 3.3: Total Amount of Ford Foundation Grants by Year.
supporting organizations that had previously received funding from the Foundation or those with strong academic reputations.

Table 3 shows the financial patterns of Foundation grants. In many cases, the Foundation provided most of a program's operating expenses. In at least one case, the differ from amount awarded. Numbers taken from grant proposals. Percentage is the grant award divided by the total budget, if available. In some cases, the Foundation was the program's only source of income during the program's start-up year. However, most grants ended by 1972. This reflects the Foundation's policy that host universities assume financial responsibility for a program. A few programs received some support over many years, and these were both master's degree programs.

The archival records and retrospective interviews with program officers suggest that these grants were selected because they contributed to the development of Black Studies as an academically legitimate, interdisciplinary undergraduate unit that rejected nationalism. There is also some evidence that indicates that Foundation officers hoped that this model for Black Studies would spread throughout academia.

**Legitimacy:** Academic legitimacy was a central problem for Black Studies, because Black Studies was justified by accusations that the college curriculum was "whitewashed." Ford Foundation officers did not feel that this was a legitimate justification for Black Studies, but they did recognize that legitimacy was a crucial issue for any new academic discipline. When I asked a former officer about Black Studies' lack of legitimacy, he recognized it was a problem but framed it as an issue that any new academic enterprise must overcome. He also hinted that careful sponsorship of programs could increase Black Studies' legitimacy:
"The degree to which we were supporting something with not much academic legitimacy... Curricula do not fall from the sky with inherent legitimacy; they evolve out of particular historical struggles and they take on legitimacy as people with strength and substance join their ranks and do research with the same level of quality as people in other disciplines. All academic disciplines go through a period of evolution and change. We try to help people understand the process of change, and we were very deliberate about selecting programs that had great promise."\(^{30}\)

In practical terms, this meant that program officers selected applications drawing heavily from existing academic institutions. Highly unorthodox applicants were rejected out of hand. As one officer put it, "We got all kinds of silly proposals... just to be polite, the reason [that we gave for rejecting the proposal] is that 'it doesn't fit into our program's purposes'... Often that's a euphemism for, 'God, I never saw such a goofy thing in my life.'"\(^{31}\) Such unorthodox proposals may have included a grant to fund a freestanding "Institute for Black Studies and Economic Development," a request for financial aid for black students from the unconventional Friend's College\(^{32}\) in Vermont, and support for Rutgers University at Newark's Black Organization of Students.\(^{33}\)

The emphasis on legitimacy had two important consequences. First, grant applications for completely new organizations were routinely denied, because the

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\(^{30}\) Telephone interview with Benjamin Payton. March 2002.


\(^{32}\) Ford Foundation Central Index. Index of rejected applications in General Correspondence under term "Afro-American Studies." 1969–1971. Ford Foundation Archive. Friend's College was an experimental college with no course requirements and student-designed majors. Housed in what was once a resort, Friends College catered to those interested in Eastern philosophy, art, and poetry. The college eventually shut down because of persistent financial difficulties.

Foundation required that an organization be held accountable for the award and that there was, at least, "a place to do it".\textsuperscript{34} Second, proposed projects could not conflict with the goals of the host institution, i.e., proposals for black colleges within predominantly white colleges would be rejected, as well as grants for student organizations.

This focus on legitimacy was also a refutation of nationalist Black Studies:

"I believe that the angriest reaction will come from black militants seeking financial assistance for their own version of black studies programs. We have already said 'no' to a few of these that involved the creation of separate black colleges within predominantly white universities, and one that involved the establishment of a communications network that would link up black student groups on campuses throughout the country... In my judgment, requests of this kind should be answered with a firm but polite 'no.'"\textsuperscript{35}

Thus, Ford Foundation officers pursued a course of action that would encourage the emerging Black Studies field to acquire legitimacy through integration into American higher education's central institutions.

\textit{Undergraduate Education:} The Foundation focused on undergraduate education. Among the eighteen grants made for support of academic programs, only two were given to master's degree programs, and the Foundation rejected the only application for a proposed doctoral program in Black Studies.\textsuperscript{36} Other grants encouraged the development of undergraduate Black Studies. Awards were given to individuals who were working on


the development of undergraduate course syllabi and to organizations sponsoring conferences at which Black Studies chairs could meet and discuss black undergraduate education.

Some graduate programs received grants. Boston University’s master’s degree program received funding for five years and so did the master’s degree program at the Atlanta University Center. It is not clear from the documentary evidence or from interviews why the Foundation did not encourage more graduate education. There is some documentation indicating that there was an intentional emphasis on undergraduate education, but it does not elaborate on the program officers’ motivations.\textsuperscript{37} One reason may have been that students initiated many Black Studies programs, and they did not demand graduate programs. Another reason may have been that Black Studies was not a professional program, which may have required master’s or doctoral programs. There is also selection bias; the Foundation simply did not receive many applications from graduate programs. Table 2 suggests that at the very least, few colleges requested grants for graduate programs, and the Foundation approved only two of them.

\textit{Interdisciplinary Black Studies and the Rejection of Nationalism}: Program officers and consultants all favored some form of Black Studies that drew heavily from existing academic disciplines. The Ford Foundation did not sponsor any programs that submitted a curriculum in which courses were not defined in terms of existing academic fields. Grant applicants frequently justified their Black Studies program by pointing out

\footnote{\textsuperscript{37} Howe II, Harold, Untitled Interoffice Memorandum written to McGeorge Bundy discussing Boston University’s master’s degree program, April 12, 1972. PA 70-302. Ford Foundation Archives.}
that it would bring together many courses that were already being taught in the university.

This emphasis on interdisciplinary Black Studies was often accompanied by an outright rejection of black nationalism. For example, the Ford Foundation awarded a grant to Morgan State College for the development of Black Studies syllabi. When administrators contacted the Foundation, they assured program officers that nationalism would be rejected, which reassured many program officers. John J. Scanlon reported in a 1969 memorandum that

"Jenkins [president of Morgan State], incidentally, holds the same views as Sir Arthur Lewis of Princeton about 'separatism' and 'black studies.' He said the separatist philosophy is black chauvinism and will lead to 'something worse than what we've been trying to get away from.' He also said that on many campuses black students were 'being sold a bill of goods' by black militants who argue that nothing is relevant unless it is relevant to 'my blackness.' 'Even if you want to build a separate black society,' he observed, 'you still need doctors, lawyers, engineers, and scientists.'" 38

The rejection of nationalism and the emphasis on interdisciplinary Black Studies can also be seen in the Foundation's selection of organizations that requested funds for professional activities. Only one, the Institute for the Black World, can be described as nationalist, a case that is discussed below in more detail. The others were organizations more closely tied with the Foundation and active in the mainstream of American academia. The National Endowment for the Humanities used Ford funds to organize a series of conferences, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences received a grant

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to publish the proceedings of a Black Studies conference. Despite the fact that nationalism was a heavily debated issue among Black Studies faculty and critics, discussions of nationalism were absent from the programs organized by both of these organizations. Similarly, none of the grants awarded to librarianship organizations went to support the cataloging of papers associated with nationalist figures.

*Diffusion of the Model:* The ultimate goal of the Ford Foundation’s efforts in Black Studies was to promote liberal interdisciplinary Black Studies throughout American higher education. Many at the Ford Foundation believed that Black Studies was a hastily organized enterprise, taken seriously only because of the political situation. The Foundation could push the field in a positive direction through grant making. In the eyes of some program officers, Foundation grants could confer legitimacy to Black Studies and promote the field’s adoption in many colleges: “It seemed best to help interested universities and colleges add a new and active ‘center’ and hope that, in time, contagion would result.”

Others at the Foundation shared this attitude but felt that emulation of model programs was too much to ask. Because many Black Studies programs were poorly designed and unstable, some program officers thought that a likely outcome was that many of these academic programs would offer poor courses. According to Foundation officer Roger Wilkins, the Foundation intended to influence the field through sponsorship of strong programs:

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"Many of these offerings will be hastily conceived and taught. As a result, thousands of students—black and white—are likely to be disappointed and disillusioned. There isn't much that the Foundation can do to prevent this. It can, however, make an important contribution to the orderly development of this hitherto neglected field of studies by helping a few strategic institutions get off on the right foot. The grants proposed here are designed to do that."\(^{40}\)

Wilkins noted in his report to Bundy that student activism might prevent the emulation of such models and that the Foundation would have to be content with sponsorship of strong programs.

3.9. *The Debate over Nationalism in Black Higher Education*

This chapter has so far concentrated on decision making within the Ford Foundation. The evidence I have presented so far supports the critical theory of philanthropy as an agent of social control. The Ford Foundation consistently chose non-nationalist Black Studies and supported interdisciplinary undergraduate programs. As suggested by neoinstitutional theories, Ford Foundation officers did try to establish a model for Black Studies that they hoped would diffuse throughout American higher education. This section and the next discuss the conflicts surrounding Black Studies and the articulation of a nationalist Black Studies model.

When the Ford Foundation sponsored Black Studies programs, the Foundation understood that they were entering a heavily disputed field. Many arguments about Black Studies appeared in widely circulated opinion journals, and it is important to understand the ideas behind nationalist Black Studies that Ford Foundation officers and Black

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\(^{40}\) Letter from Roger Wilkins to McGeorge Bundy, May 22, 1969. Office Papers of McGeorge Bundy, Box 1, Folder 5. Ford Foundation Archives. See attachment F to this document.
Studies faculty encountered. This section presents a description of nationalist approaches to higher education drawing from debates appearing in two opinion journals, *The Crisis*, the official organ of the NAACP, and *Negro Digest*, a widely circulated magazine documenting black political opinion from a variety of perspectives. These two journals were chosen because respondents often referred to them and they document opinions that may have been common among Civil Rights activists and their critics. I note that this discussion is not intended as a comprehensive review of the debate over Black Studies or the evolution of nationalist ideologies (for reviews of black nationalism, see Dawson 2001; van Deburg 1992; Glaude 2002). This section describes only the intellectual context of the Black Studies debate in the late 1960s from the perspective of individuals who were involved in funding, operating, criticizing, or consulting for Black Studies programs.

An examination of *Negro Digest* reveals that by 1965, many writers started to openly question the basic tenets of the Civil Rights movement. Dr. Nathan Hare, a future Black Studies program director at San Francisco State College, argued that nonviolence had been misused by Civil Rights leaders and it was going to have a limited place in future black struggles.\(^{41}\) The problem was that nonviolence failed to achieve equality for blacks in housing and work. At best, nonviolence humiliated employers into awarding jobs to a few blacks, while allowing those employers to continue excluding most blacks. Hare also argued that residential segregation had not decreased at all during the 1950s. Concluding his remarks on the failure of nonviolence, he noted that many Southern blacks were unwilling to employ nonviolence in response to white aggression and they

felt abandoned when Martin Luther King took his campaign to the North in 1964. While never explicitly advocating violence, Hare does note that advocates of violence were still looking back to nonviolence, but if they were to encounter violence, then “let the chips fall where they may.” For other writers, black violence was the “safe guard” of democracy.\(^{42}\) Without real confrontation, blacks might never fully obtain the equality that they had been promised. There was always the possibility that whites would resist and violent action would become necessary.

Among contributors to the *Negro Digest*, criticism of nonviolence and, by implication, the Civil Rights movement coincided with the emergence of a new intellectual agenda. This agenda included arguments for a militant stance and a renewed emphasis on the needs of the black community. Militancy was motivated by the alleged failures of the Civil Rights movement and the feeling that whites simply did not take blacks seriously, despite their sympathy with blacks. An article titled “The Social Value of Black Indignation” praised the value of a confrontational stance in daily life.\(^{43}\) For too long, blacks were without their own identity. They had lived in a world defined by white values and institutions. The consequence of such an existence was that blacks were expected to be submissive in their dealings with whites, always kind and polite, and in constant restraint of their anger. What blacks really needed was public demonstration of anger so that existing hierarchies could be challenged, and that meant the acceptance of indignation as a tool for dealing with whites.


Other writers urged black intellectuals to turn to the black community. In the May 1967 issue of *Negro Digest*, Stanford A. Cameron called on black intellectuals to stop being subpar copies of white intellectuals. The job of the black intellectual should be the reconstruction of pride in the black community; the eradication of racism was a goal that would never be achieved. In the same issue, *Negro Digest* published an extensive interview with Leopold Senghor, Senegalese president and “negritude” philosopher. He praised black American artists because they had retained their “Negro enthusiasm,” while many African artists were enthralled with Europe. He also made an argument closely resembling later nationalist criticisms of the academy. Responding to a question about the role of European thinking for Africans, he claimed that it was necessary for Africans to employ analytical thinking characterizing French culture, but it was also necessary to use intuitive thinking characterizing African culture. Senghor explicitly criticized the efforts of sociologists such as Northwestern University’s Melvin Herskovitz, because sociologists used statistics that could not access the lived experiences of blacks. Senghor implicitly argued that black experiences could not be the sole purview of traditional European modes of inquiry but required a synthesis of indigenous and European thinking.

The articulation of black nationalism in prominent journals was also accompanied by a criticism of black higher education. While liberals were defending historically black colleges because of their service to blacks, some nationalists started to wonder whether the mostly black campus was useful at all for the goal of black liberation. Clemment

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Vontress thought that the historically black campus encouraged apathy. Students at these colleges were too concerned with their careers and lived protected lives in "black suburbia."\textsuperscript{46} Professors at these schools were even worse. Faculty members tended to send critical students to counseling centers and were unable to respond to critical black scholars such as E. Franklin Frazier. The worst offenders were black college presidents, because they urged students to give up their ethnic identification so that they could live in an integrated white society. Vontress also wrote that college presidents at black colleges frequently met with students and could enforce this abandonment of black identity through sermons delivered at campus church services and face-to-face interactions.

Apathy's consequence was nonparticipation in crucial Civil Rights struggles. If apathy continued on black campuses, the movement would be co-opted by whites more willing to leave college and work for freedom.

As nationalism grew on college campuses and attracted advocates, black liberals were quick to criticize it. New York judge Francis Rivers wrote in the \textit{The Crisis}, the official organ of the NAACP, that nationalism on campus was a natural response to the black experience, and he compared the search for black identity to W.E.B. DuBois' search for identity in \textit{The Souls of Black Folk}. However, he felt that all proposals for all-black colleges and Black Studies were fundamentally misguided. He agreed with the nationalists that such projects would improve students' self-esteem, but Rivers thought that they would hamper black students' ability to cultivate critical thinking. Because

\textsuperscript{46} Vontress, Clemment E. "Should your child attend a Negro College?" \textit{Negro Digest} Vol. 16 No. 5.
black identity was an inherently extracurricular concern, pursuit of black identity could only distract students from honing their critical thinking and job opportunities.\textsuperscript{47}

When black student protest increased, sharper criticisms emerged. One college student argued that the “ghetto” had followed students to the campus. Students could either be “black,” meaning that they identified themselves in opposition to “whitey,” or “Negro,” which meant accepting social integration and economic advancement as the primary goals of a college education.\textsuperscript{48}

Harvard government professor Martin Kilson wrote the most detailed criticism of the Black Studies movement.\textsuperscript{49} Calling the Black Studies movement a fad, Kilson reminded readers that there was nothing new in the demand for black-centered education and research. Citing scholars such as Carter G. Woodson, John Hope Franklin, and E. Franklin Frazier, Kilson argued that Black Studies already existed and could be conducted with the detachment appropriate to scholarship. Black Studies advocates were mistaken in their belief that genuine black scholarship did not exist. They were also mistaken in their belief that Black Studies should automatically encourage pride amongst blacks. Any honest academic research will uncover black history’s good and bad episodes, and militants were not willing to recognize that.

Kilson made an argument for Black Studies as a grounded, interdisciplinary enterprise. Dilettantism could be avoided by making students work in a traditional discipline. Like others, he thought that students should take courses in traditional fields


\textsuperscript{49} Kilson, Martin. “Black Studies Movement—A Plea for Perspective,” The Crisis. 327–333.
like economics or literature and take extra courses in black topics. Any deviation from this approach would doom Black Studies:

"Nothing less than this should be required of any student, black or white—especially any Negro student—who would want to major in an Afro-American studies program. Indeed, anything less than this will be a colossal waste of time and resources."  

He concluded by warning readers against too many Black Studies majors. Economic advancement depended on the mastery of technical skills that were prerequisites to the medical and engineering professions. Black Studies' psychological appeal, if unchecked, could undermine black economic progress.

Proposals for black-oriented education included defenses of nationalist Black Studies. In a review of the proceedings of the Yale conference, Preston Wilcox said that Black Studies had become defined around both integrationist and nationalist visions and that future work in Black Studies must reconcile these two, not exclude one over the other. Later in the Black Studies debate, Wilcox argued that an interdisciplinary foundation for Black Studies allowed for extended white control over the field. Independence of thought could be guaranteed only through the cultivation of independent black thinking. Interdisciplinary Black Studies meant dependence on existing academic disciplines; teachers were indoctrinated through intensive doctoral education and were unable to recognize the black experience. Accordingly, white educational institutions

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50 Ibid, 331. Original was completely italicized. Here I present it unitalicized for legibility.

must recognize their inability to accredit Black Studies programs because existing academic disciplines could not recognize the authenticity of blacks as authors of their own history. Making Black Studies an extension of existing discipline would only serve to make “Black studies into White studies.”

3.10. The Ford Foundation Confronts Black Nationalism

Despite the program officers’ consistent rejection of nationalism and support for interdisciplinary Black Studies, there were moments when program officers directly confronted nationalists. The most emotional confrontation occurred at a 1970 conference at which Ford Foundation officers, Black Studies chairs, students, and other interested academics convened to discuss the future of Black Studies. The records of this conference reveal how many Black Studies chairs viewed Black Studies and how they were trying to create a black-oriented institution.

In 1969, a grant was made to the Academy for Educational Development to organize a conference for Black Studies program directors in July 1970. The conference would be an opportunity for Foundation officers, faculty, and administrators to meet and discuss the state of the Black Studies field. The conference took on a life of its own—instead of being a forum for discussion of academic issues, it turned into an emotional conflict between program directors and Foundation staff. According to John Scanlon, the Foundation program officer who supervised grants made to Black Studies programs,

52 Ibid, 77.

"[the conference] was one of those grants that turn sour just to remind Foundation
types that Bobby Burns knew what he was talking about when he wrote: 'The best laid
schemes o’ mice and men gang aft a-gley.’"\(^{54}\)

Ford Foundation staff organized the conference with the goal of producing a book
containing information about different Black Studies programs targeted at the
administrators of Black Studies programs.\(^{55}\) The book was also supposed to contain the
results of a survey of Black Studies programs.

Preconference activities went as planned. Most of the scholars and students who
were invited to the conference chose to attend. A few weeks before the conference,
Vincent Harding, a scholar associated with the Martin Luther King, Jr., Center, and
Roscoe Brown, chair of NYU’s Afro-American Studies program, circulated a letter
questioning the Ford Foundation’s motivation for organizing the conference.\(^{56}\)

When the conference convened in Aspen, Colorado, events were moving in a
direction quite different from what the Foundation or the Academy had expected. During
the social hour before the conference, Foundation officer James Armsey announced that
there had been a request to convene a Black Caucus. This immediately led to some
conflict, because the resort at which the conference was held had only one large meeting
room available. One white attendee felt excluded when the Caucus met, and he accused

\(^{54}\) Scanlon, John J., Interoffice Memorandum to the Files, June 22, 1971. PA 700-188. 1. Ford
Foundation Archives.

\(^{55}\) Eurich, Alvin C., Letter to James Armsey, November 13, 1969. PA 700-188. Ford Foundation
Archives.

\(^{56}\) Ibid, 2.
the Foundation of supporting "segregation and separatism" in a bitter letter to McGeorge Bundy.\textsuperscript{57}

The conference itself did not go as the Foundation officers had intended.\textsuperscript{58} The first day of the conference was spent debating a statement written by the Black Caucus. Roscoe Brown, who had been elected spokesman for the Caucus, read a statement attacking the Foundation and airing the complaint that "the fact that Black expertise and leadership did not have the major role in conceptualizing and organizing this conference."\textsuperscript{59} After the reading of the statement, Brown urged that the conference's length be shortened and the agenda changed.

The next few days were dedicated to discussions of how students felt about Black Studies, what Black Studies should mean to students, and Black Studies on white campuses. Participants constantly raised the issues of control—whether the funding of Black Studies by the Ford Foundation implied that the programs were "Ford programs." There was also discussion of the political and ideological aspects of Black Studies. During the last day of the conference, some members of the Black Caucus argued that there should be some accrediting agency for Black Studies programs that would be controlled by black groups. A consistent theme among critics of the Foundation was that blacks did not have enough of a role in determining the state of the field and that students should have a high degree of influence on the discipline.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{59} Underlined in the original text.
Unsurprisingly, the Foundation was reluctant to publish the proceedings of the conference, and Roscoe Brown tried to persuade John Scanlon and James Armsey to approve funds for the publication of a document that was prepared by the Black Caucus. The request was denied, and the reason given to Brown was that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 disallowed the use of philanthropic funds by a third party.\textsuperscript{60} The Foundation staff concluded the project without the publication of any kind of proceedings.

3.11. Black Studies Programs Respond to Nationalism

The remainder of this chapter discusses how some Ford-sponsored programs responded to the conflict over nationalist Black Studies. In most cases, sponsored programs adopted interdisciplinary Black Studies and stayed on this course. I discuss Howard University's program as an example of the adherence to the interdisciplinary Black Studies model. In contrast, Vanderbilt University's program showed signs of moving away from the interdisciplinary model, and I present it as an example of an academic unit that responded favorably to nationalist Black Studies and the criticisms raised by participants in the Aspen conference. Finally, I present a description of the Institute for the Black World, labeled by its director as a "Black conscious operation." Because of its early ties to Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, family, the Institute received a large Foundation grant even though it did not strictly adhere to the interdisciplinary Black Studies model. I argue that the conflict characterized the environment of Black Studies programs. The Foundation responded by sponsoring the Institute and Vanderbilt adopted

a more nationalist stance, while many programs such as Howard remained committed to interdisciplinary Black Studies. As suggested by complex environment theories, conflicts over nationalist Black Studies were mapped onto Black Studies programs.

3.12. Interdisciplinary Black Studies at Howard University

The grant made to Howard University is an example of an award made to a Black Studies program that rejected nationalism and offered an interdisciplinary approach to Black Studies. In many ways, Howard University’s program represented what Ford Foundation officers thought was worthy of support—the high-quality historically black college employing reputable scholars who could teach Black Studies courses. John J. Scanlon wrote a memo describing Howard’s strengths and opined that Howard’s program might be a very good, considering “Howard’s prestige, capability, and interest in doing an outstanding job.”\(^{61}\) Scanlon’s memo emphasized the interdisciplinary nature of the major at Howard and the fact that there were already reputable scholars in existing departments who could teach in Howard’s program.\(^{62}\)

The Afro-American Studies program at Howard was like many others, in that student protesters demanded a Black Studies program.\(^{63}\) The Howard University administration eventually acceded to student demands and set out to develop a Black Studies program. By the time that the Ford Foundation received a proposal from Howard University, the administration rejected nationalist Black Studies at Howard and pushed it

\(^{61}\) Scanlon, John J., Interoffice Memorandum to the Files. Title: Afro-American Studies Program at Howard University, April 4, 1969. PA 69-518. Ford Foundation Archives.

\(^{62}\) Ibid.

in a more interdisciplinary direction. The proposal explicitly mentions that Howard
University's administration was rejecting calls for Howard to become a center of "Black
provincialism, separatism or propaganda." The faculty rejected a proposal to establish a
College of Black Studies within Howard University and opted to instead create a new
department that would coordinate the courses at Howard University that dealt with black
history and culture and also to develop new courses for students who wished to major in
the topic.65

The Afro-American Studies department at Howard had an interim chair for one
year and was then chaired by Russell Adams, a political scientist who specialized in
American race relations. Adams reports that the Ford Foundation grant did much to
improve the department's visibility within the university and nationally. He reported that
when the Ford Foundation selected the Howard department for a grant, he received calls
from other Black Studies chairs asking how they could get a grant, and he expressed
some surprise that the Ford Foundation would deign to support something as
controversial as Black Studies. The grant also helped Howard's department survive,
because it provided crucial operating funds and helped bolster the department's
reputation within the university.66

The curriculum that Adams and others developed for Howard's department
reflected the educational philosophy shared by the Ford Foundation. Adams stated in an

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64 Proposal Submitted to the Ford Foundation for Support of a New Department of Afro-American
Studies at Howard University. 1969. No author or exact date given. 1. PA 69-518. Ford Foundation
Archives.

65 Ibid.

interview that the Howard program was, and continues to be, an interdisciplinary program that does not try to completely capture the black experience in microcosm, as nationalists might want, but views the black experience from historical, sociological, and cultural perspectives.\textsuperscript{67} Soon after opening, the Howard department established what now might be considered a typical social science approach to Black Studies. The program's summary statement to the Ford Foundation indicated that the curriculum was developed so that students could use the "disciplinary tools" of economics, sociology, and history to study the black experience. Courses included basic courses on black history and more specialized courses on black education and the history of black business.\textsuperscript{68}

Completely lacking in the documentation sent to the Ford Foundation, in an interview with Adams, and upon examination of the Howard University course catalogs was any sense that the department had adopted nationalist perspectives in its courses. When asked about this, Russell Adams responded that those persons hired by the department did not adopt those perspectives. This may reflect the strong influence that a departmental chair has on a small department like Howard's. When discussing unconventional Black Studies, Russell reported that he had to dismiss some instructors whose classes resembled charlatanry rather than traditional classes. For example, Russell reported that one lecturer was dismissed after students notified Russell that the instructor played with I-ching cards during class. This suggests that the department chair had a

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.

strong hand in dismissing, or simply not hiring, individuals who might have gravitated toward nationalist Black Studies.

3.13. The Move Toward Nationalism: Afro-American Studies at Vanderbilt

The articulation of a nationalist model for Black Studies meant that some programs would start to move in directions that conflicted with the Ford Foundation’s values. One such program was Vanderbilt’s, which originally offered interdisciplinary Black Studies but was soon chaired by an individual who moved the program toward nationalist Black Studies.

In the spring of 1968, the faculty Race Relations Committee formed and the student Afro-American Association submitted a proposal to the faculty senate for the establishment of an Afro-American Studies program. Committee chair Professor Charles E. Izzard asked the Ford Foundation in June 1969 for financial assistance. The proposal asked for $47,000 to help pay for the start-up costs of the program at Vanderbilt, funds for start-up costs at Fisk, and funds to help pay for seminars that would be the seed of an interuniversity consortium.69

The most notable aspect of the Vanderbilt proposal was that it stressed the interdisciplinary nature of Afro-American Studies. The program would allow students to major in any one of five social science and humanities disciplines while taking courses specific to the program. A special interdisciplinary course was designed around the topic of government policy toward racial minorities. In a letter to Foundation officer John

Scanlon, Professor Izzard mentioned a course in Black Drama, in which students were to stage plays written by black playwrights, that was supposed to have “socio-educational value as well as artistic merit.” The program started out as an attempt to create a set of courses that would at once appeal to the university community, the Ford Foundation, and black student groups.\textsuperscript{70}

During the 1969–1970 year, the Vanderbilt administration hired Akbar Muhammad to chair the Afro-American Studies program. Muhammad was an individual who could appeal to both mainstream academia and black nationalists. His legitimacy within the academy came from the fact that he was a scholar who was an expert in Islamic history, was working on a history doctorate from the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, and was also published in academic history journals.\textsuperscript{71} Muhammad was also a person who might have appealed to student groups at Vanderbilt because of his impeccable nationalist credentials: he was the son of Nation of Islam leader Elijah Muhammad. Although Akbar Muhammad had renounced much of the Nation of Islam’s ideology at this point, he was still a figure who might have commanded some respect from students.

Upon his arrival, he restructured the program, much to the dismay of some at Vanderbilt. According to one administrator, Muhammad “Blackwashed” the courses.\textsuperscript{72} The new courses were more focused on topics such as slavery and Third World liberation instead of the general social science topics that were taught by the members of the Race

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid, 4.

\textsuperscript{71} Curriculum Vitae for Akbar Muhammad. Undated. PA 700-045. Ford Foundation Archives.

Relations Committee. He also started to reorient the program toward members of the Black Studies movement rather than the faculty at Vanderbilt. In correspondence with the Foundation, he favorably cited the unpublished proceedings of the Aspen conference, which were perceived by many to be a separatist document. More tellingly, Mr. Muhammad requested an extension of the Ford Foundation grant so that a survey of Black Studies programs could be conducted. If the results of the survey were published, Muhammad argued, then Vanderbilt would be seen in a more favorable light by Black Studies directors everywhere.\footnote{Muhammad, Akbar, Letter to Dean Wendell G. Holladay, March 4, 1971. PA 700-045. Ford Foundation Archives.}

John Scanlon denied the request on the grounds that grant money could go only to projects designated in the original grant proposal, and the grant expired without incident. In the final report submitted to the Foundation, Mr. Muhammad thanked the Foundation for its assistance, pointed to what Foundation money had helped accomplish, and concluded by noting that despite all the progress, the program still had problems being accepted at Vanderbilt.

\textit{3.14. The Black Think Tank: The Institute for the Black World}

In only one instance did the Ford Foundation award a grant when program officers suspected that the recipient would promote nationalist Black Studies. In March 1970, the Ford Foundation awarded $100,000 to the Martin Luther King Memorial Center in Atlanta, Georgia. Founded by the King family after King’s murder, the Center’s goals were to preserve King’s papers, promote the Civil Rights movement, and become a
research center. The grant was to support the development of the Center's archives and the Institute for the Black World, an academic research organization located at the King Center, which was headed by Vincent H. Harding, a University of Chicago History Ph.D. and theorist of the Black University.⁷⁴

Before coming to the King Center and founding the Institute, Vincent Harding was involved with the Civil Rights movement and was a history professor at Spelman College.⁷⁵ When the King Center was founded, Harding became its library director and eventually the head of the Institute for the Black World. Harding frequently contacted the Ford Foundation in order to ask for funds for the Institute. The effort to receive a Ford Foundation grant culminated in September 1969, when the King Center formally submitted a request for grant action seeking $300,500.⁷⁶ Proposed activities for the Institute included the development of "experimental" Black Studies curricula, the publication of a book called Documents in Black Studies, and training for future Black Studies instructors.⁷⁷ The grant was eventually reduced to $100,000, with $65,000 for the Institute's operating costs and $35,000 for collecting and archiving materials related to the Civil Rights movement.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Harding published his theory of the Black University in forums such as Negro Digest (Summer 1970 issue) and in Ebony.


⁷⁷ Ibid, 3.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 2.
Ford Foundation officers knew that Vincent Harding did not share their views on Black Studies and that there were political risks associated with funding the Institute, even though it was associated with the King Center. For example, one Foundation officer expressed concerns that the grant might attract attention from a hostile Southern congressman, who had repeatedly attacked the Foundation and tried to regulate its activities.\textsuperscript{79} Another Foundation officer pointed out that Harding had written a militant article in \textit{Ebony} magazine that was compared to \textit{Mein Kampf} by a distressed Atlanta University Center administrator.\textsuperscript{80} Another program officer noted that Harding proposed to hire Gerald McWhorter, a sociologist who helped organize the student occupation of Morehouse College's administration building.\textsuperscript{81} Perhaps the harshest assessment of the Institute was expressed in John Scanlon's response to an early proposal for Black Studies submitted by Vincent Harding. According to Scanlon, Harding tried to provide substance for his Black Studies proposal but did nothing except to show that his version of Black Studies was "of the Blacks, by the Blacks and for the Blacks."\textsuperscript{82}

Despite these reservations, Ford Foundation officers supported the Institute. Two officers reported in an interview that they felt pressure to support projects associated with

\textsuperscript{79} Cook, Samuel DuBois, Interoffice Memorandum to James W. Armsey. Subject: Meeting with the Officers of the Foundation on the MLK and AU Centers' Proposals, October 23, 1969. PA 700-089. Ford Foundation Archives.


the King family.\textsuperscript{83} Vincent Harding reported that he felt that the Ford Foundation was very interested in supporting organizations with ties to the Civil Rights movement:

"On a certain level, Ford was helping Black Studies programs when they helped us but they were also helping the Martin Luther King archives. I went with Mrs. King to talk to McGeorge Bundy and what was clear was that they were trying to identify themselves with King. That is an understandable kind of agenda for them."\textsuperscript{84}

Foundation officers later reported in memos that Vincent Harding could be diplomatic in face-to-face meetings,\textsuperscript{85} and it is quite possible that he was able to address the concerns of Foundation officers and staff in person.

When the Institute received the grant money, it was used as promised. Harding reported to the Foundation that he hired a number of scholars-in-residence. Some of these resident scholars included Joyce Lander, a Chicago-trained sociologist and future president of Howard University, and Lerone Bennett, a historian widely known for his support of black history.\textsuperscript{86} Harding also hired Robert Hill, a historian who specialized in Marcus Garvey, the African-American nationalist. Other Institute activities included a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{84} Telephone interview with Vincent Harding. March 2002.
\end{itemize}
meeting of Black Studies chairs in the fall of 1969 and the preparation of a book of materials regarding the operation of Black Studies programs.\footnote{Ibid.}

When the grant ended, the Institute maintained close contact with the Foundation, and the subsequent history of the Institute can be gleaned from the documentation of these contacts. Before closing in 1978, Harding made the Institute into an independent organization, which he then tried to merge with the Atlanta University Center. The break from the King Center occurred ostensibly because the King family lost interest in supporting a research center like the Institute.\footnote{Cook, Samuel Dubois, Interoffice Memorandum to the File, Subject: Evaluation of Grant #700-0089, November 23, 1970. PA 700-089. Ford Foundation Archives.} The break may have also occurred because of conflicts between Harding and the King family.

After the separation from the King Center, the Institute attempted to acquire funding from other foundations. For example, Harding was able to acquire $30,000 from the Cummins Engine Foundation.\footnote{Grant proposal for the Institute for the Black World. PA 700-089. Circa 1969. No exact date given. Ford Foundation Archives. Probably authored by Vincent G. Harding.} There were also unsuccessful attempts from its founding to win grants from other large philanthropies such as the Rockefeller Foundation. Over time, Harding found it difficult to get funding for an independent Black Studies institute, and a lack of funds forced the Institute to close in the late 1970s. Harding thought that the impetus for Black Studies was tied to the rise of Black Power and urban violence. According to Harding, many found it hard to see the need for a black-oriented research institute once urban violence, the Civil Rights movement, and the student movement all started to recede:
“There were several factors in the Institute shutting down... the edge and excitement had grown out of Black Power. Consciousness and urban explosions—all of that were no longer at the forefront. It was harder and harder to get funding for a politically conscious and Black conscious operation.”

The Institute’s brief existence shows how foundations can feel pressure to support programs whose values conflict with their own, but it also shows that foundation sponsorship alone does not guarantee survival. The Institute’s director determined its direction, which made it difficult for the organization to survive once political conditions changed.

3.15. Summary and Conclusion

The Ford Foundation sponsored Black Studies programs as part of a larger attempt to improve minority higher education and promote Civil Rights. Foundation officers tried to shape the field through grants made to prestigious colleges and research organizations. While most programs continued to teach interdisciplinary Black Studies, a few adopted nationalist Black Studies. In some cases, there was little that the Ford Foundation could do. For example, the Institute for the Black World was organized as a “black conscious” organization and continued to pursue its goals, even though it may have cost the Institute the support of King Center. At Vanderbilt, the administration decided to hire a department chair who had strong personal connections to an organization closely identified with black nationalism—the Nation of Islam.

The Foundation’s sponsorship of Black Studies and the subsequent intellectual division between the Foundation and some grantees demonstrates that critical, New

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Institutional, and complex environment theories all have something to contribute to the understanding of how social movements and philanthropies define a university’s political environment. As critical theories would predict, Foundation officers selected less radical proposals. It may also be true that there was a “cooling out” effect, because the Foundation did not support any student groups and supported only one nationalist organization. As New Institutionalist theory would imply, the Foundation did actively try to influence Black Studies through sponsorship of model programs.

The debate over nationalist Black Studies and the confrontation between black intellectuals and the Foundation led to a situation in which Black Studies programs could develop in different directions. The “complexity” of the political environment did not permit transmission of a single model for Black Studies from prestigious actors to the field of Black Studies programs. Programs with directors favorably inclined toward nationalist arguments could choose to satisfy different audiences and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of their target audience.

Future research must examine in more detail the long-term consequences of philanthropic funding. This chapter focused on the Ford Foundation’s decisions and the conflict surrounding their choice of grant recipients and presented some evidence of the development of a few programs. To more fully assess philanthropy’s role as a patron of social change, future research could outline the development of these programs in more detail and examine how program directors balanced the demands from sponsors such as the Ford Foundation, the academic profession, and black intellectuals. Future research could also systematically compare programs that received grants to those who did not.
Chapter 4

Niche Dynamics, Internal Politics, and the Diffusion of Undergraduate Computer Science Programs

4.1. Introduction

This chapter uses the ideas presented in chapter 1 to develop and test hypotheses about the diffusion of Computer Science programs. This chapter is organized in the following manner. First, I discuss population ecology theory as developed by Hannan and Freeman (1978, 1990), Aldrich (1983), Carrol and Hannan (2000), and others. According to population ecology theory, an organization’s environment is defined by available resources, often called “niche,” and competition over resources deters competitors. Thus, if structural change requires resources, then population ecology theory predicts that the number of organizations competing for those resources will suppress the rate at which organizations change. Applied to the growth of Computer Science programs, population ecology theory predicts that the rate at which universities create Computer Science programs will be positively affected by the popularity of Computer Science as a college major and negatively affected by intercollegiate competition for students.

Following chapter 1’s theoretical framework, I also present and test hypotheses about the influence of a university’s internal structure on the creation of Computer Science programs. As in chapter 2, I hypothesize that size, age, and internal complexity might have positive effects on structural change. This chapter focuses on the role that
internal constituencies have in facilitating the creation of Computer Science programs in universities. Some historians have found evidence that engineers and mathematicians in universities would occasionally oppose the creation of Computer Science departments, because they felt that Computer Science did not merit its own field of study. I review some of the historical evidence on this issue and hypothesize that the presence of these groups might delay the creation of a Computer Science program.

I test hypotheses with data on Computer Science programs, universities, and the demand for undergraduate Computer Science education as reported in surveys of graduating college-bound high school seniors. I define the niche of the university as those graduating high school seniors who reside in the university’s geographical region and whose S.A.T. scores fall within the 25%–75% percentile range, because higher education researchers have found that students tend to enroll in colleges close to where they attended high school and when they fall within the 25%–75% S.A.T. range of the college. Hypotheses about a university’s internal structure are tested with data on size, endowments, and enrollments in engineering and physical science fields.

4.2. *A Review of Population Ecology Theory*

Population ecology starts with a biological analogy: social organizations are similar to biological organizations in that social organizations compete with each other for resources. From this premise, population ecologists argue that the focus of organizational theory should be the relationship among an organization, resources, and other organizations competing for those resources. Population ecology often focuses on a single population of organizations competing over the same set of resources, such as
newspapers competing over subscribers, breweries competing over beer drinkers, or labor unions competing over memberships. The set of resources that organizations depend on is often called “niche.” Hannan and Freeman (1989:50) provide the following definition:

“The niche of a population consists of combinations of resource abundances and constraints in which [population] members can arise and persist.”

Ecological research sometimes uses a firm’s product as a proxy for the resources that an organization consumes. For example, Dobrev’s (2000) analysis of the American truck market uses the truck’s engine size as a proxy for resource utilization by the manufacturer—the larger the engine size, the more resources the firm must consume.

Population ecologists use “density,” the number of organizations competing over the same set of resources, to make predictions about the creation and disbanding of firms or market entry. Some ecologists argue that organizations might be deterred from entering a new market because too many organizations occupy a niche. To avoid crowding, organizations will occupy different regions of a resource space, a process called resource partition. Carroll and Hannan (2000: 262) use a geometrical metaphor to describe resource partitioning:

“The theoretical imagery of resource partitioning relies on notions of crowding among organizations in a market characterized as a finite set of heterogeneous resources. Organizations initially attempt to find viable positions within the market by targeting their products to various resource segments. Some organizations choose narrow, homogenous targets; others choose broad targets composed of heterogeneous segments.”
Peli (1997) and Peli and Nooteboom (1999) discuss resource partition using the language of Euclidean geometry. In their version of population ecology, organizations occupy spherical areas of a vector space in which each axis represents one kind of resource. Organizations entering a crowded resource space must occupy a region of the resource space between the spherical areas occupied by other organizations.

Population ecologists use the concepts of density and resource partition to make predictions about population growth rates. Ecologists argue that high density prevents organizational births. Using Peli and Noteboom's language, there are few unclaimed areas in the resource space and as the space becomes crowded, some organizations must exit the population. High density decreases the incentive to start an organization and discourages others from entering the market. When density is low, population ecologists employ a different argument. Low density correlates with a lack of legitimacy.

Organizations in low-density environments have difficulties acquiring loans from banks and may not be able to attract customers or clients. Consequently, low density correlates with low birth rates. Increases in density improve legitimacy, leading to higher birth rates. For some value of the density, competitive pressures outweigh legitimacy's benefits, resulting in an inverted U-shaped organizational birth rate curve. This line of reasoning is summarized in a modified version of Theorem 10.3.1 in Carrol and Hannan (2000: 228):

Theorem 1: Organizational founding rates ($\mu$) initially rise with increasing density, reach a maximum, and then decrease with further increases in density:

$$\mu(t) = \kappa_\mu(t) \frac{\rho(N_t)}{\min(\rho(N_t), \ell)},$$

and
\[ \mu(t)' \equiv \frac{d\mu(t)}{dN_i} > 0, \text{ if } N_i < N^*_\mu \text{ and } \mu(t)' < 0 \text{ if } N_i > N^*_\mu. \]

Here \( \varphi \) denotes the effects of legitimacy, \( \ell \) denotes a limit on the positive effects of legitimacy, \( N^*_\mu \) is the critical point in density at which mortality starts to increase, and \( \varphi \) denotes the effects of competition; \( \kappa \) is the effect of other relevant conditions, which are historical and industry specific.

Although Theorem 1 does not directly address organizational change, much of the same reasoning applies to structural change. High-density niches should discourage change because of competition. Managers will be hesitant to enter low-density environments because entry might be viewed as illegitimate. Organizations will be most likely to enter a new market for some intermediate density value, resulting in an inverted U-shaped effect of density on organizational change.

### 4.3. Ecological Hypotheses about the Creation of Computer Science Programs

This section discusses college choice in order to develop ecological hypotheses about the creation of Computer Science programs. I argue that a university's niche includes the students who might enroll in the college. Population ecology theory then implies that demand for an academic program among prospective students will have a positive effect on program creation. Ecological theory also suggests that competition will decrease the probability that a university will create an academic program. I then discuss how Theorem 1 can be used to deduce the hypothesis that density has an inverted U-shaped effect on program creation.

There are two relevant findings from the college choice literature. First, the distance between a college's mean S.A.T. score and an individual's S.A.T. score has a
positive effect on the probability that the individual will apply to the college. Furthermore, applicants tend to be accepted by colleges whose median S.A.T. score matches their own. Empirically, college-bound seniors tend to enroll in colleges when their own combined S.A.T. falls within 50 points of the college’s average (Manski 1983; Bateman and Spruill 1996; Litten 1982). Second, students tend to enroll in colleges located in their own state or geographic area (Paulsen 1990b). The studies cited above have found that the proximity to a college has a large effect on the probability that a student will apply to the college or elect to enroll in the college if he or she is accepted by the college.

In this chapter, I define the niche of a college to be those graduating college-bound seniors who reside in the college’s region\(^1\) and whose S.A.T. scores fall within the college’s 25%–75% S.A.T range. Since I am interested in Computer Science programs, I focus on those students whose S.A.T. math score falls within the 25%–75% S.A.T. mathematics range of the college. According to population ecology theory, organizations are more likely to create a subunit if there are resources available. An academic program will be created if there are eligible high school seniors willing to enroll in the program. The proportion of students in a college’s niche who intend to major in Computer Science will have a positive effect on the creation of a Computer Science program:

*Hypothesis 1:* The proportion of college-bound high school seniors in a college’s niche intending to enroll in a Computer Science program has a positive effect on the creation of Computer Science programs. The college’s niche is defined to be those college-bound

---

\(^1\) I use the US Census Bureau region. Students and colleges are in the Northeast, Midwest, South or West. (US Census Bureau 2001)
high school seniors whose math score falls within the college’s 25%-75% S.A.T. math range and who reside in the college’s region.

![Graph showing niche overlap of two colleges.](image)

**Figure 4.1: Niche Overlap of Two Colleges**

Population ecology theory predicts negative effects of competition in addition to positive effects of the total resources available to an academic program. As noted above, ecologists use density as a proxy for competition, but more recent ecological writings stress that organizations do not compete for the exact same set of resources. Polos and Hannan (2002) argue that organizations extract resources from overlapping regions of a space. In this chapter, the density of a college’s niche must be defined as the total number of all the colleges whose niche overlaps with the college, weighted by the degree of overlap. The weight used in computing niche overlap of college A with college B is simply the fraction of college A’s S.A.T. math range covered by college B’s S.A.T. math range. See Figure 4.1 for an illustration of niche overlap for colleges.
Hypothesis 2: The total number of colleges in a niche, weighted by the extent of niche overlap, will have a negative effect on the establishment of a Computer Science program.

According to Theorem 1 above, there will be a U-shaped effect of density on the creation of new programs:

Hypothesis 3: The square of the weighted sum of colleges whose niche overlaps with a given college will have a negative effect on the probability that a college will create a Computer Science program.

4.4. Structural Hypotheses about the Creation of Computer Science Programs

This chapter also tests the hypotheses about the effects of internal organizational structure on the creation of Computer Science programs. As in chapter 2, I hypothesize that size, age, endowments, and curricular diversity will affect the creation of a Computer Science program. The arguments presented in chapter 2 are not specific to the diffusion of Black Studies programs and apply to the growth of Computer Science programs. I also include control variables for public ownership and Carnegie category.

The remainder of this section discusses the role that internal constituencies have in promoting the creation of Computer Science programs. Some historical evidence suggests that engineers and mathematicians might have opposed the creation of early Computer Science programs. Historians of Computer Science have noted that Computer Science programs were often controversial within universities and research institutes, because some scientists and engineers did not feel that computing was distinct from
engineering, mathematics, or other existing scientific disciplines. For example, Baron and Mounier-Kuhn (1990) report that computer scientists in various French universities in the 1940s and 1950s had to overcome the perception that computing theory was a kind of applied mathematics undeserving of the status accorded to existing disciplines. Coy (1997) describes a similar process occurring in postwar German universities. German educational ministers placed Computer Sciences—"informatics"—within engineering or other applied science units. Coy attributes this to political processes occurring with various German educational and scientific ministries as well as to intellectual boundaries enforced by existing academic communities.

Historians have found evidence that early Computer Science units faced some opposition in American universities and research institutes. In many cases, it was felt that computing could easily be an extension of existing science, an attitude encountered by computer pioneer and mathematician John von Neumann (Aspray 1990). Von Neumann's first attempt to bring a UNIVAC computer to the Institute for Advanced Study in the late 1940s was blocked by colleagues, because they felt that computing would dilute the Institute's commitment to pure science (Regis 1988). Computing was a type of engineering, not a pure science like physics or mathematics, and therefore not acceptable.

Oral histories of computer scientists who worked at American universities in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s suggest that existing departments often tried to assume the functions of a Computer Science department, which could either split a Computer Science group or lead to its failure. Academic administrators often located Computer Science work groups inside departments of electrical engineering, operations research, or
library science, making it difficult for some Computer Science degree programs to emerge as independent academic units (Aspray 1999).

Enforcement of disciplinary boundaries could be tenacious. Joseph F. Traub, a computer scientist at MIT, Columbia University, Bell Laboratories, and other institutions, discusses some of the disciplinary conflicts surrounding Computer Science programs in the 1960s. At the University of California, Berkeley, the emerging Computer Science group was torn between the School of Letters and Science and the engineering school:

“At Berkeley, there were two departments: and two departments are perhaps worse than none, because there was a bitter battle between Abe Taub, who headed a department (he’s a mathematician who’d been recruited from Illinois to head the computer center and to build a Computer Science department in the School of Letters and Sciences), and Lotfi Zadeh who was the head of the electrical engineering and Computer Science department... In the late 1960’s, the country watched while this bitter battle was waged at Berkeley between two departments.” (Traub 1985:4)

The University of California, Berkeley, was not the only major research university to experience difficulties. Columbia University was divided by a similar conflict between mathematicians and engineers that prevented the creation of a Computer Science program, although the university was the home of IBM Watson Laboratory. Traub describes the conflict between electrical engineers and mathematical statisticians at Columbia and the conflict’s effect on the ability to establish a reputable Computer Science program:

“...there was a CS effort, as part of the Electrical Engineering and Computer Science department, and another effort within Mathematical statistics. The two departments would fight each other over people, and nobody could do effective
recruiting. There was a national survey done about a year or two before I got there... out of those departments, Columbia's program—there was no department—was ranked sixtieth out of seventy on a par with Simon Fraser and the University of Calgary. That was how Computer Science at Columbia was viewed.” (Traub 1985: 21)

In administering the new Columbia University Department of Computer Science, Traub reports that he had to resolve these disciplinary conflicts and convince the university administration that Computer Science was as “important a discipline as physics or mathematics.” (22)

Similar conflicts were experienced by George Forsythe, a computer scientist who was the first chair of the Department of Computer Science at Stanford University, which went on to become one of the “Big Three” departments of Computer Science. Forsythe’s widow, Alexandra, recounts in an oral history the disciplinary issues at Stanford (Forsythe 1979). For example, George Forsythe helped avoid some conflicts by hiring both mathematicians and nonmathematical computer scientists (14). These individuals engaged in activities that distinguished the Computer Science department, and it “became more evident as computing grew that computing science wasn’t synonymous with mathematics or a subset of it.” (15) Such hires helped the Computer Science group develop a distinct identity and avoid some conflicts with the mathematics department, but Forsythe still had to contend with the perception that Computer Science was not a discipline. For example, Alexandra Forsythe reports that there was a great effort to establish computation as an activity of special intellectual importance—otherwise, computation might be spread out throughout Stanford and “we will end up just like
UCLA—lots of computer centers... apparently this is something he [George] wanted to avoid.” (21)

Given this historical evidence of opposition to Computer Science as a discipline, I hypothesize that the presence of large engineering and physical science programs will delay the creation of a Computer Science program because a Computer Science program. If an engineering program is large, there might be a push to have Computer Science integrated into existing engineering or physical science units. We arrive at a hypotheses:

_Hypotheses 4:_ The proportion of students who earn bachelor's degrees in engineering or physical sciences will have a negative effect on the creation of a Computer Science program.

_4.5. Data and Methods_

The niche of a college is defined to be those students who fall within the university’s 25%-75% range of mathematics S.A.T. scores and who live in the university’s region. Two kinds of data were collected: data on the mathematics S.A.T. range of a college and data on the college-bound high school seniors’ demand for Computer Science education. These data were merged with college-level data on organizational features of the college such as enrollments and the year that Computer Science degrees were first awarded at a school. The earliest national survey of high seniors that asked about intended college majors is the National Longitudinal Study of
1972. The last such survey is the National Educational Longitudinal Study, which surveyed high school seniors in 1994.

*The Dependent Variable:* The dependent variable in this analysis is the year that a Computer Science bachelor’s degree was awarded by a four-year college or university. This data was acquired from the Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) and its successor, the Integrate Postsecondary Data System (IPEDS). HEGIS/IPEDS report the number of bachelor’s degrees in Computer Science in the years 1966–1998. The dependent variable is set to one when the first bachelor’s in Computer Science was reported and zero before that date. Figure 4.2 shows the total number of Computer Science B.A. programs by year.

*College S.A.T. Data:* S.A.T. data is gathered from two sources, the Manual of Freshmen Class Profiles (College Board 1965) and the College Board Surveys of 1984, 1991, and 2000. The College Board Surveys and the Manual were obtained from the College Board in New York City, New York. The Manual of Freshman Class Profiles is a 1965 reference book reporting responses to a College Board survey preceding the Annual College Board Survey. The Manual presents information on the top and bottom quarter of the S.A.T. distribution in the college, the S.A.T. scores needed to be in the top and bottom quartile of the college’s entering freshman class. The Annual Surveys contain the same data for the years 1984–2000, and the College Board permitted me to use S.A.T. college data for three years. I chose the first year, last year, and middle year in the series so I could interpolate the scores. The College Board no longer has the data from the Manual in electronic format.
Figure 4.2: Total Number of Computer Science Programs

To create a cross-sectional time series of math S.A.T. ranges, I interpolated the 1965 data and the 1984 data, the 1984 and 1991 data, and the 1991 and 2000 data. I interpolated the data from a given pair of years using the following formula, where $N < i < M$ and $i, N, M$ are integers:

$$SAT_{year_i} = i \cdot \frac{(SAT_{year_N} + SAT_{year_M})}{N - M} + SAT_{year_N}.$$

There was missing data in the 1965 Manual of Freshman Class Profiles and the Annual College Board Surveys. Before I interpolated the data, I imputed S.A.T. math ranges using complete case analysis. The imputed value is the value predicted by regressing each year’s S.A.T. range on the subsequent year (later years tended to have more data). Each wave of S.A.T. percentile scores was used to predict missing values from the previous wave.
**Niche Density**: Density is defined to be the number of organizations that occupy a niche. I argued earlier that any with any measure of density, one must take into account that organizational niches do not completely overlap. If any organization increases the density in a niche, its contribution to the density must be weighted by the extent of niche overlap. The density measure for a single college is

\[
\text{Density}_{\text{College}_A} = \sum_{\text{Other Colleges}} \text{Overlap}_{A:B}^{\text{Geography}}
\]

The geography indicator variable is equal to one when both colleges are located in the same area and zero otherwise. Let \(\text{TopA/TopB} \) be the S.A.T. math score of the top 25%/bottom 25% of the entering freshman class at college A and \(\text{TopB/BotB} \) be the same scores for college B. The niche overlap weight, \(\text{Overlap}_{A/B} \), is defined using the following rule:

\[
\text{Overlap}_{A/B} = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{if } \text{TopA} < \text{TopB} \text{ and } \text{BotB} < \text{BotA}, \\
(TopB - BotB)/(TopA - BotA), & \text{if } \text{TopB} < \text{TopA} \text{ and } \text{BotA} < \text{BotB} \\
(TopB - BotA)/(TopA - BotA), & \text{if } \text{BotA} < \text{TopB} < \text{TopA} \text{ and } \text{BotB} < \text{BotA}, \\
(TopA - BotB)/(TopA - BotA), & \text{if } \text{BotA} < \text{BotB} < \text{TopA} \text{ and } \text{TopB} > \text{TopA} \\
0, & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]
These conditions correspond to the five possible ways that two continuous intervals can overlap: one interval can be contained in the other, one endpoint of an interval can lie in the other interval, or there is no overlap. Figure 4.3 shows the overall trend in the niche density measure from 1966 to 1998.

![Graph showing average niche density per year from 1966 to 1994.](image)

**Figure 4.3: Average Niche Density Per Year**

*Data on Graduating High School Seniors Who Intend to Enroll in a Computer Science Program:* Three surveys contained information on high school seniors’ intent to enroll in a Computer Science program: the National Longitudinal Study (NLS; 1972), the High School and Beyond Sophomore First Follow Up (HSB; 1982), and the National Educational Longitudinal Survey Second Follow Up (NELS; 1994). Each of these surveys asked a nationally representative sample of high school seniors if they intended
to major in Computer Science, their S.A.T. math score, and if they intended to attend a four-year college upon graduation. NLS, HSB, and NELS contained identical questions regarding intended college major and intention to enroll in a four-year college. Each survey included a probability sample weight, which was used in all relevant computations.

The proportion of college-bound high school seniors in the college’s region and math S.A.T. range reporting an intended Computer Science major is used as a measure of the size of the niche for a potential Computer Science program. I estimated student demand in the college’s niche in the years not covered by NELS, HSB, and NLS by interpolating the 1972, 1982, and 1994 data. The formula for interpolation is as follows: \( N < i < M \) are integers and \( D_X \) is the percentage of students in a university’s niche in year \( X \) who report that they intend to major in Computer Science:

\[
D_{\text{yearN+1}} = \frac{i}{N-M} (D_{\text{yearN}} + D_{\text{yearM}}) + D_{\text{yearN}}.
\]

Figure 4.4 shows the average estimated yearly percentage of graduating high school seniors in a college’s niche who express an intention to enroll in a Computer Science program.
Figure 4.4: Average Estimated Percentage of Graduating High School Freshmen in a College's Niche that Intends to Major in Computer Science.

Organizational Variables: All other data on colleges are taken from HEGIS/IPEDS, except for age, which is taken from the Higher Education Directory. The definition of all variables except % of degrees in engineering or physical sciences is discussed in chapter 2. The percentage of bachelor’s degrees awarded in engineering or physical sciences is simply the number of degrees in those fields as defined by the National Center for Education Statistics Directory of College Majors (Snyder 1997). Physical science includes chemistry, physics, astronomy, and related fields. Engineering
includes non-Computer Science fields such as electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, and industrial engineering.

**Descriptive Statistics:** Table 4.1. shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The table includes the mean, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum for each variable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College has a computer science program</td>
<td>32361</td>
<td>0.5405</td>
<td>0.4984</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of graduating college-bound seniors in niche who express intention to enroll in computer science program (%CS)</td>
<td>21183</td>
<td>0.0335</td>
<td>0.0123</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
<td>0.0601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>21183</td>
<td>38.362</td>
<td>31.855</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>442.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density x density</td>
<td>21183</td>
<td>2486.3</td>
<td>5906.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>196116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-enrollment</td>
<td>32361</td>
<td>7.8105</td>
<td>1.2471</td>
<td>1.3863</td>
<td>11.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>18673</td>
<td>97.602</td>
<td>44.388</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita endowment</td>
<td>32361</td>
<td>8.3157</td>
<td>87.372</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4735.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curricular diversity</td>
<td>32361</td>
<td>7.2504</td>
<td>3.5992</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of bachelor's degrees awarded in physical sciences (%Phy)</td>
<td>31537</td>
<td>0.0165</td>
<td>0.0224</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of bachelor's degrees awarded in engineering (%Eng)</td>
<td>31537</td>
<td>0.0264</td>
<td>0.0821</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>32361</td>
<td>0.0896</td>
<td>0.2855</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctoral</td>
<td>32361</td>
<td>0.0753</td>
<td>0.2639</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master's</td>
<td>32361</td>
<td>0.3731</td>
<td>0.4836</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>32361</td>
<td>0.3568</td>
<td>0.4791</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics**

**Methodology:** A Partial likelihood event history model was used to model the transition from zero to one in the dependent variable (Allison 1982; Yamaguchi 1990).

See chapter 2 for a description of this model:
\[ h(t) = h(0)e^{\sum b_k x_k}. \]

4.6. Results

Table 4.2 shows the results of estimating the effects of niche density and the proportion of graduating college-bound seniors in the college’s niche who intend to major in Computer Science. The data does not support hypothesis 1—the size of the niche as measured by the proportion of graduating college-bound seniors who intend to major in Computer Science has a positive effect, but it is not statistically significant at the \( \alpha = .05 \) level.

| Variable          | Coefficient | S.E. | z    | P<|z| | Cases | Events | Log-likelihood |
|-------------------|-------------|------|------|-----|------|--------|--------|----------------|
| Model 1           |             |      |      |     |      |        |        |                |
| % CS              | 5.026       | 8.569| 0.59 | 0.558 | 798  | 652    | -3986.28 |
| Model 2           |             |      |      |     |      |        |        |                |
| Niche density     | 0.001       | 0.001| 0.85 | 0.394 | 798  | 652    | -3986.07 |
| Model 3           |             |      |      |     |      |        |        |                |
| Niche density\(^2\) | 0.00000107  | 6.35E-06| 0.17 | 0.866 | 798  | 652    | -3986.42 |
| Model 4           |             |      |      |     |      |        |        |                |
| Niche density     | 0.003       | 0.002| 1.31 | 0.191 | 798  | 652    | -3985.63 |
| Niche density\(^2\) | -0.0000111 | 0.0000123| -0.9 | 0.367 |      |        |        |                |
| Model 5           |             |      |      |     |      |        |        |                |
| % CS              | 4.529       | 8.607| 0.53 | 0.599 | 798  | 652    | -3985.94 |
| Niche density     | 0.001       | 0.001| 0.82 | 0.411 |      |        |        |                |
| Model 6           |             |      |      |     |      |        |        |                |
| % CS              | 3.659       | 8.636| 0.42 | 0.672 | 798  | 652    | -3985.55 |
| Niche density     | 0.003       | 0.003| 1.25 | 0.213 |      |        |        |                |
| Niche density\(^2\) | -0.0000106 | 0.0000123| -0.86 | 0.391 |      |        |        |                |

Table 4.2: Effects of Demand for the Computer Science Major and Niche Density on the Creation of Computer Science Programs
The hazard rate effects are not large. The average value of the proportion of graduating college-bound seniors in the college's niche who intend to major in Computer Science is .0335. Using the coefficient in model 1, one multiplies the hazard rate by $1.183 = \exp(5.026 \times .0335)$. A similar computation for the estimated effect of niche density yields an effect on the hazard rate of $1.03 = \exp(.001 \times 38.362)$, which means that density decreases the probability that a university will open a Computer Science program by 18%. According to model 3, the effect on the hazard rate of niche$^2$ is $\exp(.00000107 \times 38.362^2)=1.0016$, mildly increasing the rate at which Computer Science programs are founded by less than 1%.

Is there an inverted U-shape niche effect predicted in hypothesis 2? Using differential calculus, one can calculate the inflection point of an estimated effect via the following formula:

$$-\frac{\beta_1}{2 \beta_2} = \text{Maximal Hazard Rate effect}.$$ 

Substituting the coefficients in model 4 into the formula yields an inflection point of Maximal Hazard Rate Effect = $-\left(.003/2x - .0000111\right) = 135.13$. Note that the maximum value of the niche density variable is 442.85 and the mean is 38.362. There is an inverted U-shaped effect according to model 3.

Table 4.3 shows the results of estimating the effects of a university's internal structure on the creation of Computer Science programs. The results are similar to those reported in chapter 2 for the creation of Black Studies programs. However, age does not have a significant effect when controlling for other structural variables. As in chapter 2,
per capita endowments have a negative effect, but they are not significant at the 

\( \alpha = .05 \) level.

| Variable                  | Coefficient | S.E. | z    | P<|z| | Cases | Events | Log-likelihood |
|---------------------------|-------------|------|------|-----|-------|--------|----------------|
| **Model 7**               |             |      |      |     |       |        |                |
| Log-enrollment            | 0.66        | 0.04 | 16.38| 0   | 1223  | 981    | -6213.02       |
| **Model 8**               |             |      |      |     |       |        |                |
| Age                       | 0.003       | 0.001| 2.75 | 0.006| 1223  | 981    | -6431.42       |
| **Model 9**               |             |      |      |     |       |        |                |
| Curricular diversity      | 0.166       | 0.011| 14.66| 0   | 1223  | 981    | -6306.82       |
| **Model 10**              |             |      |      |     |       |        |                |
| Per capita endowments     | -0.004      | 0.002| -1.65| 0.098| 1223  | 981    | -6431.88       |
| **Model 11**              |             |      |      |     |       |        |                |
| Log-enrollment            | 0.539       | 0.045| 12   | 0   | 1223  | 981    | -6195.19       |
| Age                       | 0.0001      | 0.001| -0.07| 0.948|       |        |                |
| Curricular diversity      | 0.072       | 0.014| 5.21 | 0   |       |        |                |
| Per capita endowments     | -0.004      | 0.003| -1.74| 0.082|       |        |                |

Table 4.3: Effects of University Enrollments, Age, Per Capita Endowments, and Number of Programs on the Creation of Computer Science Programs

The next table shows the effects of the proportion of bachelor's degrees awarded in either the physical sciences or engineering. The bivariate analysis here does not support the theory that engineers or physical scientists delayed the creation of Computer Science programs. The evidence presented in Table 4.4 shows the opposite—that large programs in engineering and the physical sciences promote the creation of Computer Science programs. This finding might be interpreted as simply saying that universities
with some scientific orientation are more likely to start a Computer Science program than those that do not have science programs. It is also worth noting that the effect of physical science enrollments is higher than engineering enrollments.

| Model 12 | Variable | Coefficient | S.E. | z     | P<|z| | Cases | Events | Log-likelihood |
|----------|----------|-------------|------|-------|------|-------|--------|----------------|
| % Eng    | 1.467    | 0.615       | 2.39 | 0.017 | 1216 | 981   | -6386.78 |
| Model 13 | % Phy    | 2.542       | 0.903| 2.82  | 0.005| 1216 | 981   | -6390.8 |
| Model 14 | % Eng    | 1.408       | 0.603| 2.33  | 0.02 | 1216 | 981   | -6384.66 |
|          | % Phy    | 2.242       | 0.909| 2.46  | 0.014| 1216 | 981   | -6384.66 |

Table 4.4: Effects of the Proportion of Bachelor’s Degrees Awarded in Physical Sciences on the Creation of Computer Science Programs

Table 4.5 shows the estimated effects of all variables, including control variables, on the creation of Computer Science programs. The effects in the saturated model are similar to those in the bivariate analyses, but the effects of many variables decreased. For example, the effect of the percentage of bachelor’s degrees awarded in physical sciences decreased from 2.542 in model 13 to 1.825, a reduction of 28%. The effect of the percentage of bachelor’s degrees awarded in engineering decreased less, from 1.408 in model 14 to 1.258 in model 15, a decrease of 10%.

The effects of the scientific orientation of a school, as measured by the proportion of bachelor’s degrees offered in physical sciences and engineering, were reduced with the
inclusion of structural and ecological variables. In model 15, the engineering
enrollment effect was significant at the $\alpha = .05$ level and the physical science enrollment
effect was

| Variable                | Coefficient | S.E.  | z    | $P<|z|$ | Cases | Events | Log-likelihood |
|-------------------------|-------------|-------|------|---------|-------|--------|----------------|
| Model 15                |             |       |      |         |       |        |                |
| % CS                    | 17.619      | 9.343 | 1.89 | 0.059   | 794   | 652    | -3835.42       |
| Niche density           | 0.00700     | 0.00300 | 2.24 | 0.03    |       |        |                |
| Niche density2          | -0.00003    | 0.00001 | -1.96 | 0.05    |       |        |                |
| % Eng                   | 1.258       | 0.617 | 2.040| 0.042   |       |        |                |
| % Phy                   | 1.825       | 1.020 | 1.790| 0.073   |       |        |                |
| Log-enrollment          | 0.681       | 0.082 | 8.290| 0.000   |       |        |                |
| Age                     | -0.001      | 0.001 | -0.84| 0.401   |       |        |                |
| Per capita endowment    | -0.002      | 0.003 | -0.7 | 0.486   |       |        |                |
| Curricular diversity    | 0.05        | 0.018 | 2.73 | 0.006   |       |        |                |
| Research                | -0.2        | 0.376 | -0.53| 0.595   |       |        |                |
| Doctoral                | -0.119      | 0.219 | -0.54| 0.588   |       |        |                |
| Master’s                | 0.101       | 0.109 | 0.93 | 0.352   |       |        |                |
| Public                  | -0.404      | 0.115 | -3.51| 0       |       |        |                |

Table 4.5: Estimated Effects of Demand, Niche Density, Engineering and
Physical Science Enrollments, Internal Structure, and Control Variables on
Creation of Computer Science Programs

not significant at the $\alpha = .05$ level. This suggests that organizational structure accounted
for some of the effect of enrollments in pure and applied sciences. Schools with many of
their students enrolled in these majors must provide facilities such as laboratories and
extensive classroom space. Such organizations will probably be larger. Of course, the
direction of the effect is not entirely clear: small schools could increase their size by
adding science programs and attracting more students, or large schools could respond to
student demands for scientific training by creating new courses of study.
The overall picture suggested by Table 4.5 is one in which density and some measures of internal structure affect Computer Science program creation. Surprisingly, the effect of demand for the Computer Science major among college-bound high school seniors is not significant at the $\alpha = .05$ level. The two structural variables that have significant effects at the $\alpha = .05$ level are log-enrollment and curricular diversity, suggesting that size and internal complexity contribute to change. The results do not support the hypothesis that age negatively correlates with structural change as measured by academic program creation. The control variables did not have significant effects, except for being a public university, which had a negative effect. The negative effect of public ownership suggests that public universities have more difficulty mobilizing resources for new kinds of science.

4.7. Summary and Conclusion

This chapter tests hypotheses about the creation of Computer Science programs as a response to resource competition. I find support for the niche density hypothesis. Competition over resources has a negative quadratic effect on the creation of Computer Science programs. The proportion of high school seniors in the college's niche who express an intention to major in Computer Science has a positive effect on the creation of Computer Science programs, but it is not significant at the $\alpha = .05$ level. The data supported some of the hypotheses about internal structure. Age does not have significant effects and neither do endowments, but size and curricular diversity have positive and significant effects.
The results reported in this chapter suggest that environmental and structural processes both contribute to the proliferation of Computer Science programs. The inclusion of ecological variables does not eliminate the statistical significance of structural variables. The finding that a university’s scientific orientation has positive and statistically significant effects on the creation of Computer Science programs illustrates the usefulness of considering how internal constituencies might resist or support structural change in an organization.
Chapter 5

Conclusion and Directions for Future Research

5.1. Summary of the Empirical Results and Commentary

This dissertation contributes to organizational analysis by testing environmentalist and structuralist hypotheses about organizational change with statistical and historical data on the growth of academic programs in universities. Environmentalist theories, such as neoinstitutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 2000; Clemens and Cook 1998) and population ecology (Hannan and Freeman 1978, 1989; Carrol and Hannan 2000), focus on the political and economic contexts of an organization’s behavior. Structuralist theories (Weber 1947; Chandler 1955; Blau and Schoenherr 1973) focus on internal features of an organization, such as resources, the division of labor, and political constituencies. Each of the three studies in this dissertation tests hypotheses about the effects of political or economic events on the creation of academic programs and the role that internal politics and resources have in delaying or facilitating the establishment of new programs.

Chapter 2 tested hypotheses about the effects of disruptive social movement tactics on the creation of Black Studies programs. I tested the hypothesis that campus unrest has a positive effect on the creation of Black Studies programs. Campus unrest in the 1960s, as measured by the number of reported protest events in 1968, has positive and significant effects, when controlling for other measures of the university’s environment and internal structure. Once campus protest and other variables were
analysis, I found no significant effects for the yearly number of black protest events in the university’s state. These two results suggest that demands for Black Studies programs might have been motivated and framed by black insurgency, but campus protest was probably the mechanism leading to new Black Studies programs.

Neoinstitutionalist theory suggests that organizations engage in mimicry (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Haveman 1993a, 1993b), suggesting that an increase in the number of Black Studies programs will have a positive effect on the probability that more Black Studies programs will be created. I found mixed evidence for this hypothesis. Some authors describe an increasing legitimacy for Black Studies, leading to program growth (see chapter 2, section 2). The data analyzed in chapter 2 do not support the hypothesis that program creations in a state lead to more programs, while program creations in a Carnegie category have a significant effect on the number of future creations in the Carnegie category. However, Black Studies’ legitimacy as an academic field may have had some benefits for Black Studies programs. For example, legitimacy may prevent programs from being disbanded and allow program directors to acquire more resources for their program, an opinion held by some scholars (McKay 1990). The field’s legitimacy might also attract more able scholars and administrators who can bring stability to a program. Future research can examine these other hypotheses.

The fourth chapter tested hypotheses about the effect of the university’s economic environment on the creation of computer science programs. Drawing from population ecology theory, I hypothesized that intercollegiate competition over prospective students negatively affects the creation of computer science programs. To test this hypothesis, I constructed a measure of a university’s competitive environment based on the proportion
of graduating college-bound high school seniors who expressed an intention to enroll in a computer science major and the number of universities already having computer science programs competing for these students. I found that this measure of competition—called “niche density”—had an inverted U-shaped effect on the creation of computer science programs, as predicted by population ecology theory. The effect was significant at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Interpreting the creation of a new academic program, such as computer science, as an attempt to acquire more resources for the university, the results of chapter 4 support an ecological theory of market entry: universities will enter a new market when competition is low, but high competition deters market entry.

Chapters 2 and 4 found significant and positive size effects but nonsignificant age effects. University size was statistically significant, even when other structural and environmental variables were included in the analysis. Positive size effects have been found by other researchers investigating structural change in universities. For example, Blau (1973) reports positive effects of size on the creation of academic programs. Blau uses a slightly different dependent variable: the number of programs created in the previous five years. He uses ordinary least squares to estimate the effects of size, as measured by enrollments in 1968, on the number of programs created in the years 1963–1968 as reported by university administrators. Other studies finding positive effects of size on academic program creation are Woods (1977) and Zajaac and Kraatz (1996).

Blau finds significant age effects on the number of programs created in the years 1963–1968. Chapters 2 and 4 did not find significant age effects after controlling for other variables, although age did have significant negative effects in some of the bivariate Cox regressions. Why the discrepancy? One reason might be that Blau’s analysis
included a different set of covariates. The analyses presented in chapters 2 and 4 included variables that might account for age effects. For example, one might hypothesize that older universities have more alumni, more patents, and other sources of income contributing to endowments. Blau included variables that were not obviously related to age, such as length of the president’s tenure and total revenues spent on books.

Chapters 2 and 4 also tested hypotheses about the effects of internal constituencies on the creation of academic programs. The percentage of enrolled students who are black has an inverted U-shaped effect on the creation of Black Studies programs, with the largest effect when approximately 50% of the students are black. This finding supports the hypothesis that the creation of Black Studies programs correlates with campus conflict; a mixture of black and nonblack students has a stronger effect on Black Studies program creation than mostly black or nonblack campuses.

Chapter 4 hypothesized that engineers might have delayed the creation of computer science programs because they did not recognize computer science as a legitimate academic discipline early in the history of computer science. I tested this hypothesis by estimating the effect of engineering enrollments, a proxy for the scientific orientation of the college, on the creation of computer science programs. The data shows the opposite—engineering enrollments have positive effects, indicating that universities with technical orientations are more likely to open computer science programs. Why the difference between the historical accounts and the quantitative analysis? One reason might be that the conflict over computer science’s legitimacy occurred before the diffusion of computer science programs. More subtly, conflict occurs only at institutions with the capability to support a computer science program, which would be those schools
with engineering programs. From this perspective, the establishment of a computer science program ought to correlate with conflict over the status of computer science as a discipline.

Chapter 3 presented historical evidence concerning the Ford Foundation’s sponsorship of Black Studies in the early 1970s. The documentary evidence suggests that Foundation officers wished to influence the Black Studies field through sponsorship of highly visible programs embodying the “interdisciplinary” approach to Black Studies, which emphasized social science and humanities approaches to the study of the black community. The history of the Ford Foundation’s involvement in Black Studies shows how Foundation officers promoted this interdisciplinary model through sponsorship of programs at elite universities and historically black colleges. Foundation officers tended to select those programs rejecting black nationalism and rejected grant requests from all student groups.

Although the Foundation gave approximately $7 million to various Black Studies programs in the 1970s, the interdisciplinary model met some resistance. Responses from grantees, from full implementation of interdisciplinary Black Studies to outright rejection and embrace of “black conscious” research, demonstrate the ways in which prestigious actors can fail to transmit values to others. Ideological conflict and the development of competing organizational models can interfere with the widespread acceptance of a model sponsored by a high-prestige actor such as the Ford Foundation. Specifically, Black Power provided an alternative legitimating framework for Black Studies programs, and its popularity among some academics interfered with the establishment of interdisciplinary Black Studies at some universities. The historical research on the Ford
Foundation and its grantees in the Black Studies field illustrates how the ideological context of an organizational model—the interdisciplinary Black Studies program in the era of Black Power—can affect how it is received within organizations. Sponsorship of a model by elite persons is no guarantee that the model will be fully accepted by individuals within the target organizations.

### 5.2. Theoretical Implications: Movements and Bureaucracies

Ever since Arthur Stinchcombe (1965) wrote that social structure “imprints” an organization, sociologists have tried to understand the transmission of norms from the political or economic environment to an organization. Current research on organizational innovation often draws from Stinchcombe’s “environmental printing” idea, and this dissertation complements these approaches to institutional change by focusing on internal responses—such as structural change—to external processes. Fligstein (1990), for example, sees new organizational forms, such as a Black Studies program, as a consequence of “periods of crisis,” in which existing forms delegitimize, allowing political entrepreneurs to modify existing organizations and create new forms. As in Stinchcombe’s writings, as well as those of other institutionalists (see the review in chapter 1), structure follows environment. Recognizing that periods of crisis may indeed be the time when innovation occurs, this dissertation adds the argument that what transpires inside an organization affects an organization’s response to crisis and other external events.

The results of chapters 2 and 3 can be used to outline a theory of how social movements interact with organizations in such periods of crisis. First, political
entrepreneurs formulate a problem solvable through contentious behavior. As McAdam (1992), Snow and Cressey (2002), and others describe, and as Morris and Staggenborg (2002) elaborate, social movement leaders define goals for a movement and persuade recruits that a given political order is unfair or unjust. The political problem is defined so that participants believe that confrontation with the government, or willful violation of existing rules of conduct, can lead to change. For Black Studies, student activists promoted the idea that college curricula ignored African-American history or that the curricula ignored the experiences of Black Studies (see review in chapters 2 and 3). This state of affairs could be resolved through protest and demands for new kinds of courses—Black Studies courses.

A second process is the use of disruptive tactics by a social movement. As discussed in chapter 2, disruptive tactics might contribute to movement success by attracting attention to the movement and its demands and by imposing costs on political incumbents. Chapter 2’s results suggest that it was not enough that a university was located in a state with black insurgency. Chapter 2 did find that campus protest has a significant effect on Black Studies program creation. This concurs with other research finding that disruptive tactics correlate with concessions made by the date (see chapter 2, section 3). Other researchers have found that governments responded to black riots and disruptive tactics by expanding voting rights (McAdam 1982) and increasing social support, such as payments through programs like Aid to Families with Dependent Children and similar programs (Piven and Cloward 1971, 1993; Chamlin 1992; Isaac and Kelly 1981; Durman 1973; Welch 1975). In addition to change brought about by protest, there is also the possibility that organizations might copy each other—the mimicry
hypothesis. Chapter 2 found mixed evidence for this hypothesis, but mimicry effects might be stronger for other examples of movement-induced organizational change.

Once some organizations respond to a social movement by changing their internal structure, then elites outside the organization attempt to define the new organizational form. In the case of Black Studies, philanthropists understood that Black Studies could be defined in many ways: as an extension of existing disciplines, as a new field with its own methods and theories, or as an institutional space where scholars with similar research interests could meet.

The evidence presented in chapter 3 suggests that elites were very important for the growth of Black Studies programs, and elite sponsorship became a focus of conflict in the field. Ford Foundation officers provided operating funds when university administrations were unwilling or unable to do so, and the Foundation favored programs with an interdisciplinary orientation. Some black intellectuals came to criticize this approach to funding Black Studies. The visible support of one version of Black Studies became a point of contention over the meaning and goals of Black Studies. Conflicts over organizational change can then create division within organizational fields. The specific combination of internal politics, resources, and political context can pull organizations in different directions. In the case of Black Studies, conflicts over nationalist Black Studies were reflected in the fact that some universities came to have programs in which nationalism was represented in the curriculum, while other universities retained an interdisciplinary curriculum.

The consequences of moving toward a nationalist model of Black Studies are unclear. Some organizations associated with nationalist Black Studies, such as the
Institute for the Black World (chapter 3, section 10), closed. According to its founder, “urban explosions” provided a legitimating framework for the Institute’s activities that allowed it to acquire funding. Once urban unrest ended, the Institute found it difficult to acquire funds. Even academic programs inside universities could face legitimacy problems by adopting a nationalist perspective. Vanderbilt’s program moved toward what might be described as a more nationalist program, and the program chair reported having difficulties because administrators perceived the curriculum as too radical.

Taken together, chapters 2 and 3 suggest an approach to studying organizational change as a social movement outcome emphasizing opportunities created by contentious political behavior. In the evolution of Black Studies, the wave of student protest in the 1960s made Black Studies programs possible. As discussed in chapter 3, section 2, scholarship on the black community had existed for decades but there were few, if any, organizations offering degrees in the field. Once colleges were desegregated and Black Power emerged as a framework for black student politics, student protesters could successfully organize for new academic programs. Once a few were established, academic and political elites had the opportunity to influence the new programs through grant making or through advocacy of nationalist Black Studies. Both processes, the response to protest and the transmission of norms and values from elites to organizations, are mitigated by internal organizational politics and resources.

5.3. Directions for Future Research

This dissertation leaves many questions unanswered about the bureaucratic
response to social movements and about ecological theory. Unanswered questions include:

*How does organizational change initiated by a social movement fare in the long run?* All of the evidence presented in chapters 2 and 3 concerned relatively short-term outcomes, such as the establishment of a program and a program’s response to elite-sponsored models. A question now being addressed in literature is institutionalization, or the process by which organizational change becomes permanent. What allows a Black Studies program to survive and acquire financial and political resources? An answer to this question might require extensive case studies of individual programs, and some answers have been suggested by Small (1999), Frye (1976), Cunningham (1990), and others.

*What is the role of social networks in the diffusion and survival of academic programs?* This dissertation employs the theoretical framework defined by the structure/environment debate in the sociology of organizations. However, some scholars suggest that organizational boundaries are poorly defined and that organizational theory can be enriched by considering the ties that cut across organizational boundaries (Powell 1990; Haveman 2000). For example, what exactly was it about San Francisco State’s administration that made it susceptible to being influenced by black student protesters? What ties between administrators and students facilitated the program’s creation? Are universities at the center of networks of student activists more likely to have Black Studies programs? The introduction of network theory could also help explain the diffusion of computer science programs. Did universities with administrators involved in certain networks have a higher rate of adopting a new program? What “invisible
colleges” in operations research or electrical engineering formed the core of the academic computing discipline?

*How do the theories and hypotheses tested in this dissertation fare in non-American contexts?* American institutions of higher education are not governed by a ministry of education or other central authority (Clark 1982; Ben-David 1972). Aside from satisfying accreditation requirements, American universities are free to offer any curriculum. Government ministries in Europe and elsewhere exert more control over universities. In some university systems, government ministries approve new courses of study and research units. The presence of state authority over higher education suggests that state coercion might play an important role in the establishment of academic programs outside the United States. Future research could test hypotheses about how universities in centralized systems respond to protest and rising demands for vocational training.
Appendix: Interview Instruments for Ford Foundation officers and Black Studies Program Chairs

Chapter 3 presents excerpts from interviews conducted with retired Ford Foundation program officers and former chairs of Black Studies programs. The purpose of these interviews is to augment the documentary record. Retired Ford Foundation officers were asked about the motivation behind the awarding of grants to Black Studies programs. Black Studies chairs were asked how they came to head their program and why they requested Foundation support. They were also asked if they felt the Foundation support improved the legitimacy of their program. Interviews were semistructured; respondents were allowed to add whatever additional information they deemed appropriate. Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed by me. This appendix presents the interview instruments.

A.1: The Ford Foundation and Black Studies—Questions for Program Officers

Instructions: I would be grateful if you could answer these questions about Black Studies and the Ford Foundation.

1. Could you briefly describe your association with the Ford Foundation? How did you come to work for the Ford Foundation?

2. Were you involved in administering grants or did you work at the executive level?
3. What kind of work were you doing when Black Studies emerged on college campuses in the late 1960s?

4. What role did you have in awarding, administering, or evaluating grants to Black Studies programs?

5. When Black Studies programs were founded in the late 1960s, many critics thought that they were fads or were destined for failure. Did you agree or disagree with these criticisms?

6. What did program officers or other Ford administrators think about the status of Black Studies as an academic discipline?

7. How did Ford Foundation officers, such as yourself, evaluate the uncertain status of the field?

8. Who were the strongest advocates of Black Studies within the Foundation?

9. Were there significant differences in support for Black Studies between program officers and executives such as Harold Howe II and McGeorge Bundy? If so, could you say a few words about these differences?
10. What criteria did program officers and administrators use in awarding grants to Black Studies programs?

11. How did program officers choose programs to fund? Did Foundation officers develop new criteria specific to Black Studies or did they use preexisting criteria developed for other projects? If the latter is true, what projects provided models for the selection of Black Studies grants?

12. How did the awards to Black Studies programs fit in with the larger goals of the Ford Foundation?

13. One goal of the Foundation was to promote the status of minorities in higher education. Were the grants to Black Studies programs considered a part of that project? How did the grants fit in with other Ford Foundation projects?

14. What criteria were used in evaluating the success of a grant? If possible, could you describe a grant that was considered successful and one that was problematic?

*A.2: The Ford Foundation and Black Studies—Questions for Black Studies Program Chairs*

Instructions: I would be grateful if you could answer these questions about Black Studies and the Ford Foundation.
1. Could you briefly describe your educational background?

2. Could you discuss how you became the chair of the Black Studies program at ____?

3. Were you involved in the submission of a grant application to the Ford Foundation? If so, why did you choose to submit a grant to the Ford Foundation?

4. Why did you think the Ford Foundation chose to fund your program?

5. Did Foundation funding help legitimize your program within the university?

6. Did Foundation funding draw attention to your program from outside the university?

7. Were there any other responses to the Foundation’s sponsorship of your program?

8. Did Foundation funding help the program survive its early years? How so?

9. Do you have any other comments on the Foundation’s sponsorship of your program?
References


DiMaggio, Paul J. 1991. "Constructing an Organizational Field as a Professional Project:


